



# Democratic Phoenix

## Agencies, Repertoires, & Targets of Political Activism

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*Synopsis:* There is widespread concern about declining levels of conventional political participation, exemplified by electoral turnout and party membership, as well as eroding engagement through civic associations such as churches and unions. But there are many reasons why this focus may have overlooked some important ways that modes of political activism have been reinvented in recent decades. This paper argues that traditional theoretical and conceptual frameworks derived from the literature on participation in the 1960s and 1970s, and even the core concepts, need to be revised and updated to take account of how opportunities for political activism have evolved and diversified in the late twentieth century. *Part I* of this study theorizes about shifts in the nature of political activism in terms of the *agencies* (collective organizations), *repertoires* (the actions commonly used for political expression), and *targets* (the political actors that participants seek to influence). *Part II* examines cross-national evidence for the rise of protest politics, the characteristics of those engaged in protest, and whether there is considerable overlap today between conventional and protest modes. *Part III* focuses upon environmental activists, taken as exemplifying participation via new social movements, to see whether these participants are particularly attracted towards protest politics. The conclusion considers the implications for understanding trends in civic engagement and for the future of representative democracy.

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There is widespread concern about declining levels of conventional political participation, exemplified by electoral turnout and party membership, as well as eroding engagement through civic associations such as churches and unions. But this focus may have overlooked important ways that modes of political activism have been reinvented in recent decades. This paper argues that traditional theoretical and conceptual frameworks derived from the literature on participation in the 1960s and 1970s, and even the core concepts, need to be revised and updated to take account of how opportunities for political activism have evolved and diversified in the late twentieth century. *Part I* of this study theorizes about three shifts in the nature of political activism including in terms of the *agencies* (collective organizations), *repertoires* (the actions commonly used for political expression), and *targets* (the political actors that participants seek to influence). *Part II* examines comparative evidence for the rise of protest politics, who is most likely to engage in protest in different countries, and whether there is considerable overlap today between conventional and protest modes. *Part III* focuses upon environmental activists, taken as exemplifying participation via new social movements, to see whether these participants are particularly attracted towards protest politics. The conclusion considers the implications of developments for understanding trends in political engagement and for the future of representative democracy.

### I: The Transformation of Political Activism?

Many are alarmed that Western publics have become disengaged from public affairs, detached from campaigns, and bored with politics producing, if not a crisis of democracy, then at least growing problems of legitimacy for representative government<sup>1</sup>. It is widely suggested that the active involvement of citizens in public affairs has been falling away over the years, potentially undermining the legitimacy of more fragile democracies, and widening the gap between citizens and the state. One does not need to subscribe to the stronger claims of 'strong', 'direct' or participatory theorists of democracy to believe that any long-term hemorrhage in electoral turnout, party membership and associational activism is, and should be, a matter of genuine concern. Pollyannish optimism and Panglossian sentiments should be avoided. Yet despite the weight of the conventional wisdom, the evidence of secular decline often remains scattered and patchy; consistent and reliable longitudinal trend data is limited; and most previous systematic research has been restricted to case studies of particular countries, particularly the United States, and comparative evidence among established democracies in Western Europe, making it hard to generalize more widely. An established democracy like the United States which combines both exceptionally low turnout and exceptionally strong associational activism, by definition cannot be regarded as setting the global standard followed by the rest of the world.

Conceptual frameworks for understanding modes of political participation that were developed in the 1950s and 1960s commonly still shape our current assumptions. Yet these models were developed to account for activism within a particular time and place. The expansion of the franchise in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generated the rise of traditional channels for political mobilization and expression in representative government, particularly the growth of extra-parliamentary party organizations, the spread of cheap mass-circulation newspapers, and the establishment of traditional groups in civic society exemplified by the organized labor movement, civic associations, voluntary groups, and religious organizations. By the 1940s and 1950s these channels had settled and consolidated to become taken for granted as the major institutions linking citizens and the state within established democracies. The core argument of this study is that rising levels of human capital and societal modernization mean that today a more educated citizenry living within postindustrial societies has many opportunities to engage in a diverse range of repertoires, including combining electoral activities and protest politics. In post-industrial societies the younger generations, in particular, have become less willing than their parent's and grandparents to channel their political energies through traditional agencies exemplified by parties and churches, but

are more likely to express themselves through a variety of more ad hoc, contextual and specific activities of choice, increasingly via new social movements, Internet activism, and transnational policy networks. The core claim is that agencies, channels and targets have diversified and evolved during the postwar era.

### *Agencies*

The issue of 'agency' concerns the organizational structures through which people mobilize for political expression, particularly differences between traditional interest groups and alternative new social movements<sup>2</sup>. Interest groups that evolved with the rise of democracy in nineteenth and early twentieth century in industrial societies usually involved regularized, institutionalized, structured, and measurable activities: people signed up and paid up to become card-carrying members of the Norwegian trade unions, the American Elks, and the British Women's Institute. Interest groups and parties typically had Weberian bureaucratic organizations, characterized by formal rules and regulations, fulltime paid officials, hierarchical mass-branch structures, and clear boundaries demarcating who did, and did not, belong<sup>3</sup>. Our parents and grand-parents' generations often served on a local governing board or belonged to community associations, holding fundraisers, publishing newsletters, manning publicity stalls, chairing meetings, and attending socials for the Red Cross, the Parent-Teacher Association, and the Rotary club.

Many studies suggest that recent decades have seen the rise of new social movements and transnational advocacy networks as an alternative mechanism for activists, yet one far more amorphous and tricky to gauge<sup>4</sup>. Networked agencies are characterized by direct action strategies and Internet communications, loose coalitions, relatively flat organizational structures, and more informal modes of belonging focused on shared concern about diverse issues and identity politics<sup>5</sup>. Theorists suggest that the capacity for social movements concerned about issues like globalization, human rights, debt-relief, and world trade to cross national borders may signal the emergence of a global civic society<sup>6</sup>. Traditional hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations persist, but social movements may be emerging as the most popular avenue for informal political mobilization, protest and expression. If this shift has occurred, it has important implications for interpreting and measuring trends in civic engagement. In particular, if studies are limited to traditional indicators of political participation, such as party membership, union density, and voting turnout, then any apparent erosion of civic engagement may disguise the simultaneous transformation towards alternative movements characterized by fuzzier boundaries and informal forms of support.

