



## Muslim support for secular democracy

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**Abstract:** Stirrings of popular unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria during the ‘Arab spring’ have renewed debate about the regimes most likely to replace traditional autocracies in the region. This development raises many questions, in particular, (i) *what types of regimes currently govern Muslim-plurality societies*, and (ii) *what types of regimes does the public living in these societies desire?* In particular, do Muslim publics want secular democracies, characterized by religious pluralism, separation of religious and government authorities, tolerance of diverse religious beliefs and practices, moderate parties, and constitutions where no single type of faith is privileged, following the Turkish model? Or do they prefer regimes where constitutions reflect Islamic principles, spiritual authorities predominate in politics, conservative Islamic parties prevail, and religious courts enforce Sharia law, reflecting the Iranian model? Or, alternatively, do many Muslim publics fall somewhere between these two poles?

To explore these issues, Part I outlines the conceptual framework. Part II examines the distribution of the type of regimes currently governing Muslim-plurality societies. Part III describes the survey measures used to gauge popular support for each type of regime. This study examines attitudes derived from the World Values Survey (1995-2007) conducted in 83 countries, including twenty diverse Muslim-plurality societies. Part IV presents the results of the multilevel analysis of public regime preferences. The conclusion in Part V summarizes the key findings and considers their implications.

**Keywords:** Religion, secularization, regime typologies, public opinion, democracy and democratization

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The ‘Arab spring’, marked by contagious popular unrest in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, has renewed speculation about the type of regime most likely to replace traditional autocracies in the Middle East and North Africa. These events raise many questions, in particular, *what types of regimes currently govern Muslim-predominant societies?* And *what types of regimes does the public in these societies desire?* In particular, is there widespread support for secular democracies, characterized by religious pluralism where no one type of faith is constitutionally privileged, diverse types of religious expression and practices are widely tolerated, and Islamism is one faith among many? Historically Turkey has long provided a model for this type of state, following the Atatürk reforms establishing a modern, democratic, secular state, where the constitution neither recognizes nor promotes any official religion, religious parties are banned, and faith-based discrimination is prohibited.<sup>1</sup> Or do Muslim publics prefer regimes where constitutions privilege Islam as the official faith, states are governed by clergy, conservative parties promote strict interpretations of Islam and religious courts enforce Sharia law, reflecting the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran?<sup>2</sup> Or, alternatively, do many Muslim societies fall somewhere between these two poles?

Debate about the compatibility of Islam with democracy has continued over many decades. Some concur with Huntington’s prediction of irreconcilable tensions.<sup>3</sup> This claim has been regarded as plausible given the persistence of autocratic states in the Middle East and North Africa despite previous waves of democratization occurring elsewhere in the world.<sup>4</sup> Many others challenge Huntington’s view, however, believing that there is no inevitable conflict between Islamic teachings and the principles of liberal democracy, religious pluralism, and social tolerance.<sup>5</sup> Scholars have questioned the existence of a single Islamic culture stretching all the way from Jakarta to Lagos, let alone one holding values deeply incompatible with secular democracy.<sup>6</sup>

One reason why debate remains unresolved is that many scholars have relied primarily upon qualitative sources as indirect evidence used to interpret religious cultures, including personal interviews, observations and direct experience, and traditional textual exegesis of the literature, religious scriptures, and historical documents.<sup>7</sup> Yet recent years have seen substantial advances in the empirical evidence available to analyze mass public opinion directly, as surveys based on representative samples of the general population have expanded substantially in geographic coverage and scope.<sup>8</sup> This has facilitated a growing literature comparing the empirical evidence for public opinion in many (although not all) predominately-Muslim societies in the Middle East and North Africa, South East Asia and Central Asia. This body of attitudinal research has drawn upon the resources of the Gallup World Poll,<sup>9</sup> as well as the World Values Survey,<sup>10</sup> the Pew Global Attitudes project,<sup>11</sup> Zogby International’s 2002 Arab Values Survey,<sup>12</sup> and the Afro-barometer and Arab-barometer surveys.<sup>13</sup> The expanding body of literature utilizing survey data has explored the impact of Muslim identities upon diverse types of attitudes, including the strength of religiosity, support for democracy, feelings of nationalism, attitudes towards foreign policy, and orientations towards gender equality. This growing research seeking to understand Muslim public opinion represents an important step towards a more nuanced and empirically grounded understanding of the relationship between Islam and democracy. Moreover the complex concept of ‘secular democracy’ needs to be unpacked more clearly as a distinct regime type, along with its alternatives.

