Political Protest in Fragile States

Pippa Norris

Director, Democratic Governance Group
United Nations Development Program
Bureau for Development Policy
304 East 45th Street, 10th Floor
New York, NY 10017
http://www.undp.org/governance/

McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu
www.pippanorris.com

Abstract: Since the mid-seventies, an extensive body of literature has analyzed political activism in Western democracies, utilizing the methods of survey research, historical comparisons, and events analysis to understand the ways that people participate in the public sphere, the processes that lead them to do so, and the consequences of these acts. By contrast, far less has been established about the causes and consequences of protest politics occurring in fragile states, understood here as a range of poorer developing nations facing serious risks of political instability, conflict, and, in extreme cases, even state collapse.

To explore these issues, *Part I* reviews the previous literature on protest politics and outlines the theoretical framework. *Part II* summarizes the research design. The analysis presented in *Part III* compares the individual-level *causes* of protest activism in four different types of states, with survey data derived from the 1999-2000 World Values Study. *Part IV* considers the broader *consequences* of political protest, particularly for political stability and government effectiveness. The conclusion summarizes the main results and reflects upon the role of protest politics in contributing towards processes of regime change.

Research on political activism compares the ways that people participate in the public sphere, the processes that lead them to do so, and the consequences of these acts. Although recent work has broadened the comparative perspective, the long tradition of survey research seeking to understand this phenomenon, discussed by others at this session, has focused primarily upon Western democracies.[1] Much of the initial impetus for this research was a concern about the potential consequences of participation, both positive and negative, for the stability of regimes. As Bermeo emphasizes, the question of what ordinary people do and how they act in the breakdown of autocracies or democracies has long been at the center of the political science agenda.[2]

This issue is nowhere more relevant today than in fragile states. Recent years have witnessed growing concern by the international community about the potential dangers arising from fragile states, including reports and programs initiated by the World Bank, the UN, the OECD/DAC, as well as the US and UK governments, and the State Failure Taskforce.[3] There is no standard definition or agreed measurement of what constitutes a 'fragile' state, but these are generally understood to be characterized by weak governance institutions.[4] Exemplified by the cases of Haiti, Somalia and Rwanda, fragile states characteristically lack either the political will or the capacity to deliver basic public services, especially to maintain security and alleviate deep-seated poverty. These regimes are of particular concern to the international community. At best, they pose major challenges for the distribution of development aid and they are a risky environment for private investors. At worst, they can experience state collapse, internal conflict can destabilize their neighbors by spilling over national borders, and lack of internal security may provide a haven for international terrorism.

This paper considers the survey evidence surrounding three issues which shed light upon the role of political activism in fragile states. First, who engages in protest politics in these countries, and in particular what are their social characteristics? Second, what is the political orientation of protestors towards the regime, and are fragile states characterized by high polarization between forces advocating and opposing regime change? And, lastly, is there systematic evidence that protest in fragile states undermines government stability and effectiveness, as often assumed?

In exploring these issues, multiple methodological approaches and sources of evidence can help to reconstruct patterns of protest politics. The study of 'contentious politics' and social movements draw upon event-analysis derived from news reports, records of union membership and industrial strikes, patterns of votes cast for extremist parties, and trends in membership of social movements and groups. Historical narratives provide important insights into past cases of the process of regime change, including both democratic failures and transitions from autocracy, by reconstructing how people acted politically in plazas, streets, taverns, factories, and farms. [5] The underlying attitudes and routine behaviors of ordinary people engaged in protest acts, however, can perhaps best be understood using the conventional tools of individual-level survey analysis, where available. We have now accumulated half a century of survey research on participation in Western democracies. Despite the inclusion of a few developing countries in some of the original studies, such as Mexico, India and South Africa, in general prior to the early-1990s coverage for a wide range of developing countries and types of states remained patchy and incomplete.

In recent years, however, the situation has been transformed by the availability of a series of surveys conducted in a wide range of developing countries, exemplified by the World Values Study, the Euro-barometers, the International Social Survey Program, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and the Global-barometer surveys, plus cross-national surveys by Pew, Harris and Gallup.[6] The expansion of data is to be greatly welcomed by facilitating replication both across time and among nations. Obvious questions can be raised about the quality of sampling and standards of fieldwork in countries which have not yet built up experienced market research companies and social science institutes, but the replication allows cross-checks to be developed across different studies. Familiar questions can also be raised about the quality of questionnaire translations and the employment of equivalent instruments across different nations - debates which have been with us ever since *The Civic Culture.* There are also serious challenges about interpreting public opinion in countries such as China with serious restrictions on freedom of speech and discussion. Yet in counterbalance there are certain advantages associated with conducting surveys in developing nations, namely lower refusal and non-response rates (currently approaching record levels for opinion polls

conducted in the US). Over time, as greater experience has been gained, and as an institutional survey infrastructure has developed in the social sciences, these initiatives have matured and data has accumulated. Moreover some studies in third-wave democracies suggest that patterns of political activism commonly observed in Western Europe and North America may differ from those found elsewhere, such as in Portugal, Spain and post-Communist Europe.[7]

Therefore to explore the causes and consequences of protest politics in fragile states – and thus revisit some of the core concerns motivating the original study of political activism fifty years ago – *Part I* briefly reviews the literature to summarize what we know about protest activism in Western democracies and outlines the theoretical framework. *Part II* describes the research design and the comparative framework. States are classified according to their degree of political stability and their type of regime. *Part III* analyses the structural resources and motivational attitudes leading towards protest activism at individual-level, in different types of states, utilizing survey data from the World Values Study. *Part IV* focuses upon documenting the broader *consequences* of political protest at systemic levels, particularly for regime stability and government effectiveness. The conclusion summarizes the main results and reflects upon the role of protest politics in contributing towards processes of regime change.

