Chapter 5

Classifying societies

We have examined evidence of the extensive and growing international market exchanging audio-visual goods and news information services. Global trade in creative goods and services almost doubled in value during the last decade, and now accounts for over 7 percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product.\(^1\) This expansion was fuelled by many factors including the diffusion of information and communication technologies, reductions in trade barriers, and the role of transnational media corporations in marketing and distributing cultural exports. The United States and Europe are the dominant producer nations on the supply-side; although China’s role was expanding in some sectors, developing countries generated less than 1% of global cultural exports. But which countries are fuelling the demand for these products? To help understand these patterns, this chapter develops a Cosmopolitanism index that is designed to measure the permeability of societies to inward information flows. The idea of ‘cosmopolitan communications’ is conceptualized to represent the degree of information flowing across national borders, including the extent to which people interact today within a single global community, or whether these networks remain more localized and parochial.\(^2\) The term ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘parochial’ is employed here descriptively without implying any normative judgment about either type of society. Cosmopolitan communications is understood as openness towards ideas and information derived from divergent cultures, deepening awareness of other places and peoples, including their languages, habits, and customs. Greater understanding and broader knowledge about other countries is generally viewed as desirable, but it can also be seen as reflecting a superficial smattering of familiarity with world cultures, and the loss of identity. There are also some recognized advantages to being deeply immersed within dense communication networks rooted within one particular local community. In practice, all contemporary societies reflect a mix of local and global information sources, and there are important variations among social sectors within countries. But there is also a recognizable continuum stretching from the most isolated and parochial societies at the periphery of communication networks, at one extreme, exemplified by rural and illiterate groups living in Myanmar (Burma), North Korea, Syria and Rwanda, to the other extreme, consisting of highly educated groups in Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Sweden, that are densely interconnected with information flows from the rest of the world.

The idea of cosmopolitan communications is operationalized here in terms of three closely-related aspects. External barriers include the degree to which national borders are open or closed,
whether imports of cultural goods and services are limited by tariffs, taxes, or domestic subsidies, and the extent to which there are restrictions on the movement of people through international travel, tourism, and labor mobility. To compare the extent to which countries are integrated into international networks, we draw upon the KOF Globalization Index. This provides comprehensive annual indicators of the degree of economic, social, and political globalization in 120 countries around the world since the early 1970s.\(^3\) Limits on media freedom also restrict news and information within societies, including through the legal framework governing freedom of expression and information (such as penalties for press offences); patterns of intimidation affecting journalists and the news media (such as imprisonment, deportation, or harassment of reporters); and the nature of state intervention in the media (such as state monopolies of broadcasting, political control over news, and the use of official censorship). The most isolationist regimes seek to control domestic public opinion through rigid censorship of any channels of external information, controlling state broadcasting and limiting access to foreign news. To measure the free flow of news and information internally within each society, we draw upon annual estimates of media freedom developed by Freedom House.\(^4\) Finally, the previous chapter demonstrated that economic underdevelopment is also an important barrier to information; poorer nations generally lack modern communication infrastructures, such as an efficient telecommunication sector and a well-developed multi-channel broadcasting service, and large sectors of the population in these countries often do not have the resources or skills to access media technologies. To compare national-levels of media access, we monitor differences in economic development, measured by per capita GDP in purchasing power parity. Economic development is closely correlated with patterns of media access. In combination, these three factors are combined to develop the Cosmopolitanism index, which is operationalized, tested for reliability, and then applied to compare and classify societies. Selected case-studies illustrate the contrasts between the most cosmopolitan and provincial societies, illustrating the underlying reasons behind the patterns.

**Comparing News Media Systems**

Students of mass communications have long been interested in developing typologies useful for comparing media environments across diverse societies, although no consensus has been established in the research literature, in sharp contrast to the standard conceptual frameworks that have become established elsewhere in comparative politics, for example, to classify party systems or electoral systems, types of power-sharing or power-concentrating democracy, and types of presidential-parliamentary executives. Perhaps the best-known typology designed to compare macro-level news
media systems was established during the Cold War era by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm in the classic *Four Theories of the Press*. The authors suggested that media systems around the world could be classified into four main categories, each reflecting different normative values: a libertarian press emphasizing the importance of the press as a free marketplace of ideas without state interference or regulation; a socially responsible press, reflecting many of the core values embodied in public service broadcasting; authoritarian systems where journalists were subservient to the state, in the interests of maintaining social stability and cohesion; and the Soviet Communist model, where the role of the press was to serve as a collective agitator on behalf of the party (and thus the working class). This classification was widely used in earlier decades but it has become dated over the years, particularly following the demise of the Soviet Union. More recently, two ideal types of media systems have been identified and compared across postindustrial societies: the more market-oriented commercial broadcasting industry, which developed in the United States and throughout much of Latin America (following the libertarian ideal), and the public service model of broadcasting (following the social responsibility ideal), which traditionally dominated contemporary Western Europe and Scandinavia. Increasingly, however, following deregulation of state controlled television, many countries have evolved towards a mixed or dual system, such as that used in Britain, which combines both forms of broadcasting. Moreover the simple distinction between market-oriented and state-oriented media systems, as well as between commercial and public-service broadcasting, conceals important differences within each category. Even the notion of ‘the press’ as an institution is now dated, given the great diversity of mass media outlets and information sources, such as online blogs, discussion forums and viral videos. Other theorists have subsequently expanded or modified the Siebert et al typology, for example by adding a development model of the press, although no consensus has emerged about the most useful classification.

