Australian Democracy in Comparative Perspective

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Previous chapters have documented the historical development of Australia’s electoral institutions. Some of the most important innovations include use of the Australian (secret) ballot in 1856, the employment of the Alternative Vote (AV) electoral system (preferential voting) for the House of Representatives in 1919, the introduction of compulsory voting for elections in 1924, and the adoption of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) for federal Senate elections in 1948. These innovations produced an electoral system that remains distinctive in many important regards. Worldwide, for example, only three other nations have used AV for elections to the lower house (Papua New Guinea from 1964-75, Fiji since 1996, and a modified version in Nauru), while the use of STV at national level is restricted to the Republic of Ireland and Malta (for a worldwide comparison of electoral systems see the ACE project at www.IDEA.int).

The broader constitutional arrangements in Australia are also relatively uncommon (see Singleton and Aitkin 1996; Henningham 1995; Hughes and Emy 1998; Lovell 1998; Maddox 1996). In Arend Lijphart’s (1999) classification of 36 established democracies in the post-war period, Australia falls towards the majoritarian end of the spectrum on the executive-parties dimension, with a majoritarian electoral system for the House of Representatives, a two party system and single-party Cabinet executive (counting the National Party as closely allied to the Liberals rather than in competition). Despite this there are certain important consensus elements in the federal-unitary dimension. The most significant include federal governments divided among states, divisions of legislative powers between the House of Representatives and the Senate, a rigid constitution that requires an extraordinary majority to change, judicial review, and an independent central bank (see Lijphart, Chapter 1). Australia therefore shares most in common with the political systems in Canada and the United States. The constitution is neither purely consensual (like the Netherlands or Switzerland) nor purely majoritarian (like New Zealand prior to 1993 or Britain prior to 1997).
But what has been the impact of these constitutional arrangements on Australian democracy and, in particular, on public support for the political system? If ‘institutions matter’, as Weaver and Rockman suggest (1993), then what are the consequences of these rules of the game for how Australians feel about democracy in their country? In particular, compared with those living in a range of comparable democracies, are Australians proud of their country? Are they fairly satisfied with the workings of their political system or do they believe that it needs to be reformed? Do they feel that Australian democracy functions to produce accountability, so that elections produce effective control over government and the policy process, or that politics goes on much as usual irrespective of the outcome at the ballot box? Do they feel that the federal government exercises too much power or too little? And in terms of trust in political actors, do Australians have confidence and trust in their political representatives and civil servants? By comparing attitudes in Australia with the political culture in a wide range of other nations, including established democracies in Western Europe, North America and the Pacific, and newer democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, we can develop benchmarks to monitor public evaluations of the quality of democracy in Australia. Accordingly Part I sets out the theoretical framework and discusses suitable ways to conceptualize and measure support for the political system. Part II examines the evidence using multiple indicators based on the 1995 and 1996 surveys conducted in 26-28 nations by the International Social Science Program (ISSP). The conclusion summarizes the major findings and considers their implications for evaluating Australian democracy and the broader consequences of the constitutional settlement discussed throughout this volume.

**Theoretical Framework, Data and Methods**

The literature comparing popular support for democratic governance has gone through periodic cycles of pessimism and optimism. Three major intellectual waves are evident. In the first wave, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, political developments and intellectual fashions led several theorists to predict a ‘crisis’ of Western democracy (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Huntington 1981). The grassroots demands of ‘exuberant’ democracy were believed to conflict with effective governability (Brittan 1975). These accounts struck a popular chord as the American political system was shaken by riots over civil rights, violent protest over Vietnam, and the trauma of Watergate, while similar echoes were evident in the generational uprisings of 1968 in Europe and Australia.