I: Theoretical framework

The normative literature concerning the value of citizen participation for either strengthening or undermining fragile democracies has traditionally been sharply divided. During the 1960s and 1970s, reflecting the 'reverse wave' of democratization in Latin America and post-colonial Africa, and divisive hot button politics in the United States and Western Europe, some theorists warned that forms of direct actions such as street demonstrations, mass strikes and boycotts could prove actively harmful for democracy. In 1968, Samuel Huntington's work perhaps best exemplifies this tradition of thought, when he identified 'praetorian societies' where the organization of new groups generated pressures which governments had difficulties in containing and satisfying.[8] Other scholars during this era also commonly emphasized that the growth and mobilization of civil society in Latin America and Africa could lead towards government overload, hence ineffective policy-making, public disaffection, and political instability. [9] In Western democracies too,

during the mid-1970s there were fears of violent conflict and destabilization on the streets in Paris, Tokyo, and Washington DC. The Trilateral Commission reported that Western nations were experiencing a crisis of democracy, arising from the radical actions taken by an alliance of workers and new social movements, including anti-Vietnam and anti-nuclear peace activists, the Black Power and civil rights movements, counter-culture environmentalists, and feminists.[10]

By contrast to these views, perhaps reflecting the rise of 'third wave' democracies, contemporary scholars have more often celebrated political activism by ordinary citizens. Today a vibrant civil society is usually regarded as essential for good governance and effective democratic consolidation. Political participation through the ballot box, through collective organizations such as unions and local community groups, and through street demonstrations and protest activities, are seen as providing a barrier to tyranny, a channel of public voice and accountability, and a way of challenging and checking the unbridled power of authoritarian regimes. This view has been articulated by numerous contemporary writers, particularly in pluralist theory, and this focus has revived more recently in accounts emphasizing the role of social capital.[11] Yet even in these arguments it is unclear if all forms of direct action are thought equally valuable as channels of public expression. An important distinction is commonly drawn between civic engagement when mobilizing around issues by community organizations, interest groups and voluntary associations, which are regarded as a normal part of political bargaining and compromise, and mass protests designed to challenge the basic legitimacy and authority of the state.

To explore the empirical evidence surrounding these larger debates about the value of democratic participation, and to explain individual-level patterns of political activism, the standard theoretical paradigm was established in earlier decades by the seminal works in the social psychological tradition: Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (1963)*[12]*,* Sidney Verba and Norman Nie's *Participation in America (1972)*[13]*,* Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim's *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison* (1978)[14], and Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase's *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (1979)[15]. The major cross-national survey research projects which followed, including the *World Values Study*, those on *Beliefs in Government*, *Citizen*

Involvement and Democracy, the Global-barometers, and the *European Social Survey*, amongst others, all continue to show considerable continuity with the core concepts, measures and theoretical frameworks used to study activism in *The Civic Culture.*[16]

The substantial literature emerging from this stream of research, reflecting political developments, quieted fears about the ability of protests to rock the foundations of Western democracies. [17] This body of work established two general observations about which there is now widespread consensus: protest politics has risen in most established democracies, and, at least in these societies, the population engaged in these activities has gradually normalized over the years.

In recent decades protest politics has grown in most established democracies, often substantially in Western Europe, as shown by levels of engagement through demonstrations reported in Table 1. The spread of protest politics means that it is now mainstream; in nations such as France, Sweden ad Belgium, a third or more of all citizens have demonstrated at some stage in their life. Similar growth can be observed in the few middle-income developing countries where we have comparable time-series data, such as in South Korea, South Africa and Mexico. Reflecting upon these patterns, Inglehart and Catterberg conclude: *"Petitions, boycotts, and other forms of direct action are no longer unconventional but have become more or less normal actions for a large part of the citizenry of post-industrial societies."*[18]   Analysis suggests that protest politics has generally served to supplement traditional channels of political participation, exemplified by voting, party membership, and civic activism, rather than replacing them.[19]

[Table 1 about here]

In a related development, the background and characteristics of those engaged in protest politics in established democracies, once thought the province of the young, the disaffected, workers, and students, have now spread throughout all parts of society. For example, a recent event analysis comparing over 1000 protests occurring in metropolitan Chicago concluded that: *"Since 1980 there has been a marked transformation of the movement form to the point where public protest is now largely peaceful, routine, suburban, local in nature, and initiated by the advantaged."*[20] Surveys of European demonstrators also suggest that the profile of activists has normalized, with protestors

drawn from all major sectors of society, including professionals as well as unionized factory workers, pensioners as well as students, right as well as left, and so on.[21] In short, as a result of these observations, many studies of the United States and Western Europe have confirmed that peaceful demonstrations, petitions, and consumer boycotts, regarded as radical challenges to the state during the late-1960s, have subsequently become mainstream channels of political expression.