Recent cross-national research by Hallin and Mancini proposed a revised classification of the structure of media systems found in advanced industrialized societies. The authors distinguished four criteria: the extent to which countries differ in the development of media markets (especially for newspapers); the strength of linkages between parties and the media; the degree of journalistic professionalism; and the nature of state intervention in the media system. Based on these criteria, among Western countries, the typology identified an Anglo-American (liberal) model (which the authors suggested was found in the USA, Canada, Britain), a Mediterranean (polarized pluralism) model (found in Italy, Spain, and France), and a Democratic-Pluralist model (found in Austria, Norway, and the Netherlands). The Hallin and Mancini framework is a useful development but it has also come under
challenge. The British dual commercial-public service media system is classified by the authors as Anglo-American, for example, but McQuail points out that Britain may have far more in common with the North European model, given the strong role of BBC public service broadcasting, rather than with the more commercially-dominant American television market. Moreover, as other observers have noted, the traditional distinction between commercial and public service television has become diluted today, with convergence caused by the deregulation, commercialization and proliferation of channels now available in European societies, as well as the spread of transnational media conglomerates. A broader worldwide comparison that goes beyond the role of the news media in post-industrial societies and established democracies is necessary to deal with the issues involved in this study. A more comprehensive classification must include the remaining state-controlled television systems within contemporary autocracies, such as in China and Viet Nam; severe limits on freedom of expression, independent journalism, and human rights, such as in Zimbabwe, Syria, and North Korea; as well as examining whether journalists play a distinctive function in transitional autocracies and emerging democracies. As well as conceptual issues, it is also difficult to apply the Hallin and Mancini typology to categorize types of media environments worldwide with any degree of reliability and consistency, for example, to classify developing societies in terms of the professionalization of journalism, or to gauge the strength of the linkages between parties and news media outlets.

Many other metrics are now available for comparing and evaluating media systems, including both categorical and continuous measures. One alternative approach has classified rights to freedom of expression contained in written constitutions, or whether countries have passed Freedom of Information laws. These measures are an important part of an open society but they were not used in this study, because the crucial factor shaping the actual degree of press freedom is the implementation of such rights or legislation, more than their existence as a legal formality. The Kyrgyz republic, Russia and Colombia have Freedom of Information laws, for example, while Uzbekistan’s constitution guarantees freedom of speech and the press, but this does not mean that in practice journalists are safe from imprisonment or intimidation in these countries or that these regulations have proved effective in promoting partisan balance in the news, freedom of expression and publication, or transparency in government. Moreover, freedom of information is only one dimension of any media environment, and, while often closely linked with freedom of speech and freedom of the press, these are not equivalent concepts. Others have examined and classified the structure of the news industry in different countries around the world, including state and private ownership of the major television channels and newspapers. It would be naïve, however, to assume that private ownership necessarily guarantees
greater press freedom and pluralism more effectively than well-regulated public service television. On balance, we also believe that continuous measures are often preferable to categorical classifications, because unless there are extremely transparent coding processes and judgment rules than the dividing line for the latter often generates relatively arbitrary judgments by the researcher. We are also seeking comprehensive indices that facilitate reliable comparisons over time and across a wide range of societies.

Consequently, we propose to compare societies using the Cosmopolitanism Index, conceptualized as the permeability of national borders to cross-border information flows. This composite measure is constructed by combining three well-established indicators measuring media freedom, economic development, and globalization.

**Classifying and comparing media freedom**

The first core component of the Cosmopolitanism Index concerns the extent to which countries have internal freedom of information. To measure this, we classify countries using Freedom House’s annual index of Press Freedom. A non-governmental organization, Freedom House was founded on a bi-partisan basis more than sixty years ago to promote democracy. The annual Press Freedom index is probably the best known of the available media indicators, widely used by policymakers, academics and journalists.\(^\text{16}\) It is also the most appropriate for our purposes, since it is designed to measure the extent to which countries restrict the flow of information within their national borders. The Freedom House index also provides the most comprehensive coverage of countries around the world, and the longest time-series, since it began conducting its media freedom survey in 1980. Since 1994 it has published its assessments using a 100-point scale that measures the extent to which press freedom is influenced by legal, political and economic factors.

The Freedom House index is designed to measure to what extent the free flow of news is influenced by the legal, political and economic environments. The *legal environment* subdivision encompasses “both and examination of the laws and regulations that could influence media content as well as the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions in order to restrict the media's ability to operate”. In this category Freedom House assesses several issues such as legal and constitutional guarantees of press freedom, penalties for libel and defamation as well as penal codes, the independence of the judiciary and other factors. The *political environment* evaluates “the degree of political control over the content of news media”. This includes the editorial independence of the media, intimidation and threats to journalists, the access to informational sources, and also repressive actions
such as arrests, imprisonment, physical violence and assassinations. Finally, under the *economic environment* category, the characteristics examined are related to “economic considerations that can influence the media’s activities”. Within this category, Freedom House evaluates the existence of competitive pressures leading to biased press reports and investigations, the extent of sponsoring, subsidies, and advertisement and its effect on press coverage and content, the impact of bribery by self-interested actors on what is published and the structure and concentration of media ownership.

Both the ‘legal’ and ‘economic’ categories vary from 0 (complete freedom) to 30 (lack of freedom) while the ‘political’ sub-index ranges from 0 to 40. A country's overall press freedom score is simply the sum of the scores in each of the sub-categories. The assessment of press freedom by Freedom House distinguishes between the broadcast and print media, and the resulting ratings are expressed as a 100-point scale for each country under comparison. The index is based on expert ratings derived from overseas correspondents, staff and consultant travel, international visitors, the findings of human rights and press freedom organizations, specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas, the reports of governments and multilateral bodies, and a variety of domestic and international news media.\(^{17}\) For an intuitively clearer interpretation, we reverse the Freedom House index, so that a higher number represents greater press freedom. Moreover, the coefficients are standardized around the mean (z-scores).