In the second wave during the 1980s, however, ‘crisis’ theories tended to fall out of favor, as
they appeared to have underestimated the adaptive capacities of the modern state. The resurgence of 'Morning Again' sunny optimism in the affluent mid-1980s seemed to dampen radicalism among the me-generation in America, while in Europe evidence for the 'crisis' thesis came under strong challenge. The five-volume Beliefs in Government project provided an exhaustive analysis of the state of public opinion in Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Kaase and Newton 1995). Instead of growing malaise during these decades the project found that patterns of political support showed trendless fluctuations in different European societies, whether measured by trust in politicians (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995), satisfaction with the workings of the democratic process (Fuchs 1995), institutional confidence (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995), or electoral turnout (Topf 1995). The only evidence consistent with the 'crisis' thesis was a general cross-national weakening in attachment to political parties (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). This phenomenon can be interpreted either as indicative of democratic decline or instead as the replacement of old institutions by new linkages via new social movements and global NGOs.

The last decade of the twentieth century saw a revival of some of the old concerns as many commentators sensed, if not a 'crisis' of government, then at least a more diffuse mood of angst, but the interpretations of trends remains controversial. The end of the black-and-white certainties of the Cold War proved unsettling. New democratic constitutions emerged in many states in Latin America, Asia and Africa, yet before the ink was dry the consolidation process often stagnated due to deep-rooted ethnic conflicts, widening economic inequalities, and endemic political corruption. In America, many popular accounts stressed that the electorate had become deeply disengaged, with voters commonly described as tuned-out and apathetic, at best, and 'ready to revolt', 'angry', 'disgusted', and 'frustrated', at worst (Tolchin 1996; Dionne 1991; Craig 1993). Yet evidence to support these claims has come under challenge in the US (see Norris 2000) and elsewhere (Norris 1999a). In most societies, popular support for the nation-state remains overwhelming, as indicated by high levels of national pride and patriotism (Topf et al. 1989; Klingemann 1999). Klingemann also found that in the mid-1990s the vast majority of countries display widespread adherence to democratic ideals, with a broad consensus about the desirability of basic principles such as the value of free and fair elections, freedom of speech, equality before the law, participation, and minority rights, and approval of democracy as the best form of government. Fuchs and Roller (1998:71) found a broadly similar pattern among post-communist citizens, with the majority of citizens supporting the value of political freedom. Yet at the same time many post-industrial societies have
experienced an erosion of confidence in some of the core institutions of representative democracy, such as parliaments, parties and the courts (Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999), and this pattern has also been noted in Australia (Papadakis 1999). Moreover although the indicators remain somewhat mixed and inconclusive, the available comparative evidence suggests that cynicism about politicians and civil servants has risen in a number of countries. The broad picture suggests that citizens, while adhering strongly to democratic values in the abstract, have become increasingly critical of how well regimes work in practice, producing a growing tension between ideals and reality.

To see how Australia fits into this broad picture, we can draw on cross-national surveys from the mid-1990s. The twenty-six countries in the 1995 International Social Survey Program and the twenty-eight countries included in the 1996 International Social Survey Program allow comparison of a wide range of established and new democracies drawn from many major regions: Western and Northern Europe (Austria, West Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Cyprus, Sweden, the Netherlands), Central and Eastern Europe (East Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia), North America (the United States, Canada), the Middle East (Israel), and the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines). Levels of socio-economic development vary substantially among these nations, which includes some of the larger and most affluent societies with advanced post-industrial economies, all G7 nations, such as Japan, Germany and the United States, as well as smaller welfare states like Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, and poorer countries like Bulgaria, the Philippines and Russia. The political background of these countries also allows us to compare those sharing a common British cultural heritage, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as West European and Post-Communist states.

Before we can go on to examine recent evidence for these trends we need to clarify some of the core concepts. The Eastonian framework provides the classic starting point for any discussion (Easton 1965; Easton 1975) in the tripartite distinction between support for the community (such as the nation-state), for the regime (such as parties or the courts), and the authorities (such as for particular political leaders). These distinctions are an important first step to clarifying our ideas but, as argued elsewhere (Norris 1999a), greater refinement of categories is necessary since there are significant theoretical and empirical gradations within different parts of the regime. In Easton's conception the regime constituted the basic framework for governing the country. People could not pick and choose between different elements of the regime, approving of some parts while rejecting others. Yet in
practice citizens do seem to distinguish between different levels of the regime, often believing strongly in democratic values, for example, while proving critical of the way that democratic governments work in practice. People also seem to make clear judgments concerning different institutions, such as expressing confidence in the courts while disapproving of parliament.