Accordingly, building upon the previous research literature, Part I summarizes the conceptual framework and discusses the notion of secular democracy as a regime type. Part II applies this framework to classify contemporary regimes around the world and to understand the distribution of regimes in Muslim-plurality societies. To explore what regimes are actually desired by citizens in these societies, Part III describes the survey measures monitoring public support for the principles of secular democracy. Data is derived from the pooled World Values Survey (1995-2007) conducted in 83 countries. Part IV presents the results of the multilevel analysis of public opinion. The conclusion in Part V summarizes the key results and considers their implications.

## I: The conceptual framework

As a preliminary step it is important to clarify the conceptual framework and what is understood by the notion of '*secular democracy*'. Figure 1 illustrates the regime typology used in this study which emphasizes the interaction of two dimensions: liberal democracy and religious freedom.

[Figure 1 about here]

### *Liberal democracy and autocracy*

On the horizontal dimension illustrated in this figure, states can be classified on a continuous scale, and as binary categories, according to how far constitutions meet the principles and practices of liberal democracy. The complex notion of 'democracy' is open to multiple conceptualizations and the employment of many alternative modifiers, including 'participatory', 'liberal', 'social', 'direct' and 'deliberative' forms.<sup>14</sup> Democracy is understood here, most simply, to mean the capacity of people to influence regime authorities within their nation-state. In the Schumpeterian tradition, minimalist notions of representative democracy focus upon the provision of competitive elections as the primary mechanisms guaranteeing the accountability of officials to citizens. Electoral democracy requires leaders to be recruited on the basis of free and fair multiparty contests at the ballot box which meet international standards of integrity. Nevertheless this minimalist definition fails to take account of the many other institutions required to ensure that democratic elections work effectively, including the provision of freedom of expression and respect for civil liberties, checks and balances among the core regime institutions, an independent judiciary and an effective legislature. Without these safeguards, and many others, electoral manipulation and fraud can flourish.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore this study adopts a broader understanding of liberal democracy which reflects the long tradition of classical political thought from Hobbes and Locke to Bentham and J.S. Mill. Following Robert Dahl's conception, liberal democracy rests upon the triple principles of contestation, participation, and human rights.<sup>16</sup> In practice, Dahl suggested that liberal democratic regimes (or 'polyarchies') can be identified by the presence of certain key political institutions: 1) elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and 7) associational autonomy.<sup>17</sup> Liberal democracies use competitive multiparty elections to fill offices for the national legislature and the chief executive. Yet competitive elections alone, even if conducted according to international standards of electoral integrity, are insufficient to establish liberal democratic states without freedom of expression, the availability of alternative sources of information (freedom of the media), and associational autonomy (freedom to organize parties, interest groups and social movements). Liberal democracy includes freedom of worship and tolerance of religious pluralism as basic civil liberties, although these are only one aspect of a much broader phenomenon.

The standard indicators commonly used to measure and compare levels of liberal democracy include Polity IV's scale of democracy-autocracy (from 1800-2007) and the Freedom House Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties (from 1972-date).<sup>18</sup> The emphasis on a wide range of civil liberties, rights, and freedoms in the Freedom House index means that this most closely reflects notions of liberal democracy and it has been widely employed by many comparative scholars.<sup>19</sup> The index monitors the existence of political rights in terms of electoral processes, political pluralism, and the functioning of government. Civil liberties and political rights are defined by expert assessments of each country, such as levels of freedom of speech and association, rule of law, and personal rights. Each item is allocated a score from 0 to 4 and each is given equal weight when aggregated. The raw scores for each country are then converted into a seven-point scale of political rights and a seven-point scale for civil liberties, and in turn these are collapsed to categorize each regime worldwide as either 'free', 'partly free', or 'not free'. As a result of this process, Freedom House estimate that in 2009 out of 193 nations, almost half or 89 (46%) could be classified as free while 58 nations could be classified as 'partly free'.<sup>20</sup> The index has the advantage of providing comprehensive coverage of nation-states and independent territories worldwide, as well as

establishing a long time-series of observations conducted annually since 1972. The Gastil index is standardized to a 100-point continuous scale for ease of interpretation in this study and the index is also dichotomized around the mean, to classify regimes as either liberal democracies or autocracies.