### *Repertoires*

The question of agencies is closely related to that of 'repertoires', meaning the ways that people choose to express themselves politically. Much of the traditional literature on political participation has focused extensively upon conventional repertoires of civic engagement. Rather than a unidimensional 'ladder of participation', the original typology developed by Verba and his colleagues distinguished among four main 'modes' of political participation: voting, campaign activism, community organizing, and particularized contacting activity<sup>7</sup>. These modes differed systematically in their costs and benefits. Voting, for example, can be classified as one of the most ubiquitous political activities, yet one that exerts diffuse pressure over leaders, with a broad outcome affecting all citizens. Campaign work for parties or candidates like leafleting, attending local party meetings, and get-out-the-vote drives, also typically generates collective benefits, but requires greater initiative, time and effort than casting a ballot. Communal organization involves cooperation with others on some general social issue, such as raising money for a local school, or helping at an arts collective, with varying demands depending upon the level and kind of activism. Lastly, particularized contacting, like writing to an elected official about a specific problem, requires high levels of information and initiative, generating individual benefits but little need for political cooperation. These

conceptual distinctions remain important, so this study has maintained this tradition by examining the three most common repertoires of political expression generating collective benefits, namely: voting turnout, party campaigning, and community organizing in civic society.

But the early literature also drew an important line between 'conventional' and 'protest' forms of activism, and it is not clear whether this distinction remains appropriate today. Recent decades have seen a diversification of the types of activities used for political expression. In particular, new social movements may be adopting mixed action repertoires combining traditional acts such as voting and lobbying with a variety of alternative modes such as Internet networking, street protests, consumer boycotts, and direct action. The use of mass demonstrations in radical movements is nothing novel; indeed historically there have been periodic waves of protest and vigorous political dissent by citizens throughout Western democracies<sup>8</sup>. The mid-1950s saw the start of the most recent cycle of organized protest politics in established democracies, symbolized by passive resistance techniques used by the civil rights movement in the US and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Western Europe<sup>9</sup>. The following decade saw the resurgence of direct action with the anti-Vietnam demonstrations, the fashionable wave of student protest movements and social upheaval that swept the streets of Paris, Tokyo and London, the espousal of community action by new social movements concerned about women's equality, nuclear power, and the environment, the use of economic boycotts directed against apartheid in South Africa, and the adoption by trade unions of more aggressive industrial action, including strikes, occupations, blockades and mass demonstration, occasionally accompanied by arson, damage and violence, directed against Western governments<sup>10</sup>. This development generated studies of 'protest potential' by Barnes and Kasse, among others, examining the willingness of citizens to engage in forms of dissent such as unofficial strikes, boycotts, petitions, the occupation of buildings, mass demonstrations, and even acts of political violence<sup>11</sup>. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the spread of 'people power' which helped to topple the old regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by the anti-capitalism and anti-globalization forces of the late 1990s.

During the late-1960s and early 1970s protests by anti-war hippies, black power advocates, militant workers, progressive intellectuals, students, and feminists were commonly regarded as radical politics, or even the start of violent revolutionary ferment. Today there remains a substantial difference between peaceful protests and violent political acts which harm property or people, exemplified by long-standing ethnic-nationalist and ethnic-religious conflict in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and the Basque region, and the events surrounding the destruction of the World Trade Center. Incidents of violent terrorist activities, assassinations, hijackings and the use of bombs for political purposes all fall into this category. Despite this distinction, developments in recent decades mean that the sharp dividing line drawn in earlier studies between 'conventional' electoral activities and peaceful protests has dissolved somewhat over time. Lawful street demonstrations are often used today by political parties, traditional interest groups and unions, as well as by ordinary middle-class citizens. Studies suggest that the number of people willing to attend lawful demonstrations has risen since the mid-1970s, so that the social characteristics of the protest population have gradually 'normalized'<sup>12</sup>. Public demonstrations are used today by a multiplicity of groups ranging from Norwegian anti-fuel tax car-owners to Florida retirees protesting the ballot design of Miami-Dade county, Philippino 'people power' intent on ousting President Estrada, local farmers critical of the McDonaldisation of French culture, the nouveau poor locked out from bank accounts in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, street theatre like the gay Mardi Gras in Sydney, and consumer boycotts such as those used against British supermarkets stocking genetically-modified foods. Events at Genoa combined a mélange of mainstream charities like Oxfam and Christian Aid, as well as radicals like British Drop the Debt protestors, the German Freie ArbeiterInnen Union, and Italian anarchists like Tute Bianchi and Ya Basta! Collective action through

peaceful channels has become a generally accepted way to express political grievances, voice opposition, and challenge authorities.

Direct action strategies have also broadened towards engaging in life-style politics, where the precise dividing line between the 'social' and 'political' breaks down even further, such as volunteer work at recycling cooperatives, helping at battered women's shelters, or fundraising for a local hospital, as well as protesting at sites for timber logging, the location of airport runway expansions, and the use of animals in medical research. It could be argued that these types of activities, while having important social and economic consequences, fall outside of the sphere of the strictly 'political' *per se*. This conceptualization would demarcate between, for example, running the Parent-Teachers Association fund drive (understood as a social activity) and pressuring local officials to increase public spending upon education (understood as a political activity). Yet the distinction between the 'public' and the 'private' spheres remains controversial, as the feminist literature has long emphasized<sup>13</sup>. Social movements often seek to reform the law or influence the policy process, as well as directly altering systematic patterns of social behavior, for example by establishing bottle bank recycling facilities, battered women's shelters, and art collectives. In many developing societies, loose and amorphous networks of community groups and grass-roots voluntary associations often seek direct action within local communities over basic issues of livelihood, such as access to water, the distribution of agricultural aid, or health care and schools<sup>14</sup>. The 'social' and the 'political' are commonly blurred around issues of identity politics, where, for example, a revivalist meeting of 'born again' Christians in South Carolina, a gay and lesbian arts festival in San Francisco, or the Million Man March in DC, can all be understood as expressions or assertions of political communities. Therefore in general the older definition of political participation, based on citizenship activities designed to influence government and the policy process within the nation-state, seems unduly limited today, by excluding too much that is commonly understood as broadly 'political'. Accordingly as well as analyzing electoral turnout, party work, and civic activism, studies of political participation also need to compare legitimate protest activity as a common mainstream form of expression today.

### *Targets*

This leads towards a closely related and equally important development, namely whether the *target* of participation, meaning the *actors* that people are attempting to influence, has widened well beyond the nation-state. Traditional theories of representative democracy suggest that citizens hold elected representatives and governments to account directly through the mechanism of regular elections, and indirectly in intra-electoral periods via the news media, parties, interest groups, NGOs and social movements in civil society. Verba, Nie and Kim, for example, defined political participation as "...*those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take.*"<sup>15</sup> Within this model, typical *state-oriented* activities are designed to influence the institutions of representative government and the policy process, to communicate public concerns to government officials, and to pressure them to respond. These activities remain important, but today the diffusion of power following the simultaneous process of both globalization and decentralization, means that this represents an excessively narrow conceptualization that excludes some of the most common targets of civic engagement.