Before going any farther, it is important to check whether the Freedom House index is reliable and unbiased, or whether there is any systematic skew towards an American journalistic culture or liberal notions of press freedom. To do so, we can compare the Freedom House scale with the Worldwide Press Freedom Index (WPF), produced annually by Reporters sans Frontières (Reporters without Borders).\(^ {18}\) The non-profit RSF, based in Paris, works to reduce censorship, oppose laws restricting press freedom, and support journalists. Their 100-point scale is designed to reflect the degree of freedom journalists and news organizations enjoy in each country, and the efforts made by the state to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. The Reporters sans Frontières’ annual Worldwide Press Freedom index provides measures since 2002 and covers a more limited range of countries.\(^ {19}\) The organization compiled a questionnaire containing 52 criteria for assessing the state of press freedom in each country each year. It includes a wide range of violations directly affecting journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical attacks and threats) and news media (censorship, confiscation of issues, searches and harassment). It registers the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for such violations. It also takes account of the legal situation affecting the news media (such as penalties
for press offences, the existence of state monopolies in certain areas and the existence of regulatory bodis), the behavior of the authorities towards the state-owned news media and the foreign press, and the main obstacles to the free flow of information on the Internet. The Worldwide Press Freedom Index is designed to reflect not only abuses attributable to the state, but also those by armed militias, clandestine organizations, or pressure groups that can pose a real threat to press freedom, for example intimidation by drug cartels against investigative journalists. The survey questionnaire was sent to partner organizations of Reporters sans Frontières, including fourteen freedom of expression groups on five continents, as well as to the organization’s 130 correspondents around the world, journalists, researchers, jurists and human rights activists. A 100-point country-score was estimated for each country under comparison. Based on the 2005 score, the 168 countries under comparison by WPF were then ranked. The scale was also standardized around the mean and reversed in direction, so that a higher ranking represents greater press freedom.

[Figure 5.1 about here]

Since journalistic cultures differ, and notions of press freedom are contested, the European origins and base of RSF provides a cross-check against the Washington-based Freedom House metric. As others have noted, these two measures differ in their methodologies, conceptualization, and operationalization; nevertheless the two indicators are strongly related, increasing confidence in the reliability of their estimates. To test for reliability, both indices were compared in the countries included in the World Values Survey. The results, illustrated in the scatter plot in Figure 5.1, show a strong correlation between the two measures, (R=.762, N.159, sig .001, Cubic R²=.623, sig .001). There are some outliers, such as Somalia and the Philippines, where the organizations disagree slightly in their estimates. The two indices differ in their design and methods, but the two organizations report similar estimates, which increases our confidence in the reliability of the underlying measures. Many countries scoring most highly in their internal openness, according to both these indicators, are highly developed nations such as the Netherlands and Sweden, as would be expected in view of the well-established linkages between wealth and democracy. But other countries classified with relatively free media environments by both organizations are far less affluent, such as Hungary, Mali, Trinidad and Tobago, Taiwan, Ghana, Poland, Burkina Faso, and Uruguay. The countries ranked as having the most restrictive internal barriers by both organizations, in the bottom left corner of the scatter-plot, include China, Cuba, Eritrea, Libya, and Turkmenistan, with Ethiopia, Colombia, and Russia classified as less extreme but still restrictive cases. Given the advantages of providing a longer time-series and more
comprehensive global coverage, the Freedom House Press Freedom Index was adopted to compare countries. The nations included in the World Values Survey are skewed towards the open media environments, but there are enough restrictive cases to permit comparison.

Comparing integration into global markets

The second core component of the Cosmopolitanism Index concerns the extent to which countries are integrated into global communication networks. As discussed earlier, globalization is understood as a multidimensional phenomenon that includes access to international communication networks, but also broader interconnections among nation-states, integrating peoples, resources, money, alliances, ecology, goods, services, ideas, and laws. An extensive literature has examined specific components of this phenomenon, but the pace and extent of change often differs substantially according to the aspect examined, for example in the timing of waves of population migration following the disintegration of fragile states or outbreaks of armed conflict; the dismantling of trade barriers after regional and bilateral trade agreements; and the adoption of new advances in consumer digital technologies or innovative social functions of the internet, such as the use of Face-book, YouTube or text messaging. An attempt to develop an integrated and comprehensive multidimensional index of globalization, by A.T. Kearney for Foreign Policy, combines indicators measuring economic integration through trade and finance, the diffusion of technological connectivity, levels of personal contact, and the engagement of states in international organizations. This ranking is useful but unfortunately it is restricted to measuring annual trends since 1999 in about 70 countries, which means that it cannot be used for a worldwide comparison over a longer time period.

For the second dimension of the Cosmopolitanism Index, this book draws instead on the 2008 KOF Index of Globalization, constructed by the Swiss Economic Institute, providing consistent time-series annual data for a broader range of 120 nations from 1970 to 2005. This 100-point index is based on two dozen variables, designed to gauge three dimensions: social globalization (the spread of personal contact, information flows, and cultural proximity); economic globalization (the actual long-distant flows of goods, investment capital, and commercial services, as well as restrictions through import barriers, taxes and tariffs); and political globalization (measured by integration with international inter-governmental organizations, the number of embassies based in a country, and national engagement in UN peace missions). The KOF Index measure of social globalization monitors potential information flows that are available in any country through mass and personal communications, including trends in the proportion of internet users, cable television subscribers, access to radio receivers, outgoing telephone
traffic, international letters, international tourism, and trade in newspapers and periodicals (in percent of GDP) since 1970. One important caveat is needed; the KOF index utilizes a comprehensive set of statistical indicators derived from official sources and standardized by international agencies but unfortunately these data are missing for many states, especially low-income countries that lack the institutional capacity to record and collect reliable statistics. The comparative framework includes 120 nations but coverage is systematically skewed towards more affluent economies. As a result, the index tends to over-estimate the degree of globalization worldwide. Bearing this qualification in mind, the index is therefore best for gauging annual trends over time within given countries.

