Negotiating the State:
The Development of Social Organizations in China*

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One notable feature of the reform program sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been the expansion of social organizations. With greater social space created by the reforms and with the state unable or unwilling to carry the same wide range of services and functions as before, social organizations with varying degrees of autonomy from the party-state structures have been set up. They have been allowed or have created an increased organizational sphere and social space in which to operate, and to represent social interests, and to convey those interests into the policy-making process. They not only liaise between state and society but also fulfill vital welfare functions that would otherwise go unserved.

Most analyses of the resultant state-society relationship have concentrated on the capacity of party and state organizations to organize and compartmentalize society to frustrate genuine organizational pluralism. The focus has been on top-down control and the binding of organizations into various forms of state patronage. Thus, many analysts have eschewed the idea of an extant civil society in China, although some point to its possible emergence, and instead have provided various tunes on the theme of corporatism to explain state-society relations. This line of analysis seeks to explain how the pluralizing socio-economic changes induced by market reforms co-exist with the continued dominance of the party-state. The opening-up of social space can be examined while explaining continued party-state control through indirect mechanisms of coordination and co-optation.

However, exclusive focus on "state-dominant" theories, and even the more "society-informed" concepts of social corporatism or a state-led civil society, risk obscuring the dynamics of change in China and the capacity of the "co-opted groups" to influence the policy-making process or to pursue the interests of their members. First, while the state appears to exert extensive formal control, its capacity to realize this control is increasingly limited. There is a significant gap between rhetoric and practice and between the expressed intent of the party-state authorities, a system that is itself deeply conflicted, and what can actually be enforced for any significant period of time throughout the entire country. Second, such a focus can neglect the benefits the "subordinate" organizations and their members derive from the institutional arrangements. The interrelationships are symbiotic rather than unidirectional. Third, these relationships are symbiotic because social organizations have devised strategies to negotiate with the state a relationship that maximizes their members’ interests or that circumvents or deflects state intrusion. A study of the social organization sector sheds light on these aspects and the complex interplay between the party-state and society. Structures and regulations exist to bind these organizations to state patronage and control their activities. However, social practice reveals a pattern of negotiation that minimizes state penetration and allows such organizations to reconfigure the relationship with the state in more beneficial terms that can allow for policy input or pursuit of members’ interests and organizational goals. This article first reviews the state’s strategy for a traditional Leninist reordering of the sector, second the strategies of negotiation, evasion, or feigned compliance of the social organizations, and concludes with some comments on the nature of state-society relations in contemporary China.
Leninist Strategies for Control

The social organizations that have been established run across the whole spectrum from the China Family Planning Association, which was set up by the government Family Planning Commission to receive foreign donor funding to a group such as Friends of Nature that operates as freely as one can in the field of environmental education. Naturally, the further one moves along the spectrum of party-state sponsorship towards autonomy, the more vulnerable the group is in terms of administrative interference and potential shutdown.

In October 1993, China Daily estimated that there was some 1,500 autonomous organizations operating at the national level and 180,000 locally. By the end of 1996, official statistics from the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed that 186,666 social organizations were registered nationwide, of which 1,845 were national-level organizations. The provinces of Guangdong and Yunnan boasted some 10,000 registered social organizations each, Shanghai over 7,000. A more expansive definition that would included all kinds of citizen-run organizations and economic associations produces a figure of around one million. This article is concerned with the smaller group of organizations.

While there is an increasing acceptance of the social organization sector and its further development, senior CCP leaders have made it clear that this is no free-for-all for society to organize itself to articulate its interests. Rather they prefer that the sector be developed within a highly restrictive legislative and organizational framework that ensures CCP and state control. The reasons for this are two-fold: the party’s Leninist organizational predisposition and the current phase of reforms that will shrink the role of the state in people’s lives even further.

Since the 1980s the state has tried to influence key groups in society by binding them into organizations that become dependent on patronage. To head off potential mass opposition, the state will attempt to extend its organization, co-ordination, and supervision of as much of the population as possible. This is evident in the strategies for control over the social organizations. This move by the state from insulation from society to integration within it can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent a plurality of definitions arising by revising the structure of the regime and the state’s relationship to society. In this sense, the state moves to accommodate the increasingly wide range of articulate audiences to thwart or limit the possibility of political-ideological definitions arising. However, it imports varied social interests into the state and, of course, the party. It opens up the party and state to greater influence from society than before and imports fault-lines of conflict in society into the state and party.