#### *Secular and religious states*

The concept of ‘secular’ states is equally complex, as the vertical dimension of the regime typology, along with related but distinct concepts of ‘religious states’, ‘theocracy’ and ‘state religion’.<sup>21</sup> Both ‘religion’ and ‘secularization’ are multidimensional phenomena and it is important to recognize an important distinction concerning the role of religion at three levels: (i) at macro-level in the state, (ii) at mezzo-level as a societal institution, and (iii) at micro-level, as an individual practice.<sup>22</sup> Hence societies where the public displays intense personal faith and spiritual practices may still be governed by secular constitutions. As with ‘democracy’, it is somewhat easier to conceptualize and define ‘secular’ states than to identify the precise antithesis. The American constitution recognizes a clear separation of church and state, but in many other countries there are gradations in the exact division and role of church and state. For example, many European democracies display the vestiges of religion in constitutional practices, including recognizing an established state religion, while following multicultural policies which tolerate and respect all types of faith. Hence Britain is one of the most strikingly secular societies in the world today in terms of mass observance of religious practices and the expression of religious values.<sup>23</sup> In successive decades since the 1960s, the British government has officially endorsed policies of multiculturalism, valuing diversity in religious identities and practices, for example by funding faith-based schools for Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims and other religions. Nevertheless due to the legacy of historical traditions, the Church of England remains the established religion in England, the constitutional monarch is required to uphold the Protestant faith, daily acts of worship are required in all state schools, and the House of Lords still contain more than two dozen Lords Spiritual.

Despite these complexities, ‘secular’ states are understood and defined here as *those which are neutral or impartial towards all different types of religion*, for example as evidenced by states practicing religious pluralism and multicultural policies, separation of spiritual and government authorities, tolerance of diverse religious beliefs and practices, with constitutions, laws, and regulatory frameworks where no single type of faith is favored over others, or indeed over no faith. In secular *democracies*, legitimacy and authority derives from the ballot box. The most secular states follow policies of multiculturalism, valuing diversity, mutual respect, coexistence, and tolerance of all types of religious identities and practices. Multicultural policies differ sharply from those seeking assimilation or integration. The rise of secular states can be regarded as closely intertwined with processes of democratization, although in Western Europe the expansion of religious freedom and tolerance preceded the development of the institutions of liberal democracy and the expansion of the mass franchise by many centuries.

Following a similar logic, in general it is proposed to conceptualize and define ‘non-secular’ or ‘religious’ states as those where *the state is not neutral towards all types of religion*, exemplified by multiple practices, such as where one type of faith is privileged in the national constitution, the state regulates or restricts freedom of worship or religious expression for some types of denominations, cults or sects, a single official state religion is recognized and favored, spiritual authorities are closely related to governing authorities, the state appoints or approves religious leaders, the state subsidizes some religions, the state mandates compulsory religious education in one faith in public schools, courts seek to interpret and enforce religious precepts, and, in the most extreme case of *theocracy*, the government claims to rule on behalf of God or a higher power, not deriving its legitimacy and authority from the ballot box. Theocracy is therefore treated as a sub-set and only one extreme type of religious state, not necessarily representative of more moderate variants. As with other attempts at regime classification, the distinction between secular and non-secular states can be treated as a binary division or, more realistically and accurately, as a continuous scale ranging from the most secular to the most religious state.

To distinguish and classify the practices associated with secular and non-secular states around the world, this study draws upon the Religious Freedom Index developed earlier for *Sacred and Secular*.<sup>24</sup> This is constructed based on information for each country contained in the United States State Department report on *International Religious Freedom, 2002*, a comprehensive comparison of state regulation and restrictions of all world faiths.<sup>25</sup> The scale sought to replicate the methodology and expand upon the country coverage offered by the 1992 Chaves and Cann index used in previous studies to measure state regulation.<sup>26</sup> The Index of Religious Freedom in *Sacred and Secular* focuses upon the relationship of the state and religious organizations, including issues such as whether the constitution limits freedom of religion, whether the government restricts some denominations, cults or sects, and whether the state recognizes and favors an established church (see Appendix A). All these are features conceptualized as distinguishing secular and non-secular states. The index was classified according to the criteria listed in *Sacred and Secular*, with each item coded 0/1. The twenty-point scale was then reversed so that a higher score on the 20-point scale represents greater secularity.<sup>27</sup> The classification and measurement allows us to operationalize the regime typology presented schematically in Figure 1, combining the indices of democratization and secularism, to compare nation-states worldwide.

**II: The distribution of regimes worldwide**

*Secular democracies*

The results of applying the indices across both dimensions, as illustrated in Figure 2, show that today many countries can be classified as *secular democracies*. Regimes located in the top-right quadrant of the scatter-gram presented in Figure 2 are characterized by civil and political liberties and a state which is neutral towards different types of faith, tolerating religious pluralism and multiculturalism. This includes many established liberal democracies in post-industrial societies, exemplified by Canada, the Netherlands and the United States, as well as many newer third-wave democracies, such as South Africa, South Korea and Brazil.