[Table 1 about here]

The growth and normalization of protest activism found in long-established Western democracies may also be occurring elsewhere, for example in newer democracies. Yet there are many reasons why trends may differ in many developing countries, particularly in fragile states. The notion of 'fragile' states is one which has spread rapidly within the international development community, but as yet no consensus has been reached about the best way to conceptualize, define and measure these polities. Indeed different aid agencies have often adopted this terminology to describe their relationship with certain partners, notably USAID initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan, without sufficient attention to whether this categorization is appropriate given differing types of regime falling within this group of countries. Nevertheless the core notion is attractive as it highlights the difficulties of delivering aid in many of the poorer parts in the world which are at the greatest risk of regime change. As mentioned earlier, fragile states typically lack either the political will or the capacity to deliver effective public services, especially to maintain human security and peace. Some, such as Haiti, have staggered from one crisis to another, without achieving effective government. Other states, such as Russia, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, have struggled for years to manage and contain armed regional conflict. The most dramatic cases have experienced bloody civil wars, such as those following the dissolution of the former republic of Yugoslavia. Other regimes, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, have been overthrown by foreign interventions, and newly-elected governments in these countries have proved incapable of establishing effective control of internal security. The precise sources of government instability are therefore complex and varied in different states, whether due to deep-rooted internal ethnic conflict, major economic shocks triggered by a currency or trade crisis, pervasive social poverty and lack of state capacity in the public sector, neighboring wars which spill over national

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borders, foreign invasions, the existence of international crime, drugs, and lootable natural resources, or other related causes. What fragile states share in common, however, is that they are the most vulnerable to the risk of political instability toppling the existing regime, whether democratically elected or autocratically led. Despite endemic poverty, widespread social need, and the vulnerability of the populations, this situation poses major challenges for generating the confidence necessary to attract inward investment and generate growth, and for delivering development aid through regular public sector channels.

In particular, the motivation and characteristics of protestors – and the systemic consequences of protest actions for social conflict, for government effectiveness, and for regime stability – could well be expected to differ between established democracies and less stable states experiencing deep-rooted ethnic conflict, such as in Nigeria, Indonesia, and Colombia. In fragile states, dramatic outbreaks of mass uprisings, unarmed insurrections, mass strikes, and street protests have sometimes preceded dramatic cases of regime change.[22] Observers suggest such events are exemplified by Joseph Estrada's fall from power following people power demonstrations in the Philippines, the Orange revolution in Ukraine and the Rose revolution in Georgia, and violent street clashes which destabilized the Fujimori presidency in Peru.[23] The literature on contentious politics, drawing upon historical narrative case-studies of social movement organizations, has emphasized that unarmed popular uprisings may challenge, and occasionally help to topple, existing regimes, both democratic and autocratic. [24] For example, Bermeo's study emphasizes that democracies rarely fail because of polarization among the mass electorate, with ordinary voters switching directly to extremist parties.[25] At the same time, she concludes that polarization among smaller groups of activists engaged in street protest, political strikes, and violent conflict, as well as polarization among elite leaders, has contributed towards the downfall of democracy in several well-known cases in interwar Western Europe and during the postwar era in Latin America. The political orientations of activists engaged in protest in fragile states, moreover, may be more polarized between the forces of change and retrenchment than in established Western democracies, while the systemic consequences of protest may be expected to prove more destabilizing.

The key questions for this study which arise from the notion of fragile states is the role of mass political activism – expressed primarily through participation in street demonstrations, boycotts, and political strikes – and whether this contributes towards government ineffectiveness and political instability, as some assume. In particular we can focus upon sifting the evidence for three specific issues in this paper. First, we can examine whether protestors who engage in mass demonstrations, boycotts and strikes in fragile states are similar or different in their social profile from protest activists in stable states. We can also compare the typical social profile in democracies and autocracies. Secondly, compared with stable states, we can also explore direct evidence to see whether protestors in fragile states are more sharply polarized between radicals intent on destabilizing the regime and conservatives seeking to preserve the status quo against the winds of changes. Lastly, turning to the broader systemic consequences of protest politics, we need to move beyond the individual-level of analysis to see whether societies with considerable protest politics differ in their levels of political stability and government effectiveness.

II: The research design and comparative framework

To start to explore these issues, we need to identify and classify fragile and stable states. To do this, the study draws upon the Political Stability index created by Daniel Kaufman and his colleagues at the World Bank. The index is part of the battery of items measuring six different dimension of 'good governance' based on perceptions drawn from 37 separate aggregate data sources. This includes assessments by individuals and domestic firms, as well as public opinion surveys, risk assessment ratings, and evaluations by non-governmental organizations and multilateral aid agencies. The dimension of 'political stability' was selected as this seeks to measure the likelihood of violent threat to, and changes in, government. The measure therefore corresponds closely to the notion of 'fragile states' that we are seeking to identify. The 2000 index was used to identify contemporary patterns, to match the date of the fieldwork conducted for the 4th wave of the World Values Study, the source of the data analysis.

[Figure 1 about here]

The countries included in the World Values Survey are classified by the 2000 Political Stability index, as illustrated in Figure 1, and then further categorized. Contemporary 'fragile' states are defined as those nations which scored less than -0.00 on the index. 'Stable' stables are those which scored above +0.00. Although any dichotomy is inevitably somewhat arbitrary at the precise cut off level, nevertheless the graph shows that the ranking of the Political Stability index corresponds quite well with common notions of fragile states expressed by the international community. Hence the graph shows 27 countries in the WVS which are classified as fragile states, headed by Indonesia, Algeria, and Columbia, all dealing with violent threats for secession from break-away nationalist minorities. Although different types of regimes, the African states of Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe also feature as at serious risk from political instability. The list also includes countries that were part of the former republic of Yugoslavia, as well as some of East European states, and certain poorer Muslim states in South East Asia. Lastly 49 nations are categorized as stable, with lower risk of experiencing violent overthrow or a coup d'etat.