*Non-state oriented* activities are directed towards diverse actors in the public, non-profit and private sectors. Well-known examples include international human rights organizations, women's NGOs, transnational environmental organizations, the anti-sweatshop and anti-land mines networks, the peace movement, and anti-globalization and anti-capitalism forces<sup>16</sup>. The targets are often major multinational corporations, such as consumer boycotts of Nike running shoes, McDonald's hamburgers, and Californian grapes, as well as protest demonstrations directed against international agencies and intergovernmental organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, the World

Economic Forum in Davos, and the European Commission<sup>17</sup>. The process of globalization is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, but one of the clearest political manifestations of this development is the declining autonomy of the nation-state, including the core executive, as power has shifted simultaneously towards intergovernmental organizations like the U.N. and WTO, and down towards regional and local assemblies<sup>18</sup>. Moreover the 'shrinkage of the state' through initiatives such as privatization, marketization and de-regulation mean that decision-making has flowed away from public bodies and official government agencies that were directly accountable to elected representatives, dispersing to a complex variety of non-profit and private agencies operating at local, national and international levels<sup>19</sup>. Due to these developments, it has become more difficult for citizens to use conventional state-oriented channels of participation, exemplified by national elections, as a way of challenging those in power, reinforcing the need for alternative avenues and targets for political expression and mobilization.

## **II: Evidence for the Rise of Protest Politics**

For all these reasons, therefore, any conceptualization and measurement of the mainstream forms of civic engagement and political participation needs to take account of the way that the agencies, repertoires and targets may have been transformed since the classic studies of the 1950s and 1960s. Not all these claims can be examined from the available evidence here, within the scope and methodology of this limited study, but in this paper we can explore the propensity to engage in protest politics and to support the environmental movement, to see whether these are distinct dimensions of political participation today compared with the channels of electoral, party, and civic activism, and to consider how we explain patterns of protest politics and support for new social movements in different countries.

One major challenge facing attempts to understanding and document the extent of protest politics is that these activities are often situational rather than generic. In other words, demonstrations, occupations and unofficial strikes are often triggered in reaction to specific events and particular circumstances, depending upon the structure of opportunities generated by particular issues, specific events and the role of leaders, rather than reflecting the distinctive social or attitudinal profile of citizens<sup>20</sup>. The American and British use of air strikes in Afghanistan triggered an outpouring of street rallies in Karachi, Jakarta and Islamabad, but it is doubtful if residents would have displayed particularly a-typical propensities to protest outside of this context. In the past specific critical events such as the American urban riots in the 1960s, reactions to the Vietnam War, the decision to site US nuclear weapons at Greenham Common, and the Chernoble disaster, may have played a similarly catalytic function, leading to approaches focusing on event analysis<sup>21</sup>. Reflecting these considerations, studies have often focused on 'protest potential', or the propensity to express dissent. Yet this can be problematic: surveys are usually stronger at tapping attitudes and values rather than actual behavior, and they are generally more reliable at reporting routine and repetitive actions ('How often do you attend church?') rather than occasional acts. Unfortunately hypothetical questions ('might you ever demonstrate or join in boycotts?') may well prove a poor predictor of actual behavior. These items may prompt answers that are regarded as socially acceptable, or just tap a more general orientation towards the political system (such as approval of freedom of association or tolerance of dissent)<sup>22</sup>. Given these limitations, this study focuses on those acts that people say they actually *have* done, taken as the most accurate and reliable indicator of protest activism, and excludes those that people say they *might* do, or protest potential.

### *Dimensions of Activism*

The first issue to analyze is whether there continues to be a distinct dimension of 'protest' politics, or whether this has now become merged with other common activities like joining unions or parties. Following the tradition established by Barnes and Kaase,

protest activism is measured using five items in the World Value Survey, including signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories. Factor analysis can be used to examine whether these activities fall into a distinct dimension compared with 'conventional' forms of participation exemplified by electoral turnout, political party membership, and belonging to civic groups like unions, religious-organizations, sports and arts clubs, professional associations, charitable associations, environmental groups.

[Table 1 about here]

The results of the factor analysis presented in table 1 confirm that, as expected, three distinct modes of political participation emerge. All the protest items cluster consistently together, suggesting that a citizen who would do one of these activities would probably do others as well. In contrast, civic activism emerged as another distinctive dimension, so that belonging to parties was inter-correlated with membership of unions and social clubs. Lastly electoral turnout proved a third distinctive dimension of participation; as commonly emphasized the relatively low-cost, low-benefit aspect of casting a vote means that it is atypical of the more demanding types of engagement. As the result of the analysis a 'protest activism' scale was constructed, ranging from low (zero) for someone who had no experience of any of the acts to high (5) for someone who had actually done all five types of protest acts.

[Figure 1 about here]

#### *The Distribution of Activism*

How many have experience of these different types of activities? Table 2 shows the frequency of protest behavior in the mid-1990s, compared with the standard indicators of conventional forms of participation, across different types of political system. Of these, the most popular protest activities across all countries were signing a petition, done by 28% of all citizens, attending a demonstration (16%) and joining a consumer boycott (9%). In contrast, industrial action was confined to a small minority (5%), as was occupying a building (2%). Among the conventional acts, discussing politics, voting turnout, and civic activism (belonging to at least one voluntary association) all proved by far the most common, involving about two-thirds of the public. These acts were obviously far more ubiquitous than protest politics. On the other hand, petitioning, demonstrating and boycotting were all fairly common acts, far more so than being an active party member. The comparison across different political systems shows that these activities were consistently most common among older democracies with the longest tradition of active citizenship, but nevertheless the difference among semi-democracies and even non-democracies was far less than might have been expected based on the opportunities for political rights and civil liberties in these countries.

[Table 2 about here]

#### *Trends in Protest Politics*

Has there actually been a rise in the number of people involved in protest and demonstration politics, as so often assumed? One familiar problem is that we often have to rely upon impressionistic accounts of these events, derived largely from the news headlines, but this could reflect biases within the mass media rather than changes in the real world. Some doubt whether we can assume that protest politics has grown. Survey evidence in the United States, Putnam argues, indicates only modest growth in nationwide rates of demonstration and protest over the last quarter century, with actual involvement in 'movement-type' political actions confined to a 'small and aging fraction of the population'<sup>23</sup>. Moreover although he acknowledges that public protests in Washington exemplified by the Million Man March have become somewhat more visible in the news, nevertheless he suggests that these events are often rootless and shallow, part of the media spectacle but generating little continued activism within local communities.