Accordingly, following the conventions discussed elsewhere (Norris 1999a), the original classification can be expanded usefully into a five-fold framework for comparing democracies distinguishing between support for the nation state, for democratic principles, for democratic performance, for democratic institutions, and for political actors. These concepts can be understood as ranging in a continuum from the most diffuse level of national pride and patriotism down through successive levels to the most concrete approval of particular politicians. Understanding these dimensions is also important when we are considering their consequences. At the most diffuse level, an erosion of support for the nation-state represents one of the most urgent and difficult issues facing plural societies like Indonesia, Rwanda or Kosovo. Ethno-national tensions have lead in some cases like Spain or the UK towards devolution and regional autonomy for minorities, and in the most extreme cases towards ethno-national conflict, civil war and the breakdown of the regime. At the most specific level, on the other hand, fluctuations in popular support for particular elected representatives, party leaders or governments, can be seen to represent politics as usual, which is only problematic if persistent and endemic.

The specific items used for the surveys are listed underneath each of the subsequent figures. Descriptive statistics are used to examine cross-national differences and the balance of public opinion on these issues can be summarized using the Percentage Difference Index, a simple statistic calculated as the proportion agreeing minus the proportion disagreeing with a statement. Subsequent multivariate analysis uses ordinary least squared regression models to see how far national-level differences persist as significant after controlling for the standard individual-level factors like age, sex, education and class, and national-level indicators like level of democratic and economic development.

**Political Support: Australia in Comparative Perspective**

**National Pride**

Support for the nation-state at the most diffuse level can be measured by feelings of national identity, such as the strength of territorial attachment to the local neighborhood, region, country or cosmopolitan identity (Norris 1999b), but the response is often highly complex and contextual rather
than stable. That is, people can give different responses depending upon ‘the other’ that is the point of comparison, so that different identities become relevant within different contexts. Hence I may feel European in America, or English in Scotland, or British in France. A more stable indicator is given by feelings of national pride, such as whether people feel proud of their country’s culture or international reputation. McCrone and Surridge (1998:8) found that feelings of national pride are related to a sense of national identity and attachment to one’s country. To compare levels of national pride a scale was constructed from a 10-item battery of items using the following items:

“How proud are you of <Australia> in each of the following...

- Proud of the way democracy works?
- Its political influence in the world?
- <Australia’s> economic achievements?
- Its social security system?
- Proud of <Australia’s> scientific and technological achievements?
- Its achievements in sports?
- Its achievements in the arts and literature?
- <Australia’s> armed forces?
- Its history?
- Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society?”

These items displayed some systematic cross-national variations, for example Germans were far prouder of their economic achievements than their history or army, while exactly the reverse pattern was evident in Britain, but overall responses were highly inter-correlated. Therefore each item was coded from 1 to 4 and the items were combined into a summary 40-point scale. For Figure 1, low pride was recoded as 0-19 while high pride was coded as 20-40.

[Figure 1 about here]

The results in Figure 1 show that the majority of citizens showed high pride in their own country in all the societies under comparison. Nevertheless there were significant differences across nations. The clearest division was between post-communist societies, where less than three-quarters expressed high pride about their country, with the lowest levels in Latvia, Slovakia and Poland, and the Western democracies where 80% of more of all citizens had high pride in their country. At the top of the scale, over nine out of ten citizens living in Australia, Ireland and the United States were proud of their country. In total a remarkable 95% of Australians showed strong pride in their
country, ranking Australia 3rd out of 24 nations in this regard. If there are any problems about support for the political system, this evidence suggests that it is clearly not at this level. Moreover when broken down by category, an overwhelming majority of all Australians said that they were ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ proud of their country’s scientific achievements (96%), sports (93%), arts (89%), armed services (80%), democracy (79%), and history (76%). This was not simply a reflection of patriotism in general, since in contrast there was only a bare majority feeling proud of Australia’s economic achievements or treatment of minority groups. Australian pride in their democracy was only higher in the US, the Netherlands, Canada and Norway, all countries where eight out of ten citizens thought highly of their system.