Types of regime

The degree of political stability is important but the categorization needs further refinement to take account of the type of regime. Accordingly countries in the World Values Study were also classified on a second dimension into either democracies or autocracies in 2000. This study used the dichotomous categorization and minimalist definition of regime types developed first by Przeworski and his colleagues, then updated by Cheibub and Ghandi, based on contestation for government office (see Appendix A for details). It should be noted that this measure is independent of the Political Stability index, reducing the dangers of cross-contamination. Classifications using alternative indicators of democracy were compared, including continuous scales provided by Polity IV, Vanhanen, and by Freedom House, but these did not make a substantial difference to the classification by Cheibub and Ghandi, as all these measures were highly inter-correlated.[26] As shown in Figure 2, the use of the Freedom House 7-point measure of democracy would not have made a substantial difference to the classification of regimes. The comparison of both measures allows us to categorize states in the 2000 World Values Study into four groups. Among democracies, 16 are fragile states, such as

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Indonesia and Bangladesh, and 43 are stable. Among autocracies, 11 are fragile, such as Zimbabwe, Algeria and Uganda, and 6 are stable. Clearly there is also a fairly strong correlation between the type of regime and the perceived level of political stability.[27]

[Figure 2 about here]

The World Values Survey

The analysis of political orientations and attitudes is based upon the World Values Surveys (WVS), a global investigation of socio-cultural and political change. The study has carried out representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of publics in more than 70 nation states on all six inhabited continents, containing in total 4.7 billion people or over 80% of the world's population. It builds on the European Values Surveys, first carried out in 22 countries in 1981. A second wave of surveys, in 41 nations, was completed in 1990-1991, a third wave was carried out in 55 nations in 1995-1996, and a fourth wave with 53 nations took place in 1999-2001. The pooled survey includes almost one quarter million respondents, facilitating sub-group analysis even for minority groups.

The survey includes some of the most affluent market economies in the world such as the U.S., Japan and Switzerland, with per capita annual incomes as high as $40,000 or more; together with middle-level industrializing countries such as Taiwan, Brazil, and Turkey, as well as poorer agrarian societies, such as Uganda, Nigeria, and Viet Nam, with per capita annual incomes of $300 or less. Some smaller nations have populations below one million, such as Malta, Luxembourg and Iceland, while at the other extreme almost one billion people live in India, and there are over one billion in China. The pooled survey with all waves contains stable states such as Australia, Switzerland and the Netherlands, intermediate states such as Russia, Brazil, and Turkey, as well as fragile states exemplified by Zimbabwe, Indonesia and Georgia. In terms of regional coverage, the survey includes some of the first systematic data on public opinion in many predominately Muslim cultures, including Jordan, Iran, Egypt, and Morocco. The most comprehensive coverage is available in Western Europe, North America and Scandinavia, however, where public opinion surveys have the longest tradition. The four waves of this survey took place from 1981 to 2001, although the same countries were not always included in each wave, so comparisons over the full period can be carried out in twenty

societies. Data drawn from the Political Action Study in the mid-1970s facilitates longer-term comparisons in the nations contained in both surveys.

Measuring Political Action and Political Orientations

The World Values Survey contains multiple dimensions of political attitudes and opinions, but the focus of this study concerns the actual experience of protest activism and, in particular, and whether those who engage in protest differ in their political orientations and social characteristics from civic activists. Building upon the standard social psychological baseline model, we can examine how far activism can be predicted by the typical structural resources and motivational attitudes which help to explain political participation in Western democracies.

In monitoring activism, many previous empirical studies have often been limited to examining 'protest *potential*', although critics have long suggested that this represents an inadequate indicator of actual protest behavior. Survey items may prompt answers that are regarded as socially acceptable, or just tap a more general orientation towards the political system (such as approval of freedom of association or tolerance of dissent)[28]. Surveys are usually stronger at tapping attitudes and values rather than actual behavior, and they are generally more reliable at reporting routine and repetitive actions ('How often do you attend church?') rather than occasional acts. Unfortunately hypothetical questions ('might you ever demonstrate or join in boycotts?') may well prove a poor predictor of actual behavior[29]. Accordingly this study focuses upon reported *experience* of protest activism. The measure which is used is as follows:

"Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things (scored 1), whether you might do it (scored 0), or would never, under any circumstances, do it (scored 0)."

- Signing a petition
- Joining in boycotts
- Attending lawful demonstrations
- Joining unofficial strikes
- Occupying buildings or factories

The battery of questions was used to construct a 5-point scale measuring experience of protest activism across all these items.[30]

Part III: The causes of protest politics

Who protests? The baseline social psychological model which developed from the work of Verba and others sought to explain why individuals became active by emphasizing the influence of prior *structural resources* which people bring into politics, notably educational qualifications, occupational status, and income, which are closely related to the demographic factors of age, race, ethnicity, and sex. Education, for example, furnishes analytical skills which are thought useful for making sense of complex political issues and policymaking processes, while household income is directly relevant for the capacity to make campaign donations. The 'baseline' resource model added *cultural attitudes,* exemplified by a sense of internal efficacy (confidence in the ability to influence public affairs), external efficacy (a sense of the system's responsiveness), civic knowledge, and political interest (such as following events in the news), which are commonly closely related to the propensity to become active.[31] The baseline social psychological model has been applied mainly to Western democracies but it can be used to examine the causes of protest activism elsewhere. The regression models in this study monitored the impact of the standard structural resources (logged age in years, gender, education, income, and religiosity) as well as a range of motivational attitudes associated with participation (social trust, political discussion, and political interest, although not efficacy). To understand the political orientations of protestors towards the regime, the models also included evaluations of democracy as an ideal, satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent government, and attitudes towards radical change. The the variables, and how they were operationalized and coded, are listed in Appendix A. For comparison, similar regression models were run to predict protest activism in both stable and fragile democracies and autocracies.