Using this data allows us to analyze whether there has been a steadily rising tide of economic, social and political globalization around the world in recent decades, as many observers suggest, and, also to identify which states and continents have been leaders and laggards in this process. The comparison of the overall trends in the KOF index illustrated in Figure 5.2 confirms that there has been a dramatically increasing level of globalization worldwide, as many accounts have argued. The economic and social indices show the steadiest pattern of growing interconnections since the early-1970s, while the indicators of the political dimension displayed slightly greater fluctuations over time. In the period from 1972 to 2004, the overall 100-point KOF index rose on average worldwide from 36 to 56 percentage points, representing a two-thirds increase. The overall pattern shows a gradual rise from the early-1970s to the late-1980s, followed by an accelerated surge during the last fifteen years. International agreements leading to the reduction of trade barriers and tariffs have opened markets, while the spread of technological communications has contributed to denser social networks, and the growth of the institutions of multilateral governance and regional organizations during this era has encouraged states to become increasingly interconnected.

[Figure 5.2 about here]

At the same time, however, the impact of globalization, and thus the openness of borders to external information flows, has been far from even around the world. Figure 5.3 illustrates how globalization has affected different types of economies (classified by levels of GDP in purchasing power parity measured in constant (2000) international dollars). Low-income economies, which depend largely upon export of raw primary commodities, have become increasingly integrated into international markets since the early 1990s. Economic studies indicate that societies have attracted greater international investment and flows of foreign capital following state reforms leading towards liberalization, deregulation and privatization, the dismantling of trade barriers, and the reduction or
removal of protectionist tariffs. More open developing societies have generally attracted greater inward-investment and increased trade flows, generating economic growth.\textsuperscript{27} Several developing nations have grown substantially through export-led strategies; today European and North American supermarkets are regularly supplied with a wide range of fresh imported goods flown around the world, from Kenyan produce, to Colombian flowers, or Thai shrimp. Among the middle-income emerging economies, China lifted trade barriers and negotiated entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001, and it has rapidly become the global leader in the export of manufactured goods, a strategy that has lifted large sectors of its urban population out of poverty, while India has benefitted from the rapid expansion of service technology, call centers, and off-shore commerce.\textsuperscript{28} Nevertheless, despite these important cases, a substantial 35-point gap in the KOF Globalization Index divides high and low-income economies today, and no narrowing of this gap has occurred during the last three decades (see Figure 4.5). Poorer societies have become more integrated into the global economy and global communication networks during this era, but they have not caught up with the level of integration found in most rich societies.

[Figures 5.3 and 5.4 about here]

To compare changes among the leaders and laggards in more detail, Figure 5.4 illustrates the position of countries included in the KOF globalization index in 1972 and in 2005. Countries falling on the diagonal line showed no change over this period. As the scatter plot shows, most countries (such as China, Poland, and Sweden) fall above the dotted diagonal line, indicating that they have become more globalized during the past three decades. The countries that were most globalized in 2005 include many of the smaller advanced industrialized countries and service economies, such as Belgium, Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, which are leaders in this process. The A.T. Kearney index suggests similar patterns.\textsuperscript{29} This confirms more impressionistic evidence, such as the internationalization of Brussels, Geneva, The Hague, Stockholm, and Vienna, the home of many international NGOs and many multilateral organizations for EU, NATO, and UN bureaus and agencies. The process of European integration during these decades, including the development of a single market and the institutions of European governance within the border of the European Union, has contributed towards the interconnections of member states that are at the top of the globalization index. It is notable that although one sixth of the U.S. gross domestic product is currently earned from the export of goods and services, plus income from foreign investment, the United States is not at the forefront of globalization, in part because the size of the American economy ensures a large domestic market for its goods and
services. Most leaders in globalization are smaller high-income advanced industrialized societies but some middle-income economies are also relatively globalized, including Portugal, Poland, Malaysia, and Turkey. Among low-income nations and emerging economies, China, the Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan all stand out as becoming increasingly interconnected with the rest of the world by ties of trade, communications, and multilateral governance. Lastly, the countries that are most isolated from these networks include many of the poorest nations on the African sub-continent, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Madagascar, Burundi, and the Central African Republic, as well as other low-income nations such as the isolated kingdom of Nepal, the closed regime of Iran in the Middle East, and the fragile state of Haiti in the Caribbean.30

The geographic spread of globalization is shown in more detail in Figure 5.5, illustrating the map of the world. The KOF globalization index was dichotomized into low and high globalization countries and the results of the classification are compared, showing snap-shots in 1990 and 2005, noting the qualification made earlier that many poorer nations are not included in the index. The transformation of the world during these years is easily apparent from the available data; in 1990, the major states that were most globalized included post-industrial economies in North America and Western Europe, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Chile and Venezuela. But by 2005, globalization had swept through most of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, South East Asia, as well as Asia-Pacific and parts of Southern and Western Africa. This process has not yet transformed most of Africa, however, nor the Middle East and Central Eurasia, pin-pointing the location of the disparities already observed between rich and poor economies. We can conclude that most nations have experienced a dramatic increase in the volume, density and speed of cross-border interconnections during recent decades. Globalization has been encouraged by the lowering of trade barriers and tariffs under international agreements, the spread of travel and tourism, international migration, expanding access to interpersonal and mass communications, and the integration of countries into the institutions of global and regional governance, as many observers have noted. 31 At the same time the reach of the globalization process has been limited and many of the poorest societies in the world have been largely excluded from world markets, as have some autocratic states.

[Figure 5.5 about here]
Development and lack of media access

The last core component of the Cosmopolitanism Index concerns the extent to which countries have widespread public access to communication networks. Limits on communications arise from an under-developed communications infrastructure, as already documented. This process operates at the societal level and also at the individual level. If only a few affluent segments of the public regularly watch the television news or read newspapers, then even if this process has a strong impact on these individuals, it is unlikely to affect public opinion and the national culture more broadly. On the other hand, if there is widespread public access to the news media, then this is more likely to have a broader impact on societal values and attitudes. Many international statistics have attempted to harmonize indicators of media access, including work by UNESCO on newspaper circulation figures, the availability of TV sets, and access to radios, as well as by the ITU which monitors the telecommunications infrastructure. These measures are helpful to illustrate the disparities in access, discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless the standard indicators are often incomplete across country coverage, as well as limited in providing reliable annual estimates.