Others suggest that rather than a secular steady rise in the frequency of protest and mass demonstration events, there are cyclical processes at work, characterized by sporadic outbreaks like an irregular heart-beat. Tilly argues that historically there have been periodic waves of protest and vigorous political dissent by citizens throughout Western democracies and elsewhere<sup>24</sup>. If this is correct, then incidents of protest politics in established democracies could be a passing fad of the hot-button politics of the 1960s and early 1970s that faded with the end of the great civil right struggle, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate generation.

Despite these claims, the systematic cross-national survey evidence that is available confirms that a significant long-term rise in protest politics has indeed occurred. Protest politics is not simply a passing fad of the hot politics of the 1960s and early 1970s that faded with the end of the civil right struggle, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate generation. Instead the proportion of citizens engaged in protest politics has risen, and risen dramatically, during the late twentieth century. Eight nations (Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, the United States, Italy, Switzerland and Finland) were included in the original Political Action survey conducted from 1973-1976. The protest politics items were replicated in the same countries in successive waves of the World Values Study<sup>25</sup>. The results of the comparisons of trends from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s in these nations, shown in Table 3, confirm that experience of protest politics has surged steadily over the years. The proportion of citizens who had signed a petition in these countries doubled from 32 to 60%; the proportion who had attended a demonstration escalated from 7 to 19%; the proportion participating in a consumer boycott tripled from 5 to 15%. Participation in unofficial strikes and in occupations remains confined to only a limited minority, but even here there is evidence of growing numbers.

[Table 3 about here]

Broader comparisons confirm that the rise of protest politics is by no means confined to postindustrial societies and established democracies. Tables 3 show experience of demonstrating from the early-1980s to the early-1990s in the wider range of 22 societies for which evidence is available. The results confirm that demonstration activism became more common in 17 nations, with particularly marked increases in South Korea, the Netherlands and Mexico. In contrast, participation in demonstrations only fell slightly in a few places, including Argentina and Finland. Across all these societies, the proportion of citizens with experience of taking part in demonstrations rose from 14 to 20 percent of the population during this decade. Table 4 shows that participation through signing a petition has become even more commonplace, rising from just over a third (38%) to half the population. Again steep rises in petitioning were evident in South Korea, Mexico and the Netherlands, as well as in Northern Ireland, Belgium and Sweden.

[Tables 3 and 4 about here]

The distribution of nations on the protest activism scale in Figure 1 compares the countries where WVS data is available in the mid-1990s. Although we might expect that protest might be strongest in countries without many other opportunities for democratic participation, or that it would be most prevalent in poorer nations, in fact the results show that it is strongest in established democracies and in affluent postindustrial societies. There was a strong correlation between national levels of protest activism and the UNDP Human Development Index ( $R=.529$  Sig. 001), as well as with Freedom House measures of democratization ( $R=.386$  Sig. 001). Sweden, West Germany, Norway and Australia lead the ranking, with poorer countries such as Ghana, El Salvador, India, Egypt lagging at the bottom of the comparison.

[Figure 1 about here]



Examples of dramatic events like the anti-globalization movement disruption of international summits and the peace demonstrations triggered by the US air strikes in Afghanistan suggest that willingness to engage in protest politics has increased in recent decades in many places around the world, but on the other hand this perception could reflect changes in the new media's propensity to cover these events. Confirming the more anecdotal evidence, there was an increase in the protest activism scale registered in all the 23 nations where WVS survey was conducted in both the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, with strong gains registered in some of developing countries such as South Africa, South Korea and Mexico, as well as in older democracies like Switzerland, Sweden and West Germany. There may be more media coverage of street demonstrations, rallies and public meetings, but these images reflect real changes in political behavior in many societies.

#### *Who protests?*

Earlier studies have shown that during the mid-1970s protest potential was generally highest among the younger generation, the better educated, men, and the non-religious, while public sector professionals and students were particularly active through these channels<sup>26</sup>. In more recent years, however, some suggest that as protest has gone from margin to mainstream so that the population willing to engage in such acts has 'normalized.'<sup>27</sup> Table 6 analyzes the social background of protest activists, measured by whether people had carried out at least one protest act and the mean score on the activism scale by social group, for the pooled WVS sample across all societies in the mid-1990s.

[Table 6 about here]

The results show that by the mid-1990s one third of the public had carried out at least one protest act. There was a modest gender gap, as expected, with men slightly more willing to protest than women. But overall education proved by far the best predictor of experience of protest politics, followed by social class. In a familiar pattern found in many earlier studies, 40% of those with high education had protested, compared with only one quarter of those with low education. In contrast to studies in the mid-1970s, the age profile was curvilinear, reflecting common patterns found with civic activism. It was the middle-aged who proved the strongest protest activists, with a fall off among both the youngest and the oldest cohorts. Whether this is a life-cycle effect or a generational effect is difficult to establish from cross-sectional data but this evidence probably suggests that far from being confined to the student generation, as in the past, today the protest activism has normalized as the 1960s and 1970s cohorts have aged.

### **III: Support for New Social Movements**

How does protest politics relate to the growth of new social movements, and in particular, as often assumed, are supporters of these groups more likely to engage in demonstrations, boycotts and petitions than in elections and party work? One difficulty facing any systematic analysis is that new social movements and transnational advocacy networks encompass a diverse *mélange* of organizations and causes. As exemplified by the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001, an estimated 700 groups attended the Genoa Social Forum, ranging from traditional trade unions and charities like Oxfam and Christian Aid, as well as groups concerned with peaceful protests about globalization, the protection of human rights, environmentalism, the peace movement, poverty and debt relief for developing nations, to the more radical anarchists and anti-capitalist forces at the forefront of the 'black block'.

Here we focus on environmental activism, taken as exemplifying typical forms of participation in other new social movements. There is nothing novel about concern for wildlife, biodiversity and preservation of natural habitats, indeed traditional British associations in the voluntary sector that continue to campaign on these issues, founded more than a century ago, include the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew (1840), the Royal

Society for the Protection of Animals (1864), the National Trust (1895). But the late twentieth century witnessed a dramatic rise in public concern about environmental issues, membership in environmental groups, the formation of government environmental agencies, and the number of environmental regulations and international treaties, making this movement one of the most important forces in the policy process<sup>28</sup>. The diverse organizational structure of environmental groups, and the emphasis on 'life-style politics' and direct action for recycling and environmental protection of local areas, exemplifies many of the defining features of new social movements. Environmentalism encompasses a diverse coalition: ecologists and peace activists, holistic theorists and anti-nuclear power activists, feminists, animal rights activists, the organic farming movement, the soft energy movement, consumers concerned about genetically modified food, and converts from radical left groups, as well as traditional organizations seeking to preserve the countryside and wildlife habitats. There are fuzzy boundaries. Support includes activities as different as joining the Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, recycling bottles and cans, boycotting non-organic produce, signing a petition against a road development, helping restore a local wildlife habitat, voting for a Green party, or protesting against a multinational company<sup>29</sup>.