[Table 2 about here]

The results in Table 2 show that most of the standard factors previous studies have found to be associated with protest activism in stable democracies were confirmed in this study as well, with the exception of gender. It appears that although men were more likely to engage in activities such as demonstrations and strikes in the past, this difference

has faded over time in many established democracies.[32] The impact of logged age was also positive, suggesting that if protest was once confined to the young, it is no longer the case. In these nations, the baseline model explained about one fifth of the variance in protest activism. As others have often reported, the results confirm that in stable democracies, protest politics was higher in more affluent societies, as well as among the better educated and more well-off, among those interested in politics and those who engage in political discussion. The political orientations of activists proved more interesting, however, with protestors disapproving of the performance of those in government but also expressing strong support for democratic ideals and favoring radical change. This is the phenomenon of 'critical citizens' or 'disaffected democrats' which has been observed earlier.[33]

What of protest politics under the other types of regime? In fragile democracies, protest was greater in more affluent societies as well as among the well educated, men, and the older populations, not the young. Political interest and discussion were also motivating factors, and those who protested were also more in favor of democratic ideals and radical change. The political orientations suggest that protest in fragile democracies does not represent a backlash against democracy or even the government in power, but rather it is similar in many regards to the background and motivation of activists in stable democracies. Fragile democracies face multiple challenges in consolidating and institutionalizing the regime, and deepening the quality of democratic institutions. But the profile of protestors suggests that this should function as a positive channel of expression and mobilization of civil society.

There was a largely similar profile in fragile autocracies, in terms of the background and attitudes of protestors, although there were some differences in political orientations towards the regime. In particular, in these states those who protested expressed a mixed set of attitudes, with slightly greater than average disapproval of their rulers, while also disapproving of democratic ideals and favoring radical change. It remains unclear whether these results form a consistent and coherent orientation and further analysis is needed to explore these attitudes in more depth. In stable autocracies, protestors appear to be more critical of their government and pro-democracy in

orientation, suggesting that this may represent dissidents and opposition sympathizers who are actively pressing for reform.

We can go further, however, in exploring the political orientations of those engaged in protest to see whether there was higher polarization in fragile states between the forces advocating radical revolution and those favoring maintenance of the status quo. Such polarization would be expected to generate stronger clashes and to destabilize mass politics. By contrast we would expect that in stable states, public opinion would be more strongly clustered in the middle of the political spectrum, supporting gradual reform rather than either radical pole. The comparison in Table 3 shows that the proportion of the population pressing for radical change was greatest in fragile democracies and in fragile autocracies. By contrast fewer favored radical change in stable states. There were some modest differences in the proportion who supported maintaining the status quo in different types of regime, but these differences were not substantial in size. The idea that populations are more polarized between the forces for reform and conservatism in fragile states receives some support from this comparison but it is not self-evident that polarizations is dramatically greater among those who are most active in protest politics.

[Table 3 about here]

Part IV: The consequences of protest politics

So far we have examined individual-level data but the broader concerns about the role of protest politics focused on the consequences of this phenomenon at systemic level. The driving force behind many of the original surveys was to consider whether mass strikes, street insurgencies, and people power would generate pressures on both democratic and autocratic regimes, reducing their capacity to function and generating political instability. To consider this issue, we can see whether societies with high levels of protest politics are systematically related to patterns of political stability and government effectiveness, in both cases drawing upon the Kaufmann et al/World Bank indicators of good governance.

[Figures 3 and 4 about here]

The results of the correlations, without any prior controls, are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. In both cases the patterns reveal the important difference between the role of

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protest activity in autocratic and democratic states. In democracies, protest activity is associated with greater stability and government effectiveness. By contrast, in autocracies there is a negative relationship. What explains these patterns? Citizens are most actively mobilized in the public sphere in long-established democracies such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark, which are also among the most stable and well-run governments. Although political protest was once regarded by some theorists as dangerous for the health of democracy, if it generated an over-loaded state and if it undermined traditional sources of authority, the evidence presented here and elsewhere strongly suggests that demonstrations, petitions and boycotts encourage a vibrant and active democratic state. We have fewer cases of autocracies to compare, but the correlations show that greater levels of protests are associated with more political instability, for example in Algeria and in the former republic of Yugoslavia. Coupled with the analysis of the characteristics of protestors in fragile autocracies, this indicates that protests are more likely to engage democratic sympathizers pressing for reform, rather than to be plebiscitary acts designed to maintain the power of the rulers.

Conclusions

Survey research is an invaluable tool for many purposes, but often the individual-level focus of behavioral research obscures its potential capacity to address important larger issues in democratic theory. The initial impetus for *The Civic Culture,* and for much subsequent work, was a concern about the potential consequences of participation, both positive and negative, for the stability of regimes. In the contemporary celebration of the liberal value of civic participation for democracy there is also a tendency to be complacent about its virtues and to minimize its darker side, for example dangers even in established democracies such as France, Britain and the Netherlands, such as recent cases when initially-peaceful mass protests about government policy have occasionally slid into street violence, looting and the destruction of property, and riots. In particular it is by no means obvious that fragile governments, such as those elected in contemporary Iraq or Afghanistan, have the ability to cope peacefully and maintain order in response to mass actions, given their tenuous grip over the security forces. Similarly other countries such as Nigeria, India, and Algeria have experienced a fine dividing line between legitimate, peaceful protests and deadly ethnic riots.

Reflecting upon these findings suggests that two major challenges face the study of political activism in general, and protest politics in particular. One is to integrate our long and distinguished body of work on the causes of participation in Western democracies to explore how far these generalizations hold in many other countries, types of regime, and political contexts. This work is already being advanced with the expansion of survey research far beyond affluent post-industrial nations, although more needs to be done. The other urgent and equally important challenge is to relate individual-level and systems level analysis, to explore not just the drivers of individual behavior but also the consequences of these acts for the political regimes. This includes research identifying the threats to fragile states and what can be done to strengthen effective and practical democratic reforms. Unless political science is more relevant to the policymaking community, it will focus increasingly inwards, talking to itself, but failing to address the most critical challenges of our era. The study of political activism is more than half a century old but, despite all the knowledge we have accumulated, we still have a long way to go down this road.