Given these problems, for the third component the Cosmopolitanism Index incorporates estimates of per capita GDP in purchasing power parity, expressed in international dollars, provide a standard indicator for levels of economic development. These statistics are almost universally available on an annual basis as a reliable time-series, as well as being strongly correlated with the available statistics from the Banks Cross National Time Series data 1972-2007 on media access. Table 5.1 shows the strong and significant correlation (R=.742*** ) between levels of economic development (GDP in purchasing parity power, expressed in constant International dollars) and the media access scale (combining the proportion of households with TVs and radio sets, newspaper circulation, and internet users) derived from the Banks dataset. Moreover economic development was also strongly correlated with the KOF annual globalization index during the same period (R=.806***). The Freedom House Press Freedom index (1994-2006) was also significantly correlated with economic development (R=.547*** ) as well as with the KOF Globalization Index (R=.574*** ) and with the Banks media access scale (R=.470***).

[Table 5.2 about here]

Reliability analysis is a suitable procedure to estimate the internal consistency of any composite scaled measure. The standardized indicators for Media Freedom, the Globalization Index, and Economic
Development generated a strong Cronbach’s Alpha (.855), suggesting a high degree of internal consistency in the scale, and the Alpha weakened if any separate component was excluded. When the three indices were subjected to principle component factor analysis with varimax rotation, as shown in Table 5.2, the test could only extract a single dimension, explaining in total 77% of the variance. Given the strong inter-correlation among these indicators, entering all three dimensions separately into regression models can cause serious problems of multi-collinearity, where the size and signs for coefficients and standard errors become unreliable. Accordingly the indicators of Media Freedom, Economic Development and the Globalization Index were first standardized around the mean, with a standard deviation of 1, to give each component equal weighting, and then combined into a single Cosmopolitanism index. The final index was also standardized around the mean, with a standard deviation of 1.0, as is conventional for multilevel regression analysis, to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients in subsequent models.

The Cosmopolitanism Index rankings

Based on these considerations, we can operationalize and apply the Cosmopolitanism Index to classify 118 countries worldwide where data is available, illustrated in Figure 5.6, and briefly describe some illustrative cases.

Cosmopolitan societies

The most cosmopolitan societies are classified in this study as those with the lowest external and internal barriers in access to information, and this includes the countries ranked at the top of figure 5.6. Many of these are affluent post-industrial economies and established democracies, especially smaller societies such as Luxembourg, Switzerland, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as well as larger West European countries such as Germany and France. Anglo-American countries are also well-represented, including the United States, the UK, and Australia. It is striking that a range of newer democracies and middle income emerging economies from different regions around the world are also relatively cosmopolitan, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, South Korea, and Chile. These countries have made rapid strides in press freedom during recent years, as well as a broader range of political rights and civil liberties, and they have also become leading nations that are more strongly integrated into multilateral networks of trade, communications, and governance.
Switzerland most clearly exemplifies cosmopolitan communications, a small multi-linguistic country at the cultural cross-roads of Europe, with a population of 7.5 million, bordering on Germany, Austria, Lichtenstein, Italy and France. One of the most affluent countries in the world, with a GDP per capita of $41,100, the prosperous Swiss economy has a large service sector that is closely tied to international finance, insurance, banking, and tourism, as well as a manufacturing sector in chemicals and precision instruments. Although not a member of the European Union, Switzerland is closely tied to multilateral organizations, with many United Nations agencies and bureaus headquartered in Geneva, including the World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, and International Labor Organization. Switzerland also lays claim to being the world’s oldest democracy, where freedom of the press was enshrined in the federal constitution in the mid-19th century. According to Reporters without Borders, in 2007 Switzerland ranked as 11th highest out of 169 nations in press freedom, above the UK, Canada and Germany. Freedom House ranks it even higher (7th out of 195 countries).

Today broadcasting is dominated by the public service Swiss Broadcasting Corporation (SRG/SSR), founded in 1952, which operates seven TV networks and eighteen radio stations.32 Most of its funding comes from license fee revenues; a smaller proportion comes from TV advertising. Public service broadcasting is organized today as a non-profit company, with a complicated set of regional associations, including audience councils, designed to safeguard the public interest. The Swiss Broadcasting Corporation has a mandate to produce programming for domestic consumption, as well as information programs for to promote Switzerland’s image abroad and to support contact with the Swiss expatriat community. Since 1982, Switzerland has operated a dual system, and multiple private (commercial) radio and TV stations offer programs at national and regional levels. In addition, television stations from France, Germany and Italy are widely available, thanks to the high penetration of multi-channel cable and satellite TV. By 2002, more than 80% of all households were equipped with either satellite receivers or broadband cable networks. There are about forty German-language television channels available in Switzerland, such as RTL, ARD and Pro, and some German commercial broadcasters provide tailored versions of their channels for the Swiss market. Similarly, the French-speaking and Italian-speaking regions show a lot of programming imported from outside the country. English-language programs are commonly broadcast dubbed into other languages in Switzerland, while CNN International, BBC Prime, EuroNews, Sky TV and CNBC are all available in English, along with World Radio Switzerland. The European Audiovisual Observatory analyzed the daily audience market share for TV viewing and estimated that in 2002, over 60% of the Swiss audience was watching foreign channels.33 With a highly-educated and affluent population, the telecommunication infrastructure in Switzerland is
also well-developed, with extensive access to the computers, landline and mobile telephones, and with one of the highest rates of broadband wireless access to the internet in Europe; in 2006, just over two-thirds (68%) of the population used the Internet, according to Nielsen Net//Ratings. There are also multiple leading daily newspapers, such as Blick and Tagesanzeiger published in Zurich, Le Matin in Lausanne, and Corriere del Ticino in Lugano, as well as general interest magazines and multiple publishing houses.