**Evaluations of Democratic Performance**

But national pride in Australia may be very different from satisfaction with the performance of their government and how positively people responded towards the political system as a whole. For example many US citizens are highly patriotic and proud of American achievements in sports, the military and the economy, while also proving deeply critical of the federal government. Satisfaction with the performance of democracy can be seen to provide an overall evaluation of how well the regime is functioning, in particular whether Australians believe that the system works well without any changes, whether it needs to be reformed, or whether it needs to be completely altered. This can be understood as distinct from attitudes towards democracy as an ideal or abstract value, since this item taps how well the system functions. The survey asked:

"All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in (R’s country) works these days?"

- It works well and needs no changes
- It works well and needs some changes
- It does not work well and needs a lot of changes
- It does not work well and needs to be completely changed."

Figure 2 presents the Percentage Difference Index, as defined earlier, representing the overall balance of positive responses (who favor largely maintaining the status quo) minus the negative responses (who opt for moderate or radical reform). Three main patterns emerge in the results.

[Figure 2 about here]

First, there is considerable cross-national variation ranging from Norway at the highest level, where on balance over three-quarters of the public express approval of their system, down to Russia,
where dissatisfaction is endemic. This range of responses is similar to that found in previous studies based on the 1995-7 World Values Study (Klingemann 1999), lending further confidence to the results.

Second, the most plausible explanation of the ranking suggests that it is probably systematically related to the length of experience of stable democracy and to levels of socioeconomic development in each country, both of which have commonly been found to be associated with democratic satisfaction (Lipset 1993; Klingemann 1999), although the exact nature of this relationship remains to be determined with multivariate analysis and it is far from linear, for example Italians have little faith in their political system compared with citizens in newer democracies like Poland and the Philippines, and there are also considerable contrasts even between neighbors like Sweden and Norway, also found elsewhere (see Holmberg 1999).

Lastly, when compared with other nations, Australia emerges as relatively satisfied with their political system, ranking second out of twenty-five nations and therefore well ahead of equivalent established democracies like the Canada, Britain, and New Zealand. Overall three-quarters of Australians (76%) felt that the system ‘works well but needs some changes’. Few Australians expressed the most positive response, that the system needed no change (8%), but also few felt that the system needed many changes (15%), and almost none opted for complete reform (2%). This preliminary evidence therefore starts to indicate that attitudes towards the political system are remarkably positive in Australia, even when compared with similar post-industrial societies.

Confidence in Political Institutions:

To see whether this pattern remains evident at institutional level we can compare attitudes towards the electoral system and whether people felt that these mechanisms make government responsive to the issues of the day. As discussed throughout this book, elections are the critical mechanism designed to produce government accountability and responsiveness. To monitor judgments about their effectiveness in these regards, the survey asked the following question.

“how much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Elections are a good way of making governments pay attention to the important political issues facing our country.”

Overall the results in Figure 3 show that on balance positive attitudes outweighed negative feelings of electoral responsiveness. The rank order of countries serves to confirm the observations already made. Again there are substantial cross-national differences, ranging from Norway where citizens display the highest approval of their electoral system down to Hungary and Slovakia, with far lower
levels of confidence. And although not quite so high, in this ranking Australians come 5th from the
top in terms of evaluations of electoral responsiveness, with two-thirds on balance showing positive
attitudes. Democracies ranking with lowest confidence in electoral responsiveness tend to be post-
Communist societies, for example there was a marked division between West and East Germans,
although Italy and Japan, both countries which have long experienced one-party predominant
systems, also rank at the bottom of the chart, as does France.

[Figure 3 about here]

The federal system of the dispersal of powers is another central feature of the Australian
constitution, producing considerable autonomy at state-level. To evaluate how Australians feel about
this, we can see whether they believe that the federal government in Canberra has too much or too
little power. Figure 4 shows the results, in this case comparing five nations where we can examine
trends from 1985-1996. The results show that in each country people are more likely to believe that
federal governments have too much rather than too little power, a pattern most marked in the United
States and Britain. The pattern for Australia is distinctive for two reasons: people are least dissatisfied
with the power of the federal government in this country and, moreover, dissatisfaction has declined
slightly over time. The contrasts in evaluations of the powers of government between the more
liberal culture in the United States and the more Benthamite tradition in Australia are substantial: in
1995, two-thirds of Americans thought that their federal government has ‘far too much’ or ‘too
much’ power compared with less than a third of Australians (28%).