Figure 1: Classification of states

Note: The classification of states is based on the Political Stability index 2000, as gauged by the Kaufmann et al. 'Fragile' states are defined as those nations which scored less than -0.00 on the index. 'Stable' stables are those which scored above +0.00.
Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. 'Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002.'
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html

Figure 2: Classification of states by levels of stability and democracy

Note: See Appendix A for the indicators and coding. The measure of Political Stability 2000 was gauged by the Kaufmann et al.

Figure 3: Protest and political stability

Note: See Appendix A for the measures. The mean level of protest activity in each country was derived from the 1999-2000 World Values Study. The measure of Political Stability 2000 was gauged by the Kaufmann et al.

Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. '*Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002*.' World Bank.

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html

Figure 4: Protest and government effectiveness

Note: See Appendix A for the measures. The mean level of protest activity in each country was derived from the 1999-2000 World Values Study. The measure of Givernment Effectiveness 2000 was gauged by the Kaufmann et al.

Source: n Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. '*Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002.*' World Bank.
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html

Table 1: The rise in demonstrating: the proportion who have demonstrated by nation, mid-1970s to 2000

	Mid-1970s (i)	Early 1980s (ii)	Early 1990s (iii)	1999 to 2000 (iv)	Change (ii) to (iv)
Belgium		13	21	39	+26
Netherlands	7	12	25	32	+20
Sweden		15	22	35	+20
France		26	31	38	+12
Denmark		18	27	28	+10
Ireland		12	16	21	+9
South Korea (*)		5	19	14	+9
Italy	19	25	34	33	+8
US	12	12	15	20	+8
Norway (*)		19	19	26	+7
South Africa		6	13	13	+7
West Germany	9	14	20	20	+6
Iceland		14	23	20	+6
Canada		13	21	19	+6
Australia (*)		12		18	+6
Britain	6	10	14	13	+3
Japan		7	9	10	+3
Northern Ireland		18	18	20	+2
Spain		22	21	24	+2
Mexico		8	20	10	+2
Finland	6	14	12	14	0
Argentina		19	16	13	-6
Switzerland	8			16	
Austria	7		10	16	
MEAN	9	14	20	21	+7

Note: *"Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it."* % '*Have actually attended lawful demonstration*'
Data is unavailable for blank entries. (*) Latest available data is 1995-7
Sources: (i) Barnes and Kaase *Political Action: An Eight-Nation Study 1973-76*/
    (ii)-(iv) The World Values Study, early-1980s to 1999-2000.

Table 2: Protest activism, 2000

	Stable democracies			Fragile democracies			Fragile autocracies			Stable autocracies		
	B	(s.e.)	Sig.	b	(s.e.)	Sig.	B	(s.e.)	Sig.	B	(s.e.)	Sig.
DEVELOPMENT												
Level of economic development	.000	.000	***	.000	.000	***	.000	.000	***	.000	.000	N/s
STRUCTURE												
Age *(Logged years old)*	.201	.043	**	.276	.054	***	.490	.125	***	-.072	.058	*
Gender *(Male=1)*	-.006	.014	N/s	.082	.017	***	.103	.038	***	.067	.018	***
Education *(7-pt scale)*	.215	.009	***	.171	.013	***	.207	.029	***	.093	.075	***
Religiosity (7-pt scale)	-.032	.003	***	-.003	.004	N/s	.009	.010	N/s	.003	.004	***
Income *(10-pt scale)*	.022	.003	***	-.006	.003	N/s	-.005	.009	N/s	.015	.008	*
MOTIVATIONAL ATTITUDES												
Political Interest	.149	.009	***	.152	.010	***	.138	.025	***	.076	.012	N/s
Political discussion	.163	.012	***	.109	.015	***	.121	.037	***	.150	.016	***
Social trust (1=trusting)	.129	.015	***	-.023	.021	N/s	-.022	.062	N/s	-.015	.015	N/s
POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS												
Satisfaction with incumbent government	-.064	.016	***	.001	.010	N/s	-.046	.023	*	-.102	.023	***
Approval of democratic ideals	.006	.001	***	.003	.001	***	-.003	.001	**	.003	.001	***
Support for radical change	.072	.028	***	.096	.013	***	.071	.035	*	.033	.033	N/s
Constant	-1.62			-1.05			-1.18			.746		
Adjusted R²	*.223*			*.101*			*.095*			*.149*		
N.	*21564*			*13946*			*2770*			*3695*		

Notes: Protest activism is analyzed using linear regression models, listing unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors and significance.. *=p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001 See Appendix A for all variables.   The dependent variable is *Protest activism* (scale of experience of signing petitions, joining boycott, demonstrating, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings).

Source: World Values Study 2000

Table 3: The political orientations of protestors, 2000

		Support radical change	*Favor gradual reform*	*Preserve status quo*	Coef (sig)
Stable democracy	Protested	6	81	13	
	Not	7	77	15	.040*
Fragile democracy	Protested	20	67	14	
	Not	17	63	21	.154***
Fragile autocracy	Protested	18	68	15	
	Not	10	71	19	.234***
Stable autocracy	Protested	8	75	17	
	Not	14	67	20	.044 N/s

Note: See Appendix A for measures. The classification of activists is based on those who had committed at least one protest act.