But not all cosmopolitan societies are affluent post-industrial societies; some emerging economies such as South Africa are also increasingly cosmopolitan. Following the transitional democratic elections in April 1994, the South African media landscape has experienced the liberalization and deregulation of state control of broadcasting, the diversification of the print sector, constitutional and legal guarantees of freedom of access to state-held information, and growing use of the Internet. Deregulation in 1996 led to a proliferation of radio stations. Listeners in Johannesburg can choose from among forty radio services, from the national broadcasts of the state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to community stations targeting local neighborhoods or ethnic groups. SABC operates three national TV networks and two pay-TV channels, while commercial national broadcasters offer free and pay-TV channels, offering the usual mix of news and current affairs, sports and entertainment, movies, reality shows, and soaps, combining locally-produced and imported programming. The constitution provides for freedom of the press, and this is generally respected. In 2006, for example, out of 168 nations worldwide, Reporters sans Frontières ranked South Africa 44th from the top in press freedom, higher than the United States (ranked 53rd) and Japan (51st), and roughly similar to Italy and Spain. Laws, regulation and political control of media content are considered moderate. Human Rights Watch, an international watchdog body, praises the progress that South Africa has made in freedom of expression, despite remaining critical of the countries’ human rights record on other issues, including deep levels of rural poverty, challenges of patriarchy and gender equality, and violations of the rights of asylum-seekers and economic migrants. Newspapers and magazines publish reports and comment critical of the government and the state-owned SABC is far more independent now than during the apartheid era. As a result, although there remain tensions in the complex relationship between journalists and the ANC, during the last decade the news media have emerged as an increasingly autonomous actor, less closely aligned with the interests of the government or political parties. South Africa is also one of the leading countries on the continent in terms of integration in the global economy, with the 2008 KOF index ranking the country as 48th most globalized out of 120 nations, in a roughly comparable position to Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. Countries in globalized-
pluralist category of media environments are most exposed to the impact of cross-border information flows, with minimal protectionist barriers to foreign imports and global influences on indigenous national cultures.

**Provincial societies**

By contrast, provincial societies are those where communication and information networks are more strongly rooted within a particular local community or region, with more rigid barriers to external forces. We expect to find that the beliefs and attitudes of the people living in provincial societies will be less affected by the cultural impact of cross-border information flows. Provincial societies are ranked at the bottom of figure 5.6. The most extreme outliers, such as Myanmar, Iran, Syria, Haiti, Nepal, Burundi, and Rwanda, are poorly integrated into global markets; they are also relatively isolated from participation in the major international and regional communication networks, lacking investment in their telecommunications infrastructure, as well as having limited internal press freedom for journalists and reporters in civic society. Some of these societies, including Zimbabwe, Iran, Egypt, Syria and Pakistan, have experienced intermittent periods of media liberalization followed by state clamp-downs, with sporadic battles involving the governing authorities, conservative forces, opposition reform movements in civil society and independent journalists in the struggle over control of the press.37

Syria illustrates the role of the state in contributing towards isolationism. In this country, the government owns and controls much of the media, including the daily newspapers, *Al-Thawra* ("The Revolution"), *Tishrin*, and the English-language *Syria Times*, while the Baath party publishes *Al-Baath*. There was a brief flowering of press freedom after Bashar al-Assad became president in 2000. The normally staid government newspapers cautiously started to discuss reform and democracy. For the first time in nearly 40 years, private publications were licensed. The new titles included political party papers *Sawt al-Shaab* and *Al-Wahdawi*, and a satirical journal. But within a year, under pressure from the old guard, the president cautioned against over-zealous reform, a subsequent press law imposed a new range of restrictions, and publications could be suspended for violating content rules. Criticism of President Bashar al-Assad and his family is banned and the domestic and foreign press is censored over material that is deemed to be threatening or embarrassing. Journalists practice self-censorship and foreign reporters rarely get accreditation. Reporters without Borders documents common abuses: “Journalists and political activists risk arrest at any time for any reason and are up against a whimsical and vengeful state apparatus that continually adds to the list of things banned or forbidden to be mentioned. Several journalists were arrested in 2006 for interviewing exiled regime opponents, taking
part in conferences abroad or for criticizing government policies. They were subjected to lengthy legal proceedings before the Damascus military court that, under a 1963 law, tries anyone considered to have undermined state security.”38 Critical journalists outside the country write for the Lebanese or pan-Arab press, such as the Beirut daily Al-Nahar, and the influential London daily Al-Hayat, as well as contributing to Al-Jazeera and other regional satellite channels.39 Syrian TV, operated by the Ministry of Information, operates two terrestrial and one satellite channel. It has cautiously begun carrying political programs and debates featuring formerly taboo issues, as well as occasionally airing interviews with opposition figures. Syria also launched some privately-owned radio stations in 2004 but these were restricted from airing any news or political content. With an estimated 1.5 million internet users in Syria by 2007, the web has emerged as a vehicle for dissent. In the view of Reporters Without Borders, however, Syria is one of the worst offenders against internet freedom as the state censors opposition bloggers and independent news websites. Human Rights Watch notes that the government of Syria regularly restricts the flow of information on the internet and arrests individuals who post comments that the government deems too critical.40 Overall Syria ranks 154th out of 166 countries in the RWB 2007 Worldwide Press Freedom index. Similarly, in terms of press freedom, Freedom House ranks the country 179th out of 195 states worldwide.41