This study measures how far citizens had carried out a battery of five actions that cover some of the most typical forms of environmental activism, as shown in table 7, such as recycling, contributing to an environmental organization and attending a meeting about these issues. Active membership of an environmental organization, used earlier to gauge civic society, was added to this battery. Responses to all these six items scaled consistently into a single dimension, and proved highly inter-correlated (Cronbach's Alpha=0.77). Table 7 shows that environmental activism varied across these items, from 40% of the public who said that they had tried to reduce water consumption for environmental reasons down to 11% who had attended a meeting, signed a letter or petition aimed at protecting the environment. The 'lifestyle' dimensions of activism all proved more popular and widespread than those involving more narrowly policy-oriented forms of support.

[Table 7 about here]

To examine who was environmentally active, Table 8 shows the distribution that has done at least one environmental act and the mean score for groups on the scale. The results show that two-thirds claim to have done at least one environmental act. There was a slim gender gap, with women slightly more likely to be active on these issues than men. But again education and class proved far stronger predictors of activism, reflecting the well-known propensity for environmentalism to be strongest among the well educated and among managerial and professional households. Age proved to be slightly curvilinear, with environmentalism strongest among the early middle-aged, rather than among the youngest cohort, but overall only a modest difference by age group.

[Table 8 about here]

Since the patterns that have been observed so far could be due to the type of societies included in the comparison, Table 9 introduces models that control for levels of human and democratic development, social structure and cultural attitudes. The models then test for the impact of the environmental activism scale on four dimensions of political participation. The results show two important and distinctive findings.

First, after introducing all these prior controls, *environmental activism is negatively associated with voting turnout and positively related to protest politics*. The associations are not particularly strong, but they are significant and they prove robust against different statistical tests. This suggests that environmentalists are less likely than average to cast a ballot in elections, and they are more likely to engage in protests such as demonstrations, petitions, strikes, and boycotts. Figure 10.2 shows the clear relationship at societal level between the two scales of environmental activism and protest activism: postindustrial societies like Sweden, New Zealand, Germany and

Australia that were strong on one dimension were often strong on the other as well, with development displaying a curvilinear relationship. In these regards, the green movement could indeed be regarded as the emergence of an alternative form of politics, as many advocates claim, which may also be evident with other new social movements, such as those concerned with feminism, human rights, or conflict resolution.

[Figure 2 about here]

Yet the second important finding is that at the same time *environmental activism is positively related to the conventional channels of party membership and civic activism*. Indeed, environmental activism is one of the best predictors of membership in all the other forms of joining to community groups such as sports and arts clubs, as well as professional associations and unions. This suggests that rather than an alternative and distinctive form of civic engagement, people who are active through recycling, green shopping, and donating to environmental groups are also likely to be found among many other mainstream civic organizations. Activism through these channels can be regarded as supplementary rather than zero-sum choices.

[Table 9 about here]

#### **IV: Conclusions and Implications**

Commentators highlight common warning signs that are believed to be undermining the three central channels of mass activism, including sagging electoral turnout, rising anti-party sentiment, and the decay of civic organizations. But are these concerns justified? What this study suggests is that there are many reasons to believe that there have been important changes in the agencies, repertoires and targets of political activism. It is more difficult to find systematic evidence to analyze these issues, but the analysis of protest politics and environmental activism presented in this limited study presents four main findings:

- (i) Factor analysis confirms that protest activism remains a consistent dimension of political participation, which proves distinct from voting participation, and from conventional civic activism through belonging to parties, voluntary associations, and community organizations.
- (ii) Many forms of protest politics, exemplified by petitions, demonstrations, and consumer boycotts, have become increasingly popular in many countries during the 1980s. Protest politics is not merely a passing phenomenon, but instead it is on the rise as a channel of political expression and mobilization.
- (iii) Protest politics is particularly pervasive among the well-educated managerial and professional classes in postindustrial societies, as many other have suggested, but it has also become more 'mainstream' today. By the mid-1990s protest was no longer confined to the students and the younger generation. The social background of protestors today reflects the propensity of groups to participate through conventional means as well.
- (iv) Lastly participation within new social movements is measured in this study by environmental activism, which proved to be *negatively* related to voting turnout, but *positively* linked to party membership, civic activism and protest politics.

These conclusions are explored further elsewhere, including in research examining the characteristics of protest activists, contrasting anti-state, strategic resource, and contextual theories, with unique evidence drawn from demonstrators in Belgium<sup>30</sup>. The general thesis outlined in this study is that before we can conclude that the vitality of civic activism is under threat, studies of conventional forms of political participation exemplified by electoral turnout and party membership need to take

account of other alternative avenues for political expression to provide a more balanced and holistic perspective. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the channels of elections, parties, and interest groups were primary route for citizens to influence the policy process within the nation-state but today the diversification of agencies, repertoires and targets means that energies can and often do flow through new tributaries. As a result of this process, governments face difficult challenges in balancing and aggregating more complex demands from multiple channels, but from the perspective of citizens this provides more diverse opportunities for engagement that may well be healthy for representative democracy. In short, contrary to popular assumptions, the traditional electoral agencies linking citizens and the state are far from dead. And, like a Phoenix, the reinvention of civic activism allows political energies to flow through diverse alternative avenues as well as conventional channels.

Table 1: Dimensions of Political Participation

|  | Civic Activism | Protest<br>Activism | Voting<br>Turnout |
|--|----------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Belong to environmental organization             | .680           |                     |                   |
| Belong to charitable organization                | .647           |                     |                   |
| Belong to art, music or educational organization | .643           |                     |                   |
| Belong to professional association               | .638           |                     |                   |
| Belong to political party                        | .584           |                     |                   |
| Belong to sport or recreational organization     | .536           |                     |                   |
| Belong to church or religious organization       | .521           |                     |                   |
| Belong to labor union                            | .423           |                     |                   |
| Attend a lawful demonstration                    |                | .765                |                   |
| Join in boycotts                                 |                | .764                |                   |
| Join unofficial strike                           |                | .756                |                   |
| Sign a petition                                  |                | .687                |                   |
| Occupy buildings or factories                    |                | .680                |                   |
| Voted in election                                |                |                     | .926              |
| % Variance                                       | 20.1           | 19.6                | 7.2               |

Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

Protest activism: *“Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it.”*

Source: World Values Survey, mid-1990s

Table 2: Experience of Political Activism, mid-1990s

| % 'Have done'                     | Older<br>democracy | Newer<br>democracy | Semi-<br>democracy | Non-<br>democratic | <b>All</b>  |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| Discuss politics                  | 72.3               | 72.2               | 68.2               | 65.6               | <b>70.0</b> |
| Voting turnout                    | 73.1               | 68.9               | 56.3               | 60.8               | <b>64.5</b> |
| Civic activism                    | 73.0               | 60.3               | 63.1               | 40.7               | <b>62.4</b> |
| <i>Signed a petition *</i>        | 60.7               | 22.6               | 19.4               | 10.0               | <b>28.5</b> |
| <i>Attended demonstrations*</i>   | 19.1               | 12.5               | 15.7               | 19.1               | <b>15.7</b> |
| <i>Joined in boycott *</i>        | 17.1               | 6.7                | 7.5                | 3.0                | <b>8.9</b>  |
| Active union member               | 8.2                | 5.0                | 4.7                | 3.5                | <b>5.4</b>  |
| <i>Joined unofficial strike *</i> | 4.8                | 4.4                | 5.6                | 5.2                | <b>5.0</b>  |
| Active party member               | 5.8                | 4.2                | 4.7                | 2.5                | <b>4.6</b>  |
| <i>Occupied buildings *</i>       | 1.5                | 2.0                | 1.6                | 0.3                | <b>1.6</b>  |

## Notes:

(Highlighted in italic) \* Protest acts: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it." % 'Have actually done'

*Discuss politics*: % 'Frequently' or 'Occasionally'

*Civic activism*: Active or passive member of at least one voluntary association (i.e. a sports club, arts club, environmental group, charitable group, excluding party or union)

*Voting Turnout*: Aggregate mean Vote/VAP 1990s.

Source: World Values Survey, mid-1990s

Table 3 The Rise of Protest Politics, mid-1970s to mid-1990s

|                    | Mid-1970s | Early 1980s | 1990 | Mid-1990s |
|--------------------|-----------|-------------|------|-----------|
|                    | (i)       | (ii)        | (ii) | (ii)      |
| Signed petition    | 32        | 46          | 54   | 60        |
| Demonstrated       | 9         | 14          | 18   | 17        |
| Consumer Boycott   | 5         | 8           | 11   | 15        |
| Unofficial Strike  | 2         | 3           | 4    | 4         |
| Occupied buildings | 1         | 2           | 2    | 2         |

## Notes:

Protest acts: *"Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it."* % 'Have done'

The proportion of citizens who reported actual experience of these protest activities in eight postindustrial societies (Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, the United States, Italy, Switzerland and Finland).

Sources: (i) The Political Action survey (1973-1976). (ii) World Values Survey.

Table 4: Rise in Demonstration Activism, early 1980s to the early 1990

|                  | Early 1980s | Early 1990s | Change 1980-1990 |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|
| South Korea      | 5.4         | 18.9        | 13.5             |
| Netherlands      | 11.9        | 25.0        | 13.1             |
| Mexico           | 7.7         | 20.2        | 12.5             |
| Iceland          | 13.6        | 23.4        | 9.8              |
| Italy            | 24.7        | 34.1        | 9.4              |
| Denmark          | 17.8        | 27.0        | 9.2              |
| Belgium          | 12.7        | 21.2        | 8.5              |
| Canada           | 13.0        | 21.0        | 8.0              |
| South Africa     | 6.4         | 13.3        | 6.9              |
| Sweden           | 15.1        | 21.8        | 6.7              |
| Australia        | 12.0        | 18.0        | 6.0              |
| West Germany     | 13.8        | 19.5        | 5.7              |
| France           | 25.8        | 31.2        | 5.4              |
| Ireland          | 12.2        | 16.3        | 4.1              |
| Britain          | 9.7         | 13.6        | 3.9              |
| US               | 12.2        | 15.1        | 2.9              |
| Japan            | 6.6         | 9.4         | 2.8              |
| Northern Ireland | 17.9        | 17.8        | -0.1             |
| Norway           | 19.4        | 19.0        | -0.4             |
| Spain            | 21.8        | 21.2        | -0.6             |
| Finland          | 14.2        | 11.9        | -2.3             |
| Argentina        | 18.8        | 14.6        | -4.2             |
| <b>MEAN</b>      | <b>14.2</b> | <b>19.7</b> | <b>5.5</b>       |

Note: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it." % 'Have actually attended lawful demonstration'

Source: World Values Survey.



Table 5: Rise in Petitioning, early 1980s to the early 1990

|                  | Early 1980s | Early 1990s | Change 1980-1990 |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|
| South Korea      | 15.7        | 40.6        | 24.9             |
| Northern Ireland | 33.0        | 57.9        | 24.9             |
| Mexico           | 8.2         | 31.4        | 23.2             |
| Belgium          | 21.6        | 44.5        | 22.9             |
| Netherlands      | 33.1        | 50.1        | 17.0             |
| Sweden           | 53.0        | 69.9        | 16.9             |
| Canada           | 60.6        | 76.5        | 15.9             |
| South Africa     | 17.1        | 31.5        | 14.4             |
| Ireland          | 27.9        | 41.4        | 13.5             |
| Britain          | 62.6        | 74.5        | 11.9             |
| Japan            | 40.7        | 52.0        | 11.3             |
| Iceland          | 36.7        | 46.6        | 9.9              |
| Australia        | 68.7        | 78.6        | 9.9              |
| West Germany     | 45.5        | 55.1        | 9.6              |
| US               | 61.2        | 70.1        | 8.9              |
| Denmark          | 42.0        | 50.3        | 8.3              |
| France           | 43.8        | 51.4        | 7.6              |
| Italy            | 37.5        | 44.2        | 6.7              |
| Finland          | 29.0        | 34.0        | 5.0              |
| Norway           | 54.4        | 59.4        | 5.0              |
| Spain            | 20.6        | 17.5        | -3.1             |
| Argentina        | 28.6        | 21.4        | -7.2             |
| <b>MEAN</b>      | <b>38.3</b> | <b>50.0</b> | <b>11.7</b>      |

Note: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it." % 'Have actually signed a petition'

Source: World Values Survey.