The natural Leninist tendency to thwart organizational plurality is compounded by the fear of potential for social unrest and the opposition that the reforms have created. There has been a consistent fear that social organizations might become covers for groups engaging in political activities or to represent the interests of disgruntled workers and/or peasants. The phenomenon of Solidarity in Poland remains a very powerful image to
many of China’s leaders as they grapple with the far-reaching economic reforms. The political changes in the region following the Asian financial crisis have also unsettled China’s leaders. They have seen a number of authoritarian regimes challenged by street demonstrations and challenges from society to hold leaders more accountable. In particular, the fall of Suharto in Indonesia caused concern and the Chinese media was instructed to play down coverage of the events. They fear that developments elsewhere in Asia might lead to internal questioning about the wisdom of a development strategy that relies on market forces in the economy combined with centralized political power structures. In China, a number of underground workers’ groups have sprung up with names such as the "Anti-hunger League" and the "Anti-Unemployment Group." Strikes, go-slows, sit-ins, and rural unrest have become a feature of daily life. The authorities have become concerned that some have used the laxity of implementation and the vagueness of previous legislation for social organizations to register as sporting or cultural events to escape detection and some officially registered groups are said to have linked with dissident and underground religious movements.

The reforms outlined at the 15th Party Congress (September 1997) and the Ninth National People’s Congress (March 1998), if fully implemented, would reduce further the intrusive role of the state and sponsor far greater social differentiation. In their totality, the policies would amount to a "revolution" in the relationship between state and society in terms of taking the former out of crucial areas of the life of the latter. With individuals increasingly responsible for finding their own work and housing, taking more individual responsibility for social security and pensions, and becoming consumers in an increasingly marketized economy, it is inevitable that they will wish to have a greater political voice, accountability over officialdom, and develop new organizations to fulfill their desires and objectives.

Essentially the CCP is left with a fundamental dilemma. Continued rapid economic growth is deemed vital to party survival but this will entail further layoffs, down-sizing of the government bureaucracy and the shedding of more government functions. This creates the need to expand the social organization sector to take on these functions on behalf of society or the likelihood of social instability and unrest will increase. At the same time, however, the party’s Leninist pre-disposition makes it wary, at best, and hostile, at worst, to any organization that functions outside of its direct or indirect control. The necessity of the further development of social organizations was recognized by both CCP General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, and by newly installed Premier, Zhu Rongji, at the Party and State Congresses. In his speech to the 15th Party Congress, Jiang stressed the need to "cultivate and develop" what he termed "social intermediary organizations" as the reform program proceeded. Jiang recognized that the key to unlocking the problem of state enterprise reform is the provision of adequate social security coverage, especially for pensions, and restructuring medical and unemployment insurance. The shift of these burdens away from state run enterprises would inevitably require an expansion on the social organization sector.

The plan for restructuring the State Council that was passed at the First Session of the Ninth Congress stated that many functions appropriated by government organs be given
back to society and handled by new social intermediary organizations. The plan mentioned several times the important role that such organizations could play. In introducing the plan, Luo Gan, State Councilor and secretary general of the State Council, complained that many problems that should have been dealt with by "legal means or through social intermediary organizations" had been taken on by government. Luo stated that "government has taken up the management of many affairs which it should not have managed, is not in a position to manage, or actually cannot manage well." This overload detracted from the government’s capacity to carry out its work effectively. As a result, Luo called for "social intermediary organizations" to be expanded. In this process, the responsibilities of these organizations were to be defined clearly along with those of government institutions and enterprises.

This recognition of the need for expansion of the sector brought back to the fore the necessity to tighten regulation. As a result, officials were instructed to push ahead with completing the drafting of the regulations as a priority and the State Council approved them in September 1998. This took many observers by surprise as severe differences of opinion about the level of control by the state over social organizations had held up the drafting process. The lack of progress had also been hampered by the fact that non-economic legislation is not usually accorded high priority in the legislative process.