[Figure 4 about here]

Trust in Political Actors

Lastly at the most specific level, many popular commentators have noted an erosion of
confidence in political leaders and representatives, as well as creeping cynicism about government
bureaucrats. To examine this issue, the survey used the following questions:

“How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

- People elected as MPs try to keep the promises they have made during the election.
- Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country”

In contrast to previous figures, the balance of opinion in Figures 5 and 6 is clearly
overwhelmingly negative in nearly all countries, with a few exceptions. When asked whether
politicians keep their electoral promises or civil servants can be trusted, most people show
considerable skepticism. Countries at the bottom of the rankings include Italy, Japan, Hungary and Russia, all societies characterized by low trust in political actors. Interestingly, attitudes in some transitional and consolidating democracies proved least cynical, including notably in Bulgaria and the Philippines. In this comparison Australia proved relatively trusting towards politicians (ranking 6th from top) and moderate towards civic servants (12th from top).

[Figures 5 and 6]

Explaining Political Support

To summarize the evidence covered so far, it is apparent that across a wide range of indicators Australians display relatively positive support towards their political system, whether in terms of national pride, satisfaction with democratic performance, evaluations of electoral institutions and the federal government, and, to a lesser extent, trust in politicians and bureaucrats. If the institutional arrangements discussed throughout this book have contributed towards these attitudes, it appears that by this criterion the Australian constitution should be judged a considerable success. But can we draw this inference, or is the association the result of other factors, like levels of socio-economic development among post-industrial states, or the experience of citizens living in stable democracies compared with the political upheavals in transitional and consolidating post-communist regimes?

We cannot consider a wide range of explanations here but to go further we can use multivariate analysis controlling for many factors that could help to explain these systematic cross-national differences. Table 1 displays the results of regression models predicting support for the political system, using a 24-point scale combining the items described in tables 2-6. The first model enters a country’s current level of democratization, based on the 1996 Freedom House 7-point index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Economic development is measured using 1996 World Bank data of per capita GDP. The second model then enters the standard demographic and social variables that are commonly found to influence political attitudes, including age, gender, education, family income, and left-right party affiliation. Lastly the final model enters countries as dummy variables to see whether the national differences remain significant predictors of political support after controlling for all these other factors.

[Table 1 about here]
The results of the first model show that the two indicators of national development are about equally strong predictors of systems support. As we have already observed, diffuse levels of support for the political system can be expected to accumulate in long-established and stable democracies, especially those post-industrial societies characterized by high levels of affluence, education and literacy. Model 2 adds the individual-level social variables, all of which prove significant and in the expected direction. That is, there is greater support for the political system among the older generation, men, the highly educated, the more affluent, and among the leftwing. The last model adds the national dummy variables and most of these remain significant even after including the prior controls. That is to say, the lower than average confidence in the political system evident in most post-communist societies in the mid-1990s is not simply the product of their lower standards of living or current levels of democratization, instead it seems to be systematically associated with their historical legacy and memories of government and the state under communist regimes. Low levels of political support are evident throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and particularly in Hungary, Russia and Poland. Attitudes towards the political system can be expected to be shaped by the experience of citizens under the new democratic regimes introduced after the fall of the Berlin Wall, including the major problems of transition and consolidation, such as fragmented party systems, an ineffective legislature and endemic problems of corruption in Russia. As Barnes and Simon (1998) suggest, the broader political culture among post-communist citizens can also be expected to reflect a lifetime under authoritarian regimes. Problems of disenchantment with the political system are not confined to this region, however, since France and the United States also fall into this category.