[Figure 2 about here]

Most importantly, many Muslim-plurality states also fall into this category, exemplified by Mali, Albania, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Mali, for example, since its first democratically-elected president took power in 1992, has had a civilian government and enjoyed relative political stability. Over 90% of the population is Muslim, mainly Sunni, with a scattering of Christians and indigenous religions. The secular constitution provides for freedom of religion and the government respects these provisions in practice, for example with no recent reports of persecution, discrimination, or imprisonment on the basis of religious convictions or affiliation. Mali's constitution provides for a multiparty democracy, with restrictions against parties based on ethnic or religious lines. Public schools do not offer religious instruction although there are no restrictions on private religious schools for Muslims and Christians.<sup>28</sup> In short, despite widespread and deep-rooted poverty, Mali has enjoyed considerable religious freedom and tolerance accompanying the expansion of democracy in recent decades, a Muslim-plurality society exemplifying a stable and peaceful secular democratic state.

*Religious autocracies*

Figure 2 also shows many *religious autocracies* in Muslim-plurality societies, located in the bottom-left quadrant, as exemplified by Saudi Arabia and Iran as the most extreme cases. Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain and Sudan are more moderate versions of this type of state. For example, at least prior to the 'Jasmine' revolution, the Tunisian constitution stipulated the country's determination to adhere to the teachings of Islam, that Islam is the official state religion, and that the president is required to be Muslim.<sup>29</sup> The population is 99 percent Muslim and overwhelmingly Sunni. Groups that constitute less than 1 percent of the population include Shi'a

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another religion, and the government does not require registration of conversion; however, government officials are reported to occasionally harass and discriminate against converts from Islam to another religion. The government controls and subsidizes mosques and pays the salaries of imams (clerics). The president appointed the Grand Mufti of the Republic, who is the official expounder of Islamic law. The 1988 Law on Mosques stipulates that only personnel appointed by the government may lead activities in mosques. Based on Islamic law, the government forbade domestic marriages between Muslim women and non-Muslim men and courts have applied an Islamic law-based interpretation of civil law in some family cases. At the same time, in an attempt to suppress Islamic extremism, the government also restricts the wearing of "sectarian dress," including the hijab (Islamic headscarf), and officials discourage men with traditional Islamic dress and beards. Until the recent uprising, Tunisia has held elections at regular intervals but the ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (*Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique*), has exerted predominant control, sweeping up 85-90% of the vote in the 2009 Presidential and Assembly elections, facing weak and divided opposition parties. President Zine al-Abidin Ben Ali ruled for more than two decades until he was toppled and fled abroad in the January 2011 uprising, leaving Tunisia to face an uncertain future. The overall classification shows that Muslim-plurality societies are ruled by many types of regimes but it can also be observed that most of the states ruled by religious autocracies are in Muslim-predominant societies.

*Secular autocracies*

Moreover based on these indices many states can also be classified as *secular autocracies*, in the top-left-hand quadrant, where there are serious restriction on many political rights and civil liberties, but where the state constitutions are also neutral or indifferent towards different types of faith, rather than favoring one. This category includes diverse societies, both Muslim-plurality such as Chad, Libya and Eritrea, as well as non-Muslim plurality, such as Angola, Togo and Zimbabwe. In Chad, for example, more than half of the population is Muslim, approximately one-third is Christian, and the remainder follows indigenous religious beliefs or has no religion. The religious population is also divided by region. The Chad constitution is secular and it provides for freedom of religion; however, the government monitors the activities of fundamentalist Islamic groups. The government is legally obligated to treat all religious groups or denominations equally, for example there is no religious instruction in public schools. The government is led by President Idriss Deby, who seized power in a military coup over two decades ago. In the April 2011 presidential elections, the main opposition parties boycotted the contest, as their demands for electoral reform were not met. The legislative contests were also flawed by irregularities and lack of integrity. In short, President Deby's rule in Chad exemplifies a country where the leader continues to lack legitimacy derived from democratic multiparty elections, ranked by Freedom House in 2010 as one of the most repressive regimes in the world, yet with a state largely respecting religious pluralism, reflecting the divided society.

By contrast, with the single exception of the Maldives, there are few cases of *religious democracies* identified in the worldwide comparison. Table 1 and Figure 3 summarize the distribution and classification of regimes worldwide and also in Muslim-plurality societies. Thus among Islamic societies, two thirds are religious autocracies, one quarter are secular autocracies, and only 8% are secular democracies. Among other types of society worldwide, however, only one tenth are religious autocracies, one fifth are secular autocracies, while over half are secular democracies. Thus regimes in Islamic societies are indeed distinctive compared with the rest of the world. [Table 1 and Figure 3 about here about here]

### III: Measuring regime preferences

Given this distribution, what explains public preferences towards one type of regime over another? Is the type of regime congruent with public preferences in each country? And, in particular, in Muslim plurality societies, does public opinion favor secular democracy, characterized by religious tolerance, respect for diversity, and a division of church and state? Many factors will determine the final type of constitutional settlement and the regime which develops in the countries in the MENA region which are currently experiencing challenges to autocracy. Beyond popular preferences in the mass electorate, the new settlements will be shaped by the type of political elite, the power and role of the armed forces, and external pressures from the international community, among many other factors. But popular preferences in the mass culture are also likely to play a role in any constitutional settlement, especially where these are subject to popular referendum. It is therefore important to determine whether the general public in Muslim-plurality nations favors the Turkish model of secular democracy, the Iranian model of religious autocracy, or another type of constitutional settlement located between these poles.