Burma (Myanmar) is even more draconian in attempts by the regime to suppress internal dissent and to exercise total control over the media message flowing across national borders. In September 2007, for example, thousands of monks and civilians took to the streets of Rangoon in a week-long uprising against the Burmese government. In response, the military junta shut down the Internet, arrested or intimidated Burmese journalists, and severed mobile and landline phone links to the outside world. A Japanese video journalist from AFP news was shot dead. Cameras and video cell phones were confiscated by soldiers. The official Division for Press Scrutiny and Registration pressured local editors to publish stories claiming that the unrest was organized by ‘saboteurs’. In the immediate aftermath of these events, thousands of monks were said to have been arrested, but after the media clampdown no images of these events were published in the domestic and international news.42 The pattern repeated itself after the disastrous impact of Cyclone Nargis struck, killing tens of thousands in May 2008. Even in less turbulent times, critical coverage of the Burmese junta is severely restricted in domestic news media, silencing negative stories about the military leadership. Everything from poetry to films is censored. Foreign short-wave radio is a key source of information about both the outside world and events at home. The BBC World Service, Voice of America, the US-backed Radio Free Asia, and the Norway-based opposition station, Democratic Voice of Burma, drawing upon reporters exiled to
Thailand, target listeners in Burma. But if caught, citizens can be punished for listening to overseas radio broadcasts. Internet access is tightly controlled by the government. It is further hampered by a poor telephone infrastructure and an unreliable supply of electricity. Nor are these isolated instances of state control of the airwaves. Although Burma is an extreme case, regularly ranking near the bottom of worldwide annual assessments of press freedom produced by Reporters sans frontières and Freedom House, human rights observers report that many other states routinely deploy techniques designed to suppress independent journalism, manipulate and slant news selectively in their favor, and limit critical coverage of the regime.

China and Russia constitute additional, although less isolationist, cases. These countries are highly integrated into global markets economically, with well-developed infrastructures for transnational communications, as well as being leading powers in the institutions of multilateral governance. Nevertheless these societies allow only limited internal press freedom. China, for example, liberalized its newspaper market during the 1990s, by reducing state subsidies, so that publishers need to attract readers and thus commercial advertising, to remain financially viable. Nevertheless the Committee to Protect Journalists, a New York non-profit organization, claims that China is the world’s leading jailer of journalists, and there remain serious restrictions on reporting sensitive political topics, such as ethnic conflict and religion, such as the obstruction of foreign journalists trying to cover the Tibetan uprisings in March 2008. 43 Strict limits on the air-waves continue, through state control of China Central TV (CCTV), the only nation-wide broadcaster, offering 16 major television channels, and functioning organizationally as a sub-ministry within the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television. 44 The central government and party leadership also owns and controls the Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International, China Central Television, the Guangming Daily, and the People’s Daily. Text messaging is an important and growing source of inter-personal communication but the government uses sophisticated technology and an estimated 30,000 email police to intercept and censor sensitive topics on email and the Internet (such as websites about human rights), through using proxy firewalls, blocking routers, software filters, and restricted access, and Beijing also actively persecutes and imprisons cyber-dissidents. 45 While seeking to maintain strict internal control, however, the Communist party faces several growing challenges. In particular, China wanted to reinforce national pride and its positive world image as an emerging global economy by hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but this event also offered activists an opportunity to raise difficult issues of human rights for ethnic minorities in Tibet and elsewhere. In Russia, as well, many observers reported that, even though the old forms of censorship and overt state control are no longer in force, in recent years the country has
persecution and intimidation of journalists, as well as pro-government bias on television election news. Russia and China are potentially becoming increasingly open to cross-border information flows, especially through the expansion of opportunities for international trade and travel, but there remain serious internal restrictions on the main media channels (especially broadcasting) that disseminate information about the world.

Isolation from international communication networks is not simply the product of state repression, however; some poorer democracies, such as Mali, Ghana, and Benin, have a diverse independent press and few major restrictions on journalism, but they also have little public access to mass communications. In Mali, for example, freedom of expression is guaranteed in the constitution and observers report that this is generally respected by the democratic government. More than forty privately-owned newspapers and magazines are published in French, Arabic and local languages. Alongside about 125 commercial and community radio stations, and public service radio and television, there is access to multichannel satellite and cable television stations by subscription. But at the same time Mali remains relatively isolated from global markets and multilateral institutions, so that its communication infrastructure remains under-developed. Mali is one of the poorest countries in West Africa, ranking 173rd out of 177 nations according to UNDP’s 2007 Human Development index, in one of the poorest regions in the world. In 2005, per capita income was $1003 (in PPP US$). Malians have access to an estimated 570,000 radios and 160,000 television sets, along with 30,000 Internet users, for an estimated population of about 12 million. Multimedia campaigns using traditional music and village performing arts, and free wind-up radios, have been distributed for development projects, such as to spread information about family planning and environmental programs. Less than half the adult population is literate, which hampers newspaper readership and circulation. The country also has an estimated 100,000 landline and cell telephones, but telecommunications are expensive, with poor geographic coverage, and distances are large. Potentially those living in Mali, like the populations in Benin and Botswana, have a relatively free news media, but in practice public access is severely restricted by lack of the basic infrastructure for mass communications and new information technologies. The population has restricted levels of internet connectivity, access to satellite and cable broadcasting, and telecommunications.
Discussion and conclusions

Many communication theorists have attempted to compare media systems systematically, notably the classic Siebert et al distinction between libertarian and social responsibility notions of the press.\textsuperscript{49} Unfortunately the Siebert approach is now out-dated and it is difficult to operationalize with any degree of reliability and consistency. More recently, Hallin and Mancini developed a typology of media systems found in established democracies, but this remains too limited for global comparisons, including the role of the media in non-democratic regimes.\textsuperscript{50}

This chapter has developed an alternative comparative typology of cosmopolitan communications based on the society’s internal and external openness to information flows. The striking contrasts between the rich and open communications environments found in affluent cities such as Geneva, Luxembourg, and Oslo, and those of the mass publics in Port-Au-Prince, Kigali, and Damascus, are obvious to any casual observer, but the implications of these differences for the penetration of global information on local cultures has been underestimated. Operationally the Cosmopolitanism index combines the Freedom House indicators of levels of press freedom (for internal openness), the KOF indicators of levels of globalization (for external openness), and level of economic development (as a proxy indicator for media access). The classification was then applied to 118 countries worldwide, where data is available, including the 93 states included in the World Values Survey.