Table 6: Protest Activism by Social Background, mid-1990s

|                             | % Have done<br>at least one<br>protest act | Mean score<br>protest<br>activism<br>scale | Eta (Sig.) |
|-----------------------------|--|--|------------|
| All                         | 33.7                                       | .53  |            |
| <b>Gender</b>               |  |  |            |
| Men                         | 36.1                                       | .59  |            |
| Women                       | 31.5                                       | .47  | .07***     |
| <b>Age</b>                  |  |  |            |
| 18-24                       | 30.6                                       | .46  |            |
| 25-34                       | 34.4                                       | .55  |            |
| 35-44                       | 36.4                                       | .59  |            |
| 45-54                       | 37.5                                       | .61  |            |
| 55-64                       | 35.2                                       | .51  |            |
| 65+                         | 30.7                                       | .42  | .07***     |
| <b>Education</b>            |  |  |            |
| High education              | 40.5                                       | .70  |            |
| Medium education            | 33.7                                       | .52  |            |
| Low education               | 24.1                                       | .35  | .15***     |
| <b>Occupational Class</b>   |  |  |            |
| Managerial and professional | 43.7                                       | .74  |            |
| Other white collar          | 43.1                                       | .64  |            |
| Skilled manual              | 32.4                                       | .51  |            |
| Unskilled manual            | 25.6                                       | .38  | .13***     |

Note: For the protest activism 0-6-point scale see Table 2. The strength (Eta) and significance of the difference in the group mean is measured by ANOVA. Sig. \*\*\*=p.000

Source: World Values Survey, mid-1990s. (N.80583)

Table 7: Environmental activism scale, mid-1990s

| % 'Yes'   |      |
|---|------|
| Have you tried to reduce water consumption for environmental reasons?                               | 40.8 |
| Have you decided for environmental reasons to reuse or recycle something rather than throw it away? | 34.2 |
| Have you chosen household products that you think are better for the environment?                   | 33.6 |
| Are you an active or inactive member of an environmental organization? *                            | 13.8 |
| Have you contributed to an environmental organization?  | 11.5 |
| Have you attended a meeting or signed a letter or petition aimed at protecting the environment?     | 10.6 |

Note: *"Which, if any, of these things have you done in the last twelve months, out of concern for the environment?"* (% 'Yes')

(\* *Voluntary organization membership:*

Source: World Values Survey, mid-1990s.

Table 8: Environmental Activism by Social Background, mid-1990s

|                             | % Have done<br>at least one<br>environmental<br>act | Mean score<br>environmental<br>activism scale | Eta (Sig.) |
|-----------------------------|---|---|------------|
| All                         | 63.9  | 1.43  |            |
| <b>Gender</b>               |   |   |            |
| Men                         | 62.9  | 1.40  |            |
| Women                       | 64.8  | 1.46  | .01***     |
| <b>Age</b>                  |   |   |            |
| 18-24                       | 63.5  | 1.36  |            |
| 25-34                       | 67.1  | 1.51  |            |
| 35-44                       | 66.1  | 1.49  |            |
| 45-54                       | 68.4  | 1.57  |            |
| 55-64                       | 63.3  | 1.40  |            |
| 65+                         | 65.0  | 1.38  | .05***     |
| <b>Education</b>            |   |   |            |
| High education              | 70.2  | 1.64  |            |
| Medium education            | 65.2  | 1.45  |            |
| Low education               | 56.0  | 1.16  | .12***     |
| <b>Occupational Class</b>   |   |   |            |
| Managerial and professional | 71.9  | 1.73  |            |
| Other white collar          | 70.4  | 1.67  |            |
| Skilled manual              | 65.6  | 1.41  |            |
| Unskilled manual            | 59.0  | 1.19  | .13***     |

Note: For the environmental activism 0-6-point scale see Table 4. The strength (Eta) and significance of the difference in the group mean is measured by ANOVA. Sig. \*\*\*=p.000


Source: World Values Survey, mid-1990s. (N.80583)

Table 9: Environmental activism and political participation, mid-1990s

|   | Voting Turnout |             |            | Party Member |             |            | Civic Activism |             |            | Protest Activism |             |            |
|---|----------------|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------|------------|----------------|-------------|------------|------------------|-------------|------------|
|   | b              | (s.e.)      | Sig.       | B            | (s.e.)      | Sig.       | B              | (s.e.)      | Sig.       | B                | (s.e.)      | Sig.       |
| <b>DEVELOPMENT</b>                            |                |             |            |              |             |            |                |             |            |                  |             |            |
| Level of human development                    | 2.14           | .300        | ***        | -3.26        | .135        | ***        | -1.05          | .088        | ***        | .788             | .047        | ***        |
| Level of democratization                      | .576           | .020        | ***        | -.035        | .012        | ***        | .045           | .007        | ***        | .049             | .004        | ***        |
| <b>STRUCTURE</b>                              |                |             |            |              |             |            |                |             |            |                  |             |            |
| Age (Years)                                   | -.005          | .001        | ***        | .001         | .001        |            | -.005          | .000        | ***        | -.004            | .000        | ***        |
| Gender (Male=1)                               | -.239          | .050        | ***        | .263         | .029        | ***        | .122           | .016        | ***        | .068             | .009        | ***        |
| Education (7-pt scale)                        | -.128          | .012        | ***        | .027         | .007        | ***        | .071           | .004        | ***        | .028             | .002        | ***        |
| Class (10-pt scale)                           | .003           | .010        |            | .011         | .006        |            | -.012          | .003        | ***        | -.023            | .002        | ***        |
| <b>CULTURAL ATTITUDES</b>                     |                |             |            |              |             |            |                |             |            |                  |             |            |
| Political Interest (9-point scale)            | .374           | .013        | ***        | .313         | .007        | ***        | .068           | .004        | ***        | .103             | .002        | ***        |
| <b>NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT</b>                    |                |             |            |              |             |            |                |             |            |                  |             |            |
| <b>Environmental activism (6-point scale)</b> | <b>-.191</b>   | <b>.018</b> | <b>***</b> | <b>.350</b>  | <b>.010</b> | <b>***</b> | <b>.459</b>    | <b>.006</b> | <b>***</b> | <b>.114</b>      | <b>.003</b> | <b>***</b> |
| Constant                                      | -2.71          |             |            | -2.56        |             |            | .649           |             |            | -1.08            |             |            |
| <b>Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup></b>               | <b>.171</b>    |             |            | <b>.178</b>  |             |            |                |             |            |                  |             |            |
| <b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>                 |                |             |            |              |             |            | <b>.174</b>    |             |            | <b>.151</b>      |             |            |
| <b>% Correct</b>                              | <b>94.7</b>    |             |            | <b>84.7</b>  |             |            |                |             |            |                  |             |            |


Notes: Voting turnout and party activism in the mid-1990s are analyzed using logistic regression with the table listing unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors and significance. Civic activism and protest activism are analyzed using linear regression models. Sig. \*= $p < .05$  \*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\* $p < .001$  *Human Development*: Human Development Index 1990: *Human Development Report*, NY: United Nations Development Program. *Level of Democratization*: Mean Freedom House Index of political rights and civil liberties 1990-1996. [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org). *New Social Movement* Environmental activism (6-point scale). See Table 7. *Cultural attitudes*: The 9-point interest scale combined political discussion, interest, and the salience of politics, which all also proved highly inter-correlated. *Voting turnout* (yes=1); *Party member* (inactive or active member); *Civic activism* (scale of active or passive member of church, sports club, arts club, professional, union, charitable or other group); *Protest activism* (5-point scale of having signed petition, joined boycott, demonstrated, joined unofficial strike, and occupied building). For more details see Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Figure 1: Protest Activism by Nation, mid-1990s



Source: World Values Survey, mid-1990s.