Source: World Values Study 2000

Technical Appendix A: Coding and measurement

Variable	**Definitions, coding and sources**
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL INDICATORS	
Economic Development	Standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP (in PPP $US). World Bank.
Political stability	Indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism. For details of data sources, see Appendix B. Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. '*Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002*.' World Bank.
Type of fragile or stable state	The classification is derived from the Political Stability index 2000, as gauged by the Kaufmann et al. '*Fragile*' states are defined as those nations which scored less than -0.50 on the index. '*Intermediate*' states are those scoring between -.49 to +.49 on the index. '*Stable'* stables are those which scored above +0.50. Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. '*Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002*.' World Bank.
Government effectiveness	Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. '*Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002*.' World Bank.
Freedom House Liberal Democracy index	The Gastil index, the 7-point scale used by Freedom House, measuring political rights and civil liberties annually since 1972. *Freedom in the World, 2005 www.Freedomhouse.com*.
Polity IV Constitutional democracy index	The Polity IV project classifies democracy and autocracy in each nation-year as a composite score of different characteristics relating to authority structures. The dataset constructs a ten-point democracy scale by coding the competitiveness of political participation (1-3), the competitiveness of executive recruitment (1-2), the openness of executive recruitment (1), and the constraints on the chief executive (1-4). Autocracy is measured by negative versions of the same indices. The two scales are combined into a single democracy-autocracy score varying from -10 to +10. The democracy-autocracy index for 2000 was recoded to a 20-point positive scale from low (autocracy) to high (democracy). Monty Marshall and Keith Jaggers. 2003. P*olity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/*
Vanhanen Participatory Democracy Index	Vanhanen developed a scaled measure of democracy in each country according to two criteria: the degree of *electoral competition* (measured by the share of the vote won by the largest party in the national legislature), and also the degree of *electoral participation* (the proportion of the total population who voted in national legislative elections), which is combined to yield a 100-pt index of Participatory Democracy. Tatu Vanhanen. 2000. 'A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998.' *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 251-265.
Cheibub and Gandhi Contested Democracy classification	This classification of regimes from 1950-1990 was originally developed by Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, and the time series was subsequently extended to 2000 by Cheibub and Gandhi. This approach defines regimes as autocratic if the chief executive is not elected, the legislature is not elected, there is only one party, or there has been no alternation in power. All other regimes are classified as democratic. In democratic states, therefore, those who govern are selected through contested elections. Source: Jose Cheibub and Jennifer Gandhi. 2005. 'A six-fold measure of democracies and dictatorships.' Unpublished paper.
POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND ORIENTATIONS	
Support for radical change	"On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion." CODE ONE ONLY (1) The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action; (2) Our society must be gradually improved by reforms; (3) Our

	present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces; (9) Don't know. Source: World Values Study.
Protest activism scale	"Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things (coded 1), whether you might do it (coded 0), or would never, under any circumstances, do it (coded 0)." % • Signing a petition • Joining in boycotts • Attending lawful demonstrations • Joining unofficial strikes • Occupying buildings or factories Source: World Values Study.
Social trust	"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" Source: World Values Study
Approval of performance of incumbent government	"How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national office are handling the country's affairs? Would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied or very dissatisfied?" Source: World Values Study
Approval of democracy as an ideal	"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system." Source: World Values Study
Interest in politics	"How interested would you say you are in politics?" Very, somewhat, not very, not at all. Source: World Values Study
Discussion of politics	"When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?" Source: World Values Study
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	
Income	Scale of household income from Low (0) to high (10)
Education	V217." What is the highest educational level that you have ever attained?" Coded on a 9-point scale from no formal education (1) to university level with degree (9). Source: World Values Study
Logged Age	Coded from date of birth in continuous years, logged. Source: World Values Study.
Religiosity	Frequency of religious attendance, on a 7-point scale from 'Never' to 'Every day' Source: World Values Study.

Note: Full details of the World Values Survey codebooks and questionnaires can be found at www.worldvaluessurvey.com.

Technical Appendix B: Kaufmann Index of Political Stability

The Kaufmann et al index is constructed as a composite measure using the following indicators:

Table G2. Political Instability and Violence

Code	Table (Appendix 1)	Row	Concepts measured
Representative sources			
DRI	A 1.3		Risks reduction of GDP by 1–4% due to:
		24	Major Urban Riot
		20	Major insurgency/rebellion
		19	Military coup
		21	Political terrorism
		22	Political assassination
		23	Civil war
EIU	A 1.5	1	Armed conflict, war
		2	Social unrest
		4	Terrorist threat, political violence
PRS	A 1.10	4	Internal Conflict: Political violence and governance, from no tolerance of arbitrary violence to civil war torn countries (from best to worse score)
		10	Ethnic tensions: Based on intolerance and prone to conflict
WDR	A 1.13	15	Terrorism as an obstacle to business development
		5	Likelihood of unconstitutional government changes
Non-representative sources			
BERI	A 1.1	1	Fractionalization of the political spectrum
		3	Fractionalization by ethnic, language and religious groups
		5	Restrictive (coercive) measures to retain power
		6	Organization/power of radical group
		9	Societal conflict: Strikes, Violence, Demonstrations
		10	Constitutional Changes, Assassinations, Guerrillas
CEER	A 1.2	19	Political stability
GCS97	A 1.8		
GCS98		3	Likelihood of dramatic change in institutions
		28	The highest power is always peacefully transferred
GCSA	A 1.8	3	Likelihood of dramatic changes in institutions
		68	Government coups or political instability as an obstacle to development
		67	Tribal conflict as an obstacle for business development

Source: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2003. '*Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 1996-2002*.' World Bank.

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html

[1] For a review, see Pippa Norris. Forthcoming 2007. 'Political activism: New challenges, new opportunities.' For the *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics.* Edited by Carles Boix and Susan Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[2] Nancy Bermeo. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[3] See, for example, the OECD/Development Assistance Committee website (www.oecd.org/dac/fragilestates) for international initiatives and programs related to the March 2005 Paris Declaration on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States.