There are a number of countries where national differences become insignificant once prior controls are introduced, including Japan, New Zealand and Britain. Among the countries which remain significantly more positive than average in their levels of political support, most are established democracies like Australia, Ireland, Norway and West Germany, although this category also includes the Philippines. The results indicate that although confidence in government and faith in the political system is partly a matter of levels of economic and political development, nevertheless there remain significant and substantial cross-national variations that cannot be reduced to these factors. Without going further into the explanations here, it seems most likely that long-standing cultural and historical traditions, in combination with the actual and perceived performance of the political system, can help account for the contrasts between nations documented here. Further
research is required to understand the major reasons behind this pattern, developing systematic indicators to explore how the performance of democratic institutions relates to how the public evaluates their political system.

**Conclusions**

The centennial in Australia provides a suitable opportunity to reevaluate the innovations introduced in the development of Australian democracy. As this book has demonstrated, many of the features of the constitution have proved innovative, producing a political system combining considerable decentralization of powers and protection of minority rights with a majoritarian electoral system for the House of Representatives and a two-party system of adversarial parliamentary government. The evidence from this concluding chapter is that compared with a wide range of democracies worldwide, this system is one that has inspired considerable reservoirs of public support among its citizens. By all the major indicators, Australian democracy remains one that generates considerable levels of national pride, satisfaction and confidence. Of course no system is perfect, and many major reforms continue to be debated in Australian society, but compared with comparable democracies like Britain, Canada and New Zealand, as well as France, Germany and the United States, the checklist for Australian democracy looks remarkably robust and healthy.
Figure 1: National pride

![National Pride Chart](chart.png)

**Source**: ISSP-95

**Note**: Constructed from a 10-item scale of pride in R’s country in terms of the way democracy works, political influence in the world, economic achievements, social security system, scientific achievements, sporting achievements, achievements in arts, armed forces, history and fair treatment of groups. Each item is scaled 1-4 and the summary score is calculated from 0-40. Low pride is recoded as 0-19. High pride is 20-40.

Figure 2: Evaluations of Democratic Performance

![Bar Chart: Satisfaction with Democracy]

**Note**: Q15: “All in all, how well or badly do you think the system of democracy in (R’s country) works these days?
- It works well and needs no changes
- It works well and needs some changes
- It does not work well and needs a lot of changes
- It does not work well and needs to be completely changed.”

The summary Percentage Difference Index (PDI) is the % ‘no change’/’some change’ minus the percentage ‘lots of changes’/’completely changed’.

**Source**: International Social Survey Programme The Role of Government III 1996.
Figure 3: Confidence in Electoral Responsiveness

"Elections make government pay attention"

Note: Q14e. "How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Elections are a good way of making governments pay attention to the important political issues facing our country." Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. The Percentage Difference Index above represents the percentage that agrees minus the percentage that disagrees with the statement.

Figure 4: Evaluations of Powers of the Federal Government

Note: Q11c. “And what about the <federal> government, does it have too much power or too little power?” Far too much power, too much power, about the right amount of power, too little power, far too little power. The Percentage Difference Index above represents the proportion ‘far too much/too much’ minus the percentage ‘too little/far too little’.

Figure 5: Trust in Politicians

Note: Q14e. “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: People elected as MPs try to keep the promises they have made during the election.” Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. The Percentage Difference Index above represents the percentage that agrees minus the percentage that disagrees with the statement.

Figure 6: Trust in Civil Servants

"Civil servants can be trusted"

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Source: ISSP-1996

Note: Q14e. “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country” Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree. The Percentage Difference Index above represents the percentage that agrees minus the percentage that disagrees with the statement.

Table 1: Models of Political Support

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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
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**Note:** The figures represent standardized Beta coefficients in OLS regression models with the 24-point system support scale (combining items in Tables 2-6) as the dependent variable. Model 1 controls for level of democratization, using the Freedom House 7-point scale of political rights and civil liberties, and level of per capita GDP. Model 2 adds individual level controls for the respondent’s age, gender, education, family income, and left-right party affiliation. Model 3 provides the full model including nations as dummy variables. ** Sig .01. * Sig .05.

**Source:** International Social Survey Programme The Role of Government III 1996.
Reference List


Biographical Note: Pippa Norris is Associate Director (Research) of the Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy and Lecturer at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Author of two-dozen books on comparative elections and public opinion, gender politics and political communications, her most recent book is A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.