A review of the previous empirical research literature analyzing Muslim public opinion suggests several propositions about preferences for secular democracy. Recent survey findings from Muslim-plurality countries provide evidence that Islamic religiosity does not lead to negative attitudes toward democracy; instead previous studies based on the 4<sup>th</sup> wave of the WVS/EVS found no significant differences between the publics living in Western nations and in Muslim-plurality societies in approval of how democracy works in practice, support for democratic ideals, and approval of strong political leadership.<sup>30</sup> Mark Tessler compared four Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria), and reported that support for democracy as an ideal form of government is almost universal in these societies.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless Muslim publics are also found to display greater support for a strong societal and political role by religious authorities than Western publics.<sup>32</sup> If clerical leaders are believed to be legitimate governing authorities, this poses a major challenge for processes of democratization, since clergy hold their position through appointment, charisma or inheritance, not through popular electoral mechanisms. Thus previous research suggests that Muslim public opinion often displays tensions between the expressed desire for constitutional arrangements respecting the principles and values of liberal democracy, which should include

a procedural understanding of democracy was most common, many living in North African and Middle Eastern societies with little historical experience of democracy, such as Iraq, Jordan, Iran and Ethiopia, saw no contradiction between religious authorities interpreting the law and the principles and characteristics of democracy.<sup>33</sup>

To examine popular preferences, the empirical evidence used in this study draws upon the World Values Surveys/European Values Surveys (WVS/EVS), pooled across three waves conducted from 1995-2007. This project has conducted representative national surveys of the basic values and beliefs of the publics in more than 90 independent countries, containing over 88 of the world's population and covering all six inhabited continents. The study utilizes the third wave, carried out in 55 nations in 1995-1996, the fourth wave, conducted in 59 countries in 1999-2001 and the fifth wave covering 55 countries and conducted in 2005-2007.<sup>34</sup> Research which focuses in depth upon only a few Muslim-plurality country case-studies is unable to determine whether attitudes are the product of the specific type of predominant faith in any society or else the characteristics of the type of cultural region, historical legacies, levels of human development, social structures, or constitutional contexts. By contrast, a research design which examines attitudes worldwide among diverse faiths and types of societies, including twenty Muslim-plurality nations from different global regions, provides a broader and more reliable basis for comparison.

Most importantly for our purposes, the survey includes systematic data on public opinion in twenty diverse Islamic states containing Muslim-plurality populations, listed in Table 2, providing some of the broadest global comparison available from any existing representative social survey. Societies in the World Values Survey are classified by their predominant religion, based on estimates of the religious population contained in the CIA World Fact-book. *Islamic* nations are defined as those where the Muslim population is the largest plurality (although societies may, and often do, also contain substantial minorities of other faiths). It is important to compare a wide variety of societies to examine the variety of attitudes and values found among diverse Muslim nations and Islamic traditions around the globe.<sup>35</sup> The World Values Survey includes Arab states, both majority Sunni (such as Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt) and majority Shi'a (such as Iran and Iraq), as well as countries in Asia (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia), Central Europe (Bosnia Herzegovina, Albania), and in Sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso). The survey also covers states that have adopted Islam as the foundation of political institutions (such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), societies where Islam is the official or established state religion (including Egypt, Bangladesh, and Malaysia), and secular states where the constitution is neutral towards religion

including the top three in size, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The WVS/EVS surveys also covers societies with all levels of economic and human development, including many affluent Western countries, such as the U.S., Japan and Switzerland, with per capita annual incomes over \$40,000; together with middle-level Muslim countries including Malaysia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well as poorer Muslim societies, such as Bangladesh, Mali and Burkina Faso, with per capita annual incomes of \$500 or less. In terms of regimes, Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, which Freedom House (2009) classifies as one of the world's most restrictive states in respect for civil liberties and political rights, but the World Values survey also monitored public opinion in the democratic states of Mali and Indonesia, as well as the secular state of Turkey.<sup>36</sup>