The 1998 "Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations" provide a clear example of the attempt to incorporate social organizations more closely with existing party-state structures. There are several key features of the legislation that are important for a traditional Leninist reordering of the social organization sector. First, all social organizations must find a professional management unit (yewu zhuguan danwei) that will act as the sponsor, and is usually referred to as the sponsoring unit (guakao danwei) or "mother-in-law" in Chinese. After finding the sponsor and gaining its approval, the paperwork for the social organization is sent to the Ministry of Civil Affairs or its relevant department (referred to in the Regulations as the registration management agency, dengji guanli jiguan). This sets up a two-tier registration system where affiliation precedes registration. In comparison with the 1989 provisional regulations, the Regulations have for the first time specified the role of the sponsoring institution and have also raised the requirements, time and steps necessary for registration. The fact that the 1989 regulations did not outline the details of the duties of the sponsor meant that many social organizations operated in practice with no or minimal interference from the sponsor. The sponsor is expected to examine whether the social organization corresponds to an actual need and will not overlap with other organizations and that its members have the capacity to run the organization. In addition, the sponsor should ensure that the social organization abides by the law and the sponsor is held responsible for the actions of the social organization. Prior to the application to begin preparatory work, the sponsor is responsible for all reviews of the work and it is the responsibility of the sponsor to apply to the relevant department of the Ministry of Civil Affairs for registering the social organization to carry out preparatory work (Articles 9, 10, and 28).

If rejected at any stage, there is no right of appeal and it remains unclear that if a potential sponsor rejects an application, the social organization is free to look for another
sponsoring organization. However, in practice, rejection by one organ makes it very difficult to seek approval from another. For example, in the social sciences only the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences may register organizations. However, the academy has been swamped with applicants and does not have the time to review them properly. This leads to insiders having the best chance of registration, while many others will be rejected. Once rejected by the academy it is virtually impossible to find another sponsoring organization. This is what happened to the Chinese Union of Economic Societies that was rejected by the academy for, essentially, reasons of internal academy politics. Each subsequent sponsor it approached rejected it on the grounds that the academy was entrusted to sponsor organizations in the field of social sciences. As a result, the "Union" carried on its activities on an informal basis.

This need for a sponsoring organization and its role was the key bone of contention in the drafting of the new Regulations. Reformers have proposed eliminating the sponsoring agency and simply requiring registration with the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Those who wish to loosen controls have used utilitarian arguments to gain support across the various ministries. They have argued that the sponsorship system forms a burden that costs much time, cannot be maintained properly, and probably would only detect a problem after an organization was found by the police or security authorities to have stepped out of line. They have argued quite simply that the sponsors do not have the capacity to deal with the obligations. This kind of argumentation was persuasive to many ministries and potential sponsor agencies. As a result, an earlier draft that was submitted to the State Council for review abolished the need for the sponsoring organization proposing that social organizations just register with the relevant department of the Ministry of Civil Affairs directly. However, powerful figures such as Luo Gan, now Secretary General of the State Council and a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, were opposed to any relaxation of controls. On seeing the draft, Luo is said to have become very angry and declared that the purpose of the new Regulations was to tighten not loosen control over social organizations.

A number of social organizations are concerned that the net effect of this aspect of the Regulations will cause sponsors to turn down prospective social organizations and thus will result in a decline of the total number. In fact, this seems to be official intention. At a November work meeting convened to discuss ways to strengthen control and management of the sector, State Councilor, Ismail Amat stressed the need to pay attention to the quality of registered NGOs. Wu Rongze, who as head of the newly created Bureau for the Management of Non Government-Managed Organizations (minjian zuzhi guanliju) oversaw the drafting of the Regulations, when questioned on this issue, stated that official intention was indeed fewer but better.

Secondly, "similar" organizations are not allowed to co-exist at the various administrative levels. Thus, there cannot be two national calligraphy associations or two national charity federations. This helps to control representation to a smaller number of manageable units and has been used to deny registration for some groups. It ensures that the "mass organizations" such as the All China Women’s Federation and the All China Federation of Trade Unions enjoy monopoly representation and cannot be challenged by
independent groups seeking to represent the interests of women and workers. Conversely, some groups have rejected taking on such a monopoly of representation. For example, Liang Congjie and his Friends of Nature group after waiting 10 months on their request for registration received a reply from the National Environment Protection Agency that it could only register if it would take on the responsibility for representing the interests of all the Chinese people sharing environmental concerns. Liang felt this too ambitious a goal and declined. He registered instead as a secondary organization in 1994 with the Academy of Chinese Culture where he is a Professor and vice-president. It was established as a national level membership group.

Third, social organizations must register with the appropriate civil affairs department from the county-level upwards. This makes it impossible for local groups to enroll members from different areas, thus limiting the potential for the spread of grass-roots organizations that could develop national or horizontal representation. Thus, the China Charities Federation, the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ own “social organization” for welfare has 59 local charity organizations as its institutional members but all are registered separately at the respective governmental levels.