[4] M. Francois and I. Sud. 2006. 'Promoting stability and development in fragile and failed states.' *Development Policy Review* 24 (2): 141-160; William Zartman, I (ed.), 1995. *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,* Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers; Jean-Germain Gros, 1996. 'Towards A Taxonomy Of Failed States In The New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda And Haiti.' *Third World Quarterly*, 0143-6597.

[5] Nancy Bermeo. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[6] Pippa Norris. 2005. 'From the Civic Culture to the Afro-Barometer: The expansion in cross-national public opinion surveys.' *APSA-Comparative Politics Newsletter*.

[7] See, for example, Jose Ramon Montero, Richard Gunther and Mariano Torcal. 1997. 'Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, discontent and disaffection.' *Studies in Comparative International Development.* 32: 124-160; Pedro C. Magalhaes. 2005. 'Disaffected democrats: Political attitudes and political action in Portugal.' *West European Politics* 28(5): 973-991; Ronald Inglehart and G. Catterberg. 2002. 'Trends in political action: The developmental trend and the post-honeymoon decline.' *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43 (3-5): 300-316; Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde. Ed. 2003. *Uncivil society? Contentious politics in post-Communist Europe.* London/New York: Routledge.

[8] Samuel P. Huntington. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[9] For a discussion, see Nancy Bermeo. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[10] Michael Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The Crisis of Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[11] The seminal works are Robert D. Putnam. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Robert D. Putnam. 1996. 'The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.' *The American Prospect,* 24; Robert D. Putnam. 1996. 'The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.' *The American Prospect,* 24; Robert D. Putnam. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. NY: Simon and Schuster; Robert D. Putnam and Lewis Feldstein. 2003. *Better Together: Restoring the American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

[12] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. 1989 [1963].*The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. See also Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. Eds. 1980. *The Civic Culture Revisited*. Boston: Little Brown.

[13] Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: political democracy and social equality*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. See also Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Nancy Burns, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

[14] Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[15] Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. 1979. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. See also Alan Marsh. 1977. *Protest and Political Consciousness.* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; M. Kent Jennings and Jan van Deth. 1989. *Continuities in Political Action*. Berlin: deGruyter; Charles Adrian and David A. Apter. 1995. *Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics*. NY: New York University Press.

[16] For a discussion, see Ken Newton. 'Beliefs in Government: Just another brick in the wall'. Paper presented at IPSA 2006.

[17] Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase et al. 1979. *Political Action: Mass participation in five Western democracies.* Beverley Hills: Sage.

[18] Ronald Inglehart and G. Catterberg. 2002. 'Trends in political action: The developmental trend and the post-honeymoon decline.' *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43 (3-5): 300-316.

[19] Pippa Norris. 2003. *Democratic Phoenix*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[20] Douglas McAdam, R.J. Sampson, S. Weffer and H. MacIndoe. 2005. ' "There will be fighting in the streets": The distorting lens of social movement theory.' *Mobilization* 10 (1): 1-18.

[21] Peter Van Aelst and Stephan Walgrave. 2001. 'Who is that (wo)man in the street? From the normalisation of protest to the normalization.'   *European Journal of Political Research* 39 (4): 461-486; Pippa Norris, Stefaan Walgrave and Peter Van Aelst. 2005. 'Who demonstrates? Antistate rebels, conventional participants, or everyone?' *Comparative Politics* 37 (2): 189+.

[22] Kurt Schock. 2004. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Non-democracies.* St Pauls, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

[23] K.M. Roberts. 2006. 'Populism, political conflict, and grass-roots organization in Latin America.' *Comparative Politics* 38 (2): 127-+ .

[24] See, for example, Doug McAdam, John D, McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. Eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also Sidney Tarrow. *Power in Movement.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Hans Kriesi, et al. *New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.* (MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Hans Kriesi, Donatella Della Porta and Dieter Rucht. Eds. *Social Movements in a Globalizing World.* (London: Macmillan, 1998); Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani. *Social Movements.* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). For a recent review and synthesis of the literature see Ronald Aminzade et al. *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics.* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[25] Nancy Bermeo. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

[26] In the 76 nations under comparison, the the Cheibub and Ghandi classification of countries into autocracies or democracies was strongly correlated (R=.758 ***) with Freedom House 2000 index of political rights and civil liberties was strongly correlated, the Polity IV standardized scale of democracy (R= .956 ***), and the Vanhanen standardized scale of democracy (R=.662). For more details about the construction and composition of these scales, see Appendix A and chapter 3 in Pippa Norris. *Driving Democracy.* Forthcoming Cambridge University Press.

[27] In the 76 nations under comparison, the Kaufmann Political Stability index in 2000 was correlated with the Cheibub and Ghandi classification of countries into autocracies or democracies (R=.433 ***), although less strongly than with the Freedom House 2000 index of political rights and civil liberties (R=.761***),   the Polity IV standardized scale of democracy (R= .607 ***), and the Vanhanen standardized scale of democracy (R=.600).

[28] For a fuller discussion see Samuel Barnes and Max Kaase. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies.* (Beverley Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); Christopher A. Rootes. "On the future of protest politics in Western democracies: A critique of Barnes, Kaase et al., Political Action." *European Journal of Political Research* 9 (1981): 421-432.

[29] Richard Topf. "Beyond Electoral Participation." In *Citizens and the State*. Eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[30] The Cronbach test of scale reliability for these five items was .576, which is not particularly high, but it was decided to use all items on protest politics in order to facilitate comparability with previous studies using this scale.

[31] Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1971. *The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Analysis.* Beverley Hill, CA: Sage; Sidney Verba and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Social Equality and Political Participation*. New York: Harper Collins; Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-on Kim. 1978. *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison* New York: Cambridge University Press; Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[32] See Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 32003. *Rising Tide.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

[33] Pippa Norris. Ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens.* Oxford: Oxford University Press; Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.