*Popular support for the principles of democracy or autocracy*

Surveys have sought to tap public attitudes towards democratic principles and autocratic forms of governance in several ways.<sup>37</sup> Support for democracy is complex and multidimensional. In particular, if overt approval of democratic governance is tapped, without considering alternatives or trade-off values, then the relative preferences for different forms of rule cannot be determined. Hence support for democracy may be widely endorsed by Jordanians, the Egyptians or Moroccans, but it remains unclear how important this is to respondents compared with, for example, the desire to maintain social stability and order, the value of respecting traditional authorities, or the substantial risks of regime change. In the same way, if people are asked by pollsters whether they value health care and also whether they want lower taxes, then it is likely that both statements will be widely endorsed. If trade-off questions are used instead, so that people are asked whether they prefer more public spending on health care or more tax cuts, then this presents respondents with more realistic and complex choices where they are forced to prioritize options. A more effective way to explore whether democratic attitudes are robust, and to measure more nuanced choices, is to use trade-off items where citizens are asked to express their preference for different types of democratic *and* autocratic regimes. For comparability, to see whether the results remain robust and consistent with other indicators, the World Values Survey monitored preferences for democratic governance, military rule, rule by bureaucratic elites, and also strong-man leadership unchecked by parliament and elections (see Appendix A). The standardized democratic-autocratic values scale is constructed by recoding these items to reflect the endorsement of democratic rule and the rejection of autocratic forms of governance, and then combining these responses and standardizing the resulting scale to 100 points (see Appendix A). It should be noted that responses are relative to the global average; for example the majority of the public in all societies under comparison supports

democratic values, but endorsement is far more widespread in countries such as Denmark, Austria and France than in Russia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

#### *Support for secular states*

The WVS/EVS survey contains multiple items monitoring religious values, beliefs and practices, including the importance of religion, attendance at religious services, and the strength of religious identities. To monitor preferences for secular states, as proxy measures the following two items in the survey were analyzed: “How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (i) Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections; (ii) Religious leaders should not influence government decisions.” Agreement with each of these items on the 5-point ‘Likert’ type scale were understood to reflect preferences for a minimal role for church and state. The items were strongly inter-correlated, forming a suitable scale. Agreement with both items were summed and coded on a composite 10-point scale, where a higher score represents greater support for secularity. This is far from a perfect way to monitor the complex concept of religious or secular states, as many other indicators would be useful, such as measures of religious tolerance, support for religious freedoms, and approval of multicultural policies, but these two items are the most appropriate measures available in the survey as the basis for the preliminary analysis.

The dependent variables derived from these indicators are therefore threefold: (i) approval of democratic principles and rejection of autocracy; (ii) support for secularity (the division of spiritual and government authorities); and (iii) the interaction of these scales, understood as reflecting endorsement of secular democracy. The analytical models explaining these attitudes involve measurement at two distinct levels. A representative sample of individual respondents (level 1) is nested within national-level contexts (level 2). The WVS/EVS was conducted among a representative random sample of the adult population within each country. The use of Hierarchical Linear Models, in particular multilevel regression analysis, is the most appropriate technique for comparing the impact of societal-level and individual-level factors simultaneously. The models in this study use restricted maximum likelihood techniques (REML) to estimate direct and cross-level effects for hierarchical data. Individual respondents are thus grouped into countries. Each country has a different set of parameters for the random factors, allowing intercepts and slopes to vary by nation.<sup>38</sup> In hierarchical linear models, as is customary, all independent variables were centered, by subtracting the grand mean (which becomes zero). The standardized independent variables all have a standard deviation of 1.0. This process also helps to guard against problems of collinearity in the independent variables in the OLS models. The independent variables were treated as fixed components, reflecting the weighted average for the slope across all groups, while nation was treated as a random component, capturing the country variability in the slope. The strength of the beta coefficients (slopes) can be interpreted intuitively as how much change in the dependent variable is generated by a one-percent change in each independent variable. The multilevel regression models used in this study usually generate small differences in the size of the slope coefficient (b) compared with the results of OLS models, but the average standard errors for level 2 variables tend to be slightly larger. The process is thus more rigorous and conservative than OLS, avoiding Type I errors (false positives, concluding that a statistically-significant difference exists when, in truth, there is no statistical difference). In the REML model, by contrast, Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIC) is used, where the model with the lower value is the best fitting.

Level 1 in the core models includes *individual-level* Muslim religious identities, and the strength of religiosity, along with several other standard controls, described in the Technical Appendix A, including male gender (0/1), household income using a 10-point scale, age (in years), an education scale, marital status, and labor force participation. Level 2 includes *national-level* variables, including the classification of Islamic or non-Islamic societies, based on the plurality faith

in each country’s population. In addition, the study also controls for the regional location, classified as in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world, to test whether global areas differ.