The Regulations expressly prohibit national organizations from establishing any kind of regional branch (Article 19). Also, organization names are to reflect the activities and nature of the organization. Names that include China (Zhongguo or Zhonghua) or All China (Quanguo) can only be approved in accordance with state regulations while under no circumstances can a locally registered social organization use such names (Article 10).

The total intent of this legislation is clear, it is to mimic the compartmentalization of government departments and limit horizontal linkage. This favors those groups with close government ties and discourages bottom-up initiatives. It keeps people with different opinions on the same issue from setting up “opposing” interest groups. Other aspects of the regulations further hamper bottom-up initiatives or those by the disadvantaged and poorer sectors of society. The need to have substantial assets and the paperwork necessary to register will make it difficult for those groups that lack good connections and a relatively sophisticated organizational apparatus.

In addition to the application of the regulations, the state has other means beyond co-optation to attempt control. For groups the state sees as a threat or does not wish to see develop further it has adopted a number of tactics beyond co-optation. The first is outright repression and declaring the group illegal. This has been the case for a number of religious groups and those that appear to have a more political intent. The December 1998 arrest and sentencing of key leaders who tried to register the China Democratic Party are just the most recent example. However, groups closed down do not have to be only those engaged in political activities or establishing independent labor organizations. Over the years a number of organizations providing social welfare to groups not officially recognized as having needs have been shut down. For example, in 1993 a discussion club for homosexual men was shut down when its coordinator, Wang Yan, lost his job at the Ministry of Health. He was sacked for allegedly “advocating homosexuality and human rights” and the closure of the discussion group reflects official hostility to the issue of
homosexuality in China. Decisions can be very idiosyncratic. In 1996, the first home for battered women that had been set up in Shanghai was closed down. One of the prime reasons was that it was improper for an individual to run such an institution rather than the government. The shelter had been set up with funding from a local businessman as an undertaking of his business enterprise. This shows the ambivalence of authorities to the role of both individuals and business in social welfare undertakings.

In addition, a Public Security Bureau Circular from the beginning of 1997 suggests that a number of administrative measures can be used to stop certain organizations from functioning effectively. The circular proposes three measures: have the sponsoring organization remove its support (this happened to the Women’s Hotline in Beijing); pull them up on financial regulations (as with various groups in Shanghai); and identify key members and transfer them to state jobs where they will be too busy to engage in the work of the social organization (this was tried with the leadership of the Rural Women Knowing All group).

Finally, the CCP has reactivated the use of party cells within non-party organizations to try to ensure control and monitoring. In early 1998, an internal circular called for the establishment of party cells in all social organizations and the strengthening of party work in those where a cell already existed. In fact, this circular was only a reminder of party policy. According to the CCP Constitution, a cell should be established in all those organizations that have three or more members (Article 29). Where there are not enough members to establish a party cell, individual member are to link to the party cell or group of the sponsoring organization. Even where there is a party cell it is subordinated to the Party Committee of the sponsoring unit and will report to it and receive instructions and direction from it.

**Strategies of Negotiation and Circumvention**

The capacity of social organizations to evade such tight strictures and to negotiate more beneficial relations with the state derives from two main factors. The first is the declining state capacity to implement policy consistently. The second is the strategies that the social organizations use either to evade control or to turn the relationship of state sponsorship more to their own advantage.

The state lacks the finances and the human resources to implement policy effectively. Government revenue as a percentage of GDP has declined to only around 11 percent in 1995, with tax revenues in 1998 amounting to only 6.9 percent of GDP, while "off-budget" revenues have been increasing. A nationwide audit conducted in the same year suggested that such revenues amounted to 6 percent of GDP and some experts think that the real figure is much higher. A successful resolution of this problem lies not only in increasing the tax base of the government, a solution explored by the World Bank and favored by the Chinese central government, or squeezing the rural poor through levies and fees, a strategy often favored by local authorities, but also a re-thinking of the kinds of work in which the government should be engaged, its relationship to the local community, and acceptance that many functions previously managed by the local state in
the field of social welfare and asset development will have to be taken on by the local communities themselves. In poor and remote communities where marketization has barely begun and where the scope of economic activities will always remain limited, local treasuries have little recourse other than the elimination of services. In general, the decision has been taken to downsize government and social organizations set up by government departments are seen as a key provider of employment for laid-off government bureaucrats. The financial allocations to these newly formed social organizations will be reduced by one-third each year so that they will be financially independent of the originating government department after three years. Inevitably over time these organizations will develop an identity independent of the state and will become increasingly dependent on society and the business sector for funding.