Any classification of media systems should ideally meet the standards of being logically and theoretically coherent, and its empirical indicators must also be valid—that is, they must closely match the underlying concepts that they purport to measure. Moreover a key test of the utility of this classification is whether it reflects the distinct effects that are predicted theoretically. There are strong reasons to believe that the free flow of information within societies and across previously-rigid national borders will have important consequences by interacting with patterns of media use.\textsuperscript{51} The second part of the book goes on to test empirically whether people paying attention to television, the Internet, and newspapers who live in cosmopolitan societies are indeed most open to cultural change, as hypothesized.
Figure 5.1: Comparing media freedom, 2005

Note: The ratings of press freedom for 2005 provided by Freedom House and Reporters sans Frontières for the countries included in the 5th wave of the World Values Survey, 2005-6. The 100-point scores were reversed and standardized around the mean (Z-scores).

Figure 5.2: Rising trends in globalization, 1972-2004

Source: KOF Index of Globalization, 2008
Figure 5.3: The persistent globalization gap between rich and poor nations, 1975-2004

![Diagram showing the persistent globalization gap between rich and poor nations from 1975 to 2004. The gap is represented by the difference in the Mean Globalization Index (KOF 2008) for low, medium, and high-income countries over the years.]

**Notes:** The type of economy is categorized from per capita Gross Domestic Product (in purchasing power parity) in constant (2000) international dollars. ‘Low’ = less than $1999. Medium = $2000-14,999. High = $15,000+.

**Source:** GDP from World Development Indicators (World Bank); KOF Index of Globalization, 2008.
Figure 5.4: Changes in globalization over time, 1972-2005

Notes: The type of economy is categorized from per capita Gross Domestic Product (in purchasing power parity) in 2006 measured in international dollars. ‘Low’ =less than $1999. Medium =$2000-14,999. High=$15,000+. The solid line represents the regression best fit. The dotted diagonal line represents the ‘no change’ position.

Source: GDP from World Development Indicators (World Bank); KOF Index of Globalization, 2008.
Figure 5.5: The expansion of globalization 1990-2005

Note: KOF Globalization Index 100-points dichotomized into least (0-49) and most globalized (50-100) nation-states.
5.6 Cosmopolitanism Index rankings, 2005

Note: The Cosmopolitanism index is conceptualized as the permeability of societies to information flows and it is constructed according to levels of globalization, media freedom, and economic development, with all indices standardized. See text for details.
Table 5.1: Correlations with the Cosmopolitanism Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Economic development (GDP in PPP (Constant $ international) WB)</th>
<th>Media access: (Banks)</th>
<th>Media Freedom: (Freedom House)</th>
<th>Cosmopolitan Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media access:</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .742</td>
<td>.866</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Banks)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) .000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>N 4255</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Freedom:</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .547</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Freedom House)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) .000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>N 1764</td>
<td>1283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation .806</td>
<td>.716</td>
<td>.574</td>
<td>.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index: (KOF 2008)</td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed) .000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N 3305</td>
<td>3759</td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>1283</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Media Freedom, representing internal openness to information flows, is measured by the Freedom House Press Freedom Index (z-scores). Integration into global networks, representing external openness to information flows, is measured by the KOF index of Globalization, (z-scores). There were 14 cases where information was not available for the KOF Index; in these cases, countries were classified as based on the regional mean for the KOF index. The level of economic development is measured by per capita GDP in PPP in constant international dollars (World Bank). The Cosmopolitan Index combines the indices for Economic development, media freedom and globalization. For comparison, the Banks Media access scale is also included, representing the proportion with access to radio sets, TVs, newspapers and the Internet.
Table 5.2: Factors analysis of the components of the Cosmopolitanism Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globalization Index (KOF)</td>
<td>.919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development (GDP in PPP, Constant $ international) (World Bank)</td>
<td>.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Freedom (Freedom House)</td>
<td>.799</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All scales were first standardized around the mean. The principle component factor analysis with varimax rotation generated a single dimension that accounted, in total, for 77% of the variance in the composite index. For the definition and measurement of each item, see Appendix A.


4 For more methodological details and results, see Freedom House. 2007. Global Press Freedom 2007. www.freedomhouse.org. The IREX Media Sustainability Index provides another set of indicators (http://www.irex.org/resources/index.asp). The Media Sustainability Index benchmarks the conditions for independent media in a more limited range of countries across Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Unfortunately the IREX index does not contain sufficient number of cases worldwide to provide a further cross-check for this study.


7 Michael Schudson. 2002


13 See the review by Andrew Pudennphatt. 2007. Defining Indicators of Media Development: Background Paper. Paris: UNESCO.


17 For more methodological details and results, see Freedom House. 2007. Global Press Freedom 2007. www.freedomhouse.org. The IREX Media Sustainability Index provides another set of indicators (http://www.irex.org/resources/index.asp). The Media Sustainability Index by IREX benchmarks the conditions for independent media in a more limited range of countries across Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Unfortunately the IREX index does not contain sufficient cases of countries included in the WVS-5 to be useful as a cross-check for this study.

18 For details of the methodology and annual rankings, see Reporters sans Frontières. 2006. Annual World Press Freedom Index. www.rsf.org

19 For details of the methodology and annual rankings, see Reporters sans Frontières. 2006. Annual World Press Freedom Index. www.rsf.org

20 Lee B. Becker, Tudor Vlad, and Nancy Nusser. 2007. ‘An Evaluation of Press Freedom Indicators.’ International Communication Gazette, 69(1): 5 - 28. Moreover Becker et al also found that IREX’s Media Sustainability Index, covering 20 countries in 2001-2003, was also strongly correlated (R=.72 to .91) with the Freedom House and the RSF ratings. Only the Committee to Project Journalist’s tally of attacks on the press differed in their evaluations from the other three indices.

21 Further analysis found that replication of the core regression models in this study using the Reporters Without Borders classification suggests that the results remain robust and consistent irrespective of which particular measure of press freedom is used, which is hardly surprising given the strong inter-correlation of both measures.


33 Eurodata-TV/European Audiovisual Observatory.


32