**IV: Public regime preferences**

We can start by comparing the descriptive results at macro-levels without any controls, to see where the general public falls on these scales within each society, and then examine the full multilevel models seeking to predict support for secular democracy. Figure 4 illustrates public attitudes in each society towards the proxy indicator of secularity (on the vertical axis) and the endorsement of democratic principles and rejection of autocracy, depicted on the horizontal axis. Table 3 compares the proportion of the public in each society supporting each type of regime. The comparison suggests that the public living in many long-established secular democracies strongly approve of the principles underpinning this type of regime. Hence citizens in France, Belgium, Denmark and Japan are located in the top right-hand quadrant, favoring democratic values and a separation of church and state. Some newer democracies, such as Slovakia, Hungary and Estonia, also fall into this category. In these congruent cases, the regime preferences for the general public are in accordance with the constitutional principles in each state. Among Muslim-plurality societies under comparison, the publics in Tanzania and Morocco also endorse these principles. Nevertheless it is also apparent that among the many post-communist societies located in the top left-hand quadrant, such as Russia, Belarus and Romania, on balance the majority of the public still favors secular democracy but they express less strong and overwhelming endorsement of democratic principles. Mali, Indonesia and Burkino Faso also fall into this category.

[Figure 4 and Table 3 about here]

In the bottom left-hand corner, several countries express less strong support for democracy and for the principles of secularity, notably in Algeria and Malaysia, as well as in Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela. These are all societies where religious values remain deeply-rooted, hence less distinction is drawn between the role of spiritual and government authorities. Lastly in the bottom right-hand corner, we find several deeply-religious societies, including the United States, Uganda, Zambia, and Ghana, where the public strongly endorses democratic values and principles while also believing that spiritual leaders should play an influential role in public life. In the case of the United States, the public strongly endorses democratic values and principles while also believing that spiritual leaders should play an influential role in public life. In the case of the United States, the public strongly endorses democratic values and principles while also believing that spiritual leaders should play an influential role in public life.

[Table 4 about here]

To analyze the reasons for the support of these principles, a series of multilevel models are required. As shown in Table 4, these models incorporate a wide range of societal and individual-level controls which the research literature suggests might be expected to influence attitudes towards democracy and secularity. In particular, many previous studies assume that Muslim identities and religious values are given, when analysts proceed to examine how far attitudes are predicted by Muslim-majority societies at macro-level, or Muslim identities at micro level. Yet identities in every type of faith may be nominal and superficial, such as specifying formal religious affiliations on official documents, or they may reflect deeply-felt meanings and orientations. Therefore it is important to tap into religious values as well, or the importance of religion, which is expected to have a strong negative impact on preferences for secular states. The models therefore enter three predictor variables – Muslim religious identities, living in an Islamic (Muslim-plurality) society, and the strength of religiosity. The models control at individual-level for the standard socio-demographic factors which influence social and political attitudes, namely age, gender, income, education, labor-force participation and marital status. The models also control at national-level for the Middle East and North Africa, to see whether there is an additional effect arising from the regional culture

differentiating Muslim-plurality societies, and economic development, measured by logged GDP per capita in purchasing power parity.

The results of the three models are fairly consistent in the coefficients which prove significant predictors. Thus among the individual-level control variables, the factor which is most strongly and significantly related to support for secular democracy is education; those who are more educated prove most likely to endorse both democratic values and the principles of secularity. Age effects are similar; older generations are more supportive of secular democracy and its components. The other socio-demographic controls are less consistently significant in their performance. At national level, economic development is also very strongly related to support for democratic values and thus support for secular democracy. This is not surprising; elsewhere we have demonstrated a strong links among many indices of human security and development, patterns of religiosity, and support for democracy. After controlling for these factors, we do not observe a separate effect arising from the Middle East.

Lastly, in terms of the key predictor variables, after controlling for all these factors, Muslims display significantly less approval than non-Muslims for democratic values and rejection of autocratic rule, secularism, and thus endorsement of the compound indicator of secular democracy. Similar patterns can be observed for the strength of religiosity, with the more faithful less approving of democracy and secularism, as well as secular democracy. By contrast living within an Islamic society proves negative but not statistically significant. It appears that regime preferences are shaped both by the type of religious identity as well as by the strength of religiosity and these effects operate primarily at micro-level. Further analysis is required, however, to test whether the results remain robust when using alternative attitudinal indices of support for democracy and secularism, as well as whether the strength of these relationships vary among diverse Muslim-predominant societies, such as Turkey, Iran and Indonesia, with different types of contemporary regimes and political histories.