Even where there is better fiscal buoyancy and a commitment to implement controls, it is questionable how consistently and for how long they can be applied. Human resources are scarce. For example, the All China Women’s Federation will now be responsible for some 3,500 social organizations dealing with women’s affairs. It seems inconceivable that they have the labor power to discharge their duties responsibly.

One of the most popular strategies for evasion was for a social organization to register as a business under the relevant industrial and commercial bureau. Registration as a business operation required a minimal management structure with a high degree of autonomy. However, the 1998 Regulations close off this method of registration for social organizations as a commercial entity. While the route of business registration has, in theory, been closed off, the most effective way for social organizations to evade restrictions has not. This method is to register as a "secondary organization." In this case, the organization only needs to secure approval from the agency that has accepted to bring it under its supervision. The organization merely deposits a file at the appropriate administrative level of civil affairs but this organ is not involved in monitoring, or auditing the group and does not require its host agency to submit any reports. Institutions of higher learning are the most popular choice given their generally more open and liberal leaderships. Organizations range from the university’s own research centers that can operate more independently of direct Education Ministry scrutiny to centers that provide services to the public at large. An example of the latter is a walk-in legal services clinic for the disadvantaged based in Wuhan. In fact, it was the Hubei Civil Affairs Department that suggested this form of registration to the Center claiming it would "make things easier." Such organizations can simply withdraw into the shell of the university if the atmosphere gets harsher or less accommodating.

Another method is to register as a subsidiary organization within an essentially dormant social organization. An example of this is a very active family and sexual advice center in Beijing that operates under the more moribund China Association of Social Workers. A more political example is that of Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao in the 1980s who were able to weave their way through the system to establish both an influential research institute and newspaper. The Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Institute had a strong political agenda and attained a high degree of financial and intellectual autonomy. Administratively, the Institute was registered to the Talents Exchange Center of the State
Science and Technology Commission and had been set up by Chen Ziming’s sister in November 1986. To obscure the activities of the Institute, Chen and his colleagues then set up a number of subsidiary companies and cultural academic organizations. Activities were often conducted under these other organizations. In March 1988, the Institute was able to take over a newspaper, the Economics Weekly. This newspaper had originally been set up in January 1982 and was the official newspaper of the Chinese Union of Economics Societies, itself representing 418 economic inceptions with over one million individual members. After the take-over Chen Ziming acted as Manager and Wang Juntao as Deputy Editor-in-Chief. It became one of the most lively, pro-reform publications in China.

Other groups do not bother with this burrowing strategy but simply do not register at all but organize an informal group. While technically illegal, there are many "clubs," "salons," and "forums" throughout urban China. In rural China, there has been the revival of traditional philanthropic practices that revolve around clans, kinship, and local place association. Paradoxically, both the freeze on registration of new social organizations since early 1997 and the new proposed process of registration might actually led to an increase in the number of these informal organizations that do not bother to register. The sudden appearance of some 10,000 supporters of the Falun gong who surrounded the party headquarters in Zhongnanhai woke up senior leaders for the potential of such faith-based movements to inspire loyalty. This concern and the humiliation that senior leaders felt at being caught by surprise led to the draconian crack-down on the organization and the subsequent campaign to discredit the organization. Obviously, it is impossible to know how many organizations are operating illegally but a 1996 report suggests around 20,000. This report cites other survey from 1994 that suggest that Anhui had over 800 "illegal social organizations" and Hubei over 600, while in June 1995 only 13 of some 100 foundations in Yunnan were properly registered with the People’s Bank of China.

Last, but not least, because this is still a system where personal relationships overlay the formal structures, some groups have been able to use their connections to register directly with civil affairs departments or have been able to receive the patronage of a sponsoring organization even if the proposed activities do not fit readily within its domain. This is particularly prevalent at the local level and it is difficult to see the Regulations changing customary practice.

Many social organizations have also been effective in negotiating the state to influence the policy-making process or at least to bring key issues to the public domain. Three examples are noted here. The first is that of the China Family Planning Association, an organization set up by the State Family Planning Commission to operate as its NGO, what is referred to as a Government organized NGO (GONGO). The second is that of Friends of Nature, an environmental NGO that operates almost as freely as one can in this field. The third is a group of women activists gathered around the magazine Rural Women Knowing All (Nongjia nu).