Figure 2: Environmental and Protest Activism, mid-1990s



*Environmental activism:* See Table 7 for details.

*Protest activism:* See Table 1 for details.

Source: World Values Survey, mid-1990s.

Note: This paper is drawn from Chapters 10 and 11 of a new book, Pippa Norris *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* (forthcoming September 2003) New York: Cambridge University Press. Further details are available at [www.pippanorris.com](http://www.pippanorris.com).

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed review of the 'crisis of the state' literature discussing these claims see Pippa Norris. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>2</sup> For a discussion of the conceptual distinctions and theoretical frameworks in the literature, as well as the structure, function and organization of interest groups and new social movements, see Jeffrey Berry. 1984. *The Interest Group Society*. Boston: Little Brown; Jack L. Walker. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*: Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Sidney Tarrow. 1994. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Charles Tilly. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Jeffrey Berry. 1984. *The Interest Group Society*. Boston: Little Brown; Jack L. Walker. 1991. *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America*: Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press; Terry Nichols Clarke and Michael Rempel. 1997. *Citizen Politics in Post-Industrial Societies: Interest Groups Transformed*. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.

<sup>4</sup> Sidney Tarrow. 1994. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Charles Tilly. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler. Eds. 1990. *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. *Activists beyond Borders - Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco. Eds. 1997. *Transnational social movements and global politics: Solidarity beyond the state*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press; H. Kriesi, D. D. Porta and Dieter Riucht. Eds. 1998. *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*. London: Macmillan.

<sup>5</sup> Mayer Zald and John McCarthy. Eds. 1987. *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books; Anthony Oberschall. 1993. *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests and Identities*. New Brunswick: Transaction; David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. 1998. Eds. *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield; Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston and Joseph R. Gudfield. Eds. 1994. *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Douglas McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>6</sup> James Rosenau. 1990. *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Ronnie Lipschutz. 1996. *Global Civic Society and Global Environmental Governance*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

<sup>7</sup> Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1971. *The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Analysis*. Beverly Hill, CA: Sage; Sidney Verba and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Social Equality and Political Participation*. New York: Harper Collins; Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison* New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>8</sup> Charles Tilly et al. 1975. *The Rebellious Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

<sup>9</sup> Frank Parkin. 1968. *Middle Class Radicalism*. New York: Praeger.

<sup>10</sup> Barbara Epstein. 1991. *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s and 1980s*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

<sup>11</sup> Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. See also Alan Marsh. 1977. *Protest and Political Consciousness*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; Charles Adrian and David A. Apter. 1995. *Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics*. NY: New York University Press.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Van Aelst and Stefaan Walgrave. 2001. 'Who is that (wo)man in the street? From the normalization of protest to the normalization of the protester.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 39: 461-486.



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- <sup>13</sup> See Carole Pateman. 1988. *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge: Polity Press; Anne Phillips. 1991. *Engendering Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- <sup>14</sup> See Jonathan Baker. 1999. *Street-Level Democracy: Political Settings at the Margins of Global Power*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
- <sup>15</sup> Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison*. New York: Cambridge University Press. P. 46. See also Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. P. 38.
- <sup>16</sup> Saskia Sassen. 1999. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: New Press; Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Michael Edwards and John Gaventa. Eds. 2001. *Global Citizen Action*. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers; Peter Evans. 2000. 'Fighting marginalization with transnational networks: Counter-hegemonic globalization.' *Contemporary Sociology* 29(1): 230-241.
- <sup>17</sup> Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998. *Activists beyond Borders - Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- <sup>18</sup> For a discussion see David Held. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. London: Polity Press; Joseph S. Nye and John Donahue. 2001. *Governance in a Globalizing World*. Eds. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press; Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler. 1998. *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- <sup>19</sup> Harvey B. Feigenbaum, J. Henig and C. Hamnett. 1998. *Shrinking the State: The Political Underpinnings of Privatization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>20</sup> M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth, et al. 1989. *Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies*. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- <sup>21</sup> Dieter Rucht, Ruud Koopmans, Friedhelm Neidhart. Eds. 1998. *Acts of Dissent: New Developments in the Study of Protest*. Berlin: Edition Sigma.
- <sup>22</sup> For a fuller discussion see Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; Christo[pher A. Rootes. 1981. 'On the future of protest politics in Western democracies: A critique of Barnes, Kaase et al., Political Action.' *European Journal of Political Research* 9: 421-432.
- <sup>23</sup> Robert D. Putnam. 2000. *Bowling Alone*. New York: Simon & Schuster. P. 164-5.
- <sup>24</sup> Charles Tilly et al. 1975. *The Rebellious Century*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Sidney Tarrow. 1994. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Charles Tilly. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>25</sup> It should be noted that not every nation was included in every wave of the WVS survey, so the average figures across all eight nations are presented here, but further examinations suggests that this process did not influence the substantive findings.
- <sup>26</sup> J. Craig Jenkins and Michael Wallace. 1996. 'The generalized action potential of protest movements: the new class, social trends, and political exclusion explanations.' *Sociological Forum*. 11(2): 183-207.
- <sup>27</sup> Peter Van Aelst and Stefaan Walgrave. 2001. 'Who is that (wo)man in the street? From the normalization of protest to the normalization of the protester.' *European Journal of Political Research*. 39: 461-486.
- <sup>28</sup> Russell Dalton. 1994. *The Green Rainbow: Environmental Interest Groups in Western Europe*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Christopher Rootes. 1999. *Environmental Movements: Local, National and Global*. London: Frank Cass.

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<sup>29</sup> Pippa Norris. 1997 'We're All Green Now: Public Opinion and Environmentalism in Britain.' *Government and Opposition* 32(3): 320-339.

<sup>30</sup> See Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism* New York: Cambridge University Press; also Pippa Norris, Stefaan Walgrave, and Peter Van Aelst. (Forthcoming). 'Who demonstrates? Anti-state rebels or conventional participants?' Available at [www.pippanorris.com](http://www.pippanorris.com)