The China Family Planning Association has provided significant input into state policy innovation. It provides an interesting example of the extent to which GONGOs function
in the traditional Leninist "transmission belt" framework and to what extent by operating at one remove from government, they can open up social space and provide policy innovation. The Association was set up by the State Family Planning Commission to bring in international funding from which the Commission was blocked, in part by the hostility of the US Congress, and to be a member of organizations such as the International Planned Parenthood Federation. While it is charged with promoting official family planning policy, the Association has become sensitized through its international contacts and grassroots policy experimentation to the needs of women and the inadequacies of the current methods of policy implementation. The Association, particularly its local branches, has run a number of innovative projects on problems to do with sex education for young people, income generation for women, and public health education, and raising women’s awareness about their rights. Through its pilot programs, the Association has affected the government’s approach to family planning and conducted experiments to shift from a target-driven quota-based system of family planning to one that is more client driven, offering choice of contraception combined with education. This is reflected in the launch by the State Family Planning Commission in 1995 of experimentation in five rural counties with an approach to family planning called "Improving Quality of Care." This project and its subsequent expansion have emphasized reorientation toward a reproductive, more client-centered family planning program. In addition, the Commission has not always been able to control the Association entirely and the latter has begun to develop its own organizational identity and ethos. Attempts by the Commission to place its own officials in key posts within the Association have been resisted and have not always been successful.

Broadly speaking, those groups working in the field of education and environment have been permitted or have negotiated relatively freer space. Elizabeth Knup has noted with respect to managing environmental problems "it is here that rapid economic development—seen as desirable and essential—conflicts directly with other social needs which it finds difficult to address efficiently on its own." Friends of Nature provides a good example of how effective an organization can be when it is run by an energetic, charismatic individual who has a powerful vision of what they wish to achieve. The fact that this individual is Liang Congjie, grandson of Liang Qichao, and has been a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference obviously helps.

Liang has been able to use his talents, connections and political skill to steer Friends of Nature through a number of successes. In particular, his group was involved with the attempts to protect the habitat of the Golden Monkey that was being hacked away by illegal loggers in Yunnan. This was an issue that caught the attention of young people in Beijing and provided the possibility for Friends of Nature to engage in policy advocacy. Students at the Forestry academy in Beijing and at other campuses began to hold candlelight vigils for the monkeys. This greatly worried not only the Beijing Municipal authorities but also some central leaders. They were worried that the students peaceful, candle-lit vigils might turn to something more sinister but, at the same time, knew they could hardly break-up the actions. Friends of Nature began to mobilize public support for the monkey’s cause and its members wrote letters and petitions to central leaders while mobilizing friends in the media to publicize the monkey’s plight. The combination of
social mobilization, media spotlight, and central leaders’ fear of student action caused them to adopt decisions to reinforce the ban on illegal logging. Friends of Nature managed to extract a decision from the local authorities to ban the activities to preserve the golden monkey’s habitat.

The group of women activists gathered around the magazine *Rural Women Knowing All* have undertaken work ranging from sexual health of rural women, to hotlines for migrant women, to raising concerns about the high levels of suicide among young rural women. The effectiveness of this group comes not only from the social commitment of its members but also because a number of the key figures are senior members of the All China Women’s Federation. The key figure in the group is one of the chief editors of the *China Women’s Daily (Zhongguo funu bao)*, the official organ of the Federation. This has meant that the group can use the infrastructure and staff of the Federation to publish their own journal specifically targeted at rural women and to ensure that important policy issues are taken up in the official newspaper. This means that such issues are immediately in the domain of key policy-makers with respect to issues concerning women.

**Concluding Comments**

The examples given above reveal the increasing complexity of the relationship between state and society under the reforms and defy easy categorization. The problem of definition is compounded by the fact that we are trying to analyze a moving target, a state and society in transition. We are dealing with not only the dynamics of the interaction and how this has changed over time but also with the changes within the state sector and society. What appears in one place or at one time as a predatory local state may evolve into one of social partnership later. We are also dealing with a country where multiple models of state-society relations may be operating at the same time. It is clear that the local state apparatus in Wenzhou, Zhejiang, with its privatized economy and multiple intermediary organizations operates in quite a different way from a Neo-Maoist showcase on the North China plain that stresses collective and state organization. As Baum and Shevchenko have pointed out there is considerable ideological confusion concerning the analysis of the state in China. One can add that a field of study that was seriously under-theorized and parasitic in terms of the theory used is now seriously over-theorized and has begun to strain the imagination of creative word play.

As the example of social organizations shows while social space has opened up, the state has continued to retain a great deal of its organizational power and has moved to dominate the space and reorganize the newly emergent organizations. Clearly, from these examples, China is far from creating a civil society as conventionally defined. Analyses that rely on some variant of corporatism capture well the top-down nature of control in the system and how citizens are integrated into vertical structures where elites will represent their perceived interests.

However, such explanations risk both obscuring important elements of change and oversimplifying the complexities of the dynamics and interaction. It can mean that researchers pay less attention to the benefits the "subordinate" organizations and their members
derive. What are the attractions and benefits of participation or at least acquiescence with this process? The discussion of social organizations reveals that they can have considerable impact on the policy-making process, indeed more than if they were to try to create an organization with complete operational autonomy from the party-state. The interrelationships are symbiotic. Even for the more autonomous organizations, it would be foolish not to have strong party-state links. Those with close government links often play a more direct role in policy formulation than their counterparts in many other countries as they do not have to compete in social space with other NGOs for dominance and access to the government’s ear on relevant policy issues.

Each social organization in China has negotiated with the state its own niche that derives from a complex interaction of institutional, economic, and individual factors. In some cases, the outcome may be a close "embedded" relationship with the state, in others it may entail formal compliance while operating strategies of evasion and circumnavigation of the state. As the political scientist Kevin O’Brien has suggested co-opted groups become embedded over time in the system and through this process they acquire viability and legitimacy. This study of social organizations suggests that it is not mere expediency that causes new social formations or organizations to tie their fortunes to the existing state structures, especially at the local level, but it is strategically optimal for them. It can enable them to manipulate the official and semi-official institutions for their own advantage.

The study of social organizations also reveals the tensions inherent in a traditional Leninist party culture under the current development strategy. Many organizations have developed strategies to evade party and state controls and to turn the traditional "transmission belt" function to their own advantage. In addition, with the emphasis on economic development, and the shift in the party’s fundamental legitimacy to its capacity to deliver the economic goods, the objectives of party and state are not always synonymous. The party needs to effect its policy intent through both mobilization of party members and organizations at all levels and the implementation and enforcement by state organs. Local governments in pursuit of local developmental goals may take policy options that at best conflict with party policy and at worst run counter to it. The party cannot count on state organs for automatic policy support. A good example is with the privatization of state-owned enterprises that is rife at the local level but is deeply contested at the center. Also, local governments will approve social organizations or other non-state bodies that contribute to the local economy and well being. This is irrespective of formal regulatory requirements. With a membership of around 60 million, the party itself is deeply conflicted over fundamental policy issues and visions of the future. This causes a tension between the party’s traditional Leninist vanguard role and its other roles as an integrating mechanism and development agency. Last but not least it must be remembered that the party is made up of members who also form a part of the local community. Is the local party secretary who is also a Shaman loyal to the party, the locality, his beliefs or all of them? Does he import his social values into the party and if so to what effect, or are they discreet spheres of activity?
A focus on vertical integration and lines of administrative control while ignoring the way in which the relationship is negotiated ignores important horizontal relationships in society. As government downsizes further, citizens have greater responsibility for their own welfare, and more functions will be devolved to national and especially local social organizations, people will look more to the local provider of goods than the central party and state directives and regulations. This will become more important as the wealthy business class is given greater freedom over how they choose to dispose of their money.

As the historian Timothy Brook has noted, emphasis on the vertical "minimizes the capabilities and opportunities that people exercise regularly to communicate horizontally and form cooperative bodies." He suggests that we should be more aware of "auto-organization" as a more cooperative principle of social integration at the local level. Certainly many new social organizations and loose groups are not registering with the authorities and local religious and traditional belief groups are flourishing. In the urban areas, native place is the main organizing principle for the migrant communities, many of which have set up their own governing and welfare structures outside of the state.

Social scientists tend to dislike open-ended theories and seek to close down the range of options available for interpretation through a process of imposing order and logic. The notion of negotiating the state tries to do justice to the complexities of social reality in China. In the field of state-society relations, we need to develop explanations that allow for the shifting complexities of the current system and the institutional fluidity, ambiguity, and messiness that operates at all levels in China and that is most pronounced at the local level.