#### **V: Conclusions and implications**

The Arab spring has been marked by the revolutionary downfall and removal of autocratic leaders in Tunisia (President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali), Egypt (President Hosni Mubarrak), and Yemen (President Ali Abdullah Saleh). Major protests, strikes, and demonstrations have occurred throughout the region, notably in Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Oman, while the outbreak of civil war in Libya has destabilized the regime of Colonel Gaddafi. These events have encouraged many commentators to hope that the Middle East and North Africa is experiencing the gradual transition from autocracy to secular democracies, where moderate Islamic parties, new constitutions, and elected governments gradually expand human rights, including religious freedoms, pluralism, and tolerance of diverse faiths. Nevertheless contemporary events remain in continuous flux, the final outcome of these developments are far from settled, and other commentators fear that the instability caused by the popular uprisings will allow openings for conservative and more extremist religious forces to come to power, enforcing stricter interpretation of Islamic law.

The conceptual framework used in this paper suggests that contemporary regimes can be classified into four categories: secular democracies, secular autocracies, religious democracies, and religious autocracies. The study operationalized these notions then explored the distribution of regimes both worldwide and also among Muslim-plurality societies. The results of the comparison indicate that Muslim-plurality societies are governed today by diverse types of regimes, illustrated by the contrasts among Mali (exemplifying a secular democracy), Chad (classified as a secular autocracy), and Tunisia (as a religious autocracy). Thus we can conclude that *there is no basis for the popular perception that most Muslim-plurality societies are ruled by religious autocracies*, although at the same time it is also observed that *most religious autocracies are found in Muslim-plurality societies*. Further exploration is needed to understand the contrasts in the actual type of regimes

ruling Muslim-pluralist societies, examining the factors commonly associated with the persistence of autocracy and the process of democratization. Hence studies need to analyze the role of economic development and societal modernization; historical processes and colonial legacies; neighborhood effects, regional hegemonic states and international pressures; the impact of natural resources, conflict, and ethnic fractionalization; and the structure of the state in terms of power-sharing constitutional arrangements.<sup>39</sup>

To understand what regimes the public living in Muslim-plurality societies actually desires, we turned to the analysis of public opinion data. Attitudes towards ideal regime principles showed that the publics in these societies displayed diverse preferences; hence some countries, such as Tanzania and Morocco, favored secular democracy, while others such as Albania and Indonesia proved slightly less supportive of democracy although equally secular, and still others, such as Algeria, favored religious autocracy. Overall, therefore, although some assume commonality, the contrasts among Muslim-plurality societies stand out. The multilevel survey analysis suggests that Muslims, and those populations who are most religious, are generally less supportive of secular democratic values and principles than those of other faiths and the less religious.

The study provides insights into the political diversity which is evident among Islamic societies around the globe. What also emerges, moreover, is that although Muslim-plurality societies are particularly prone towards religious autocracy, this is far from the only type of regime governing these countries. The examples of secular democracy in Mali, Turkey, Indonesia and Albania provide alternative models of development for Islamic societies elsewhere, especially in countries facing new constitutional choices following successful regime transitions during the Arab spring.

**Table 1: The distribution of regimes**

	Secular democracy	Religious democracy	Secular autocracy	Religious autocracy	Total
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	N.
Muslim-plurality societies	8.0	4.0	24.0	64.0	<b>50</b>
Other societies	52.5	13.5	19.9	11.3	<b>137</b>
Worldwide	40.8	11.0	20.9	25.1	<b>187</b>

**Note:** For the construction of all measures, see Appendix A

**Table 2: Muslim-plurality countries contained in the World Values Surveys**

	Country	% Muslims	Global region
1	Iraq	98.9	Middle East
2	Algeria	98.0	North Africa
3	Iran	97.7	Middle East
4	Saudi Arabia	97.0	Middle East
5	Jordan	96.9	Middle East
6	Egypt	94.3	North Africa
7	Mali	93.0	West Africa
8	Indonesia	92.2	South East Asia
9	Azerbaijan	91.0	Central Europe
10	Bangladesh	88.7	South Asia
11	Turkey	81.7	Central Europe
12	Kyrgyzstan	74.3	Central Asia
13	Pakistan	69.6	South Asia
14	Albania	64.3	Central Europe
15	Morocco	63.6	North Africa
16	Malaysia	57.4	South East Asia
17	Burkina Faso	53.3	Sub-Saharan Africa
18	Bosnia	48.9	Central Europe
19	Tanzania	40.1	East Africa
20	Nigeria	28.1	West Africa

**Source:** Pooled World Values Survey, 1995-2007

**Table 3: Public preferences for regimes**

	Public preferences for regimes			
	Secular democracy	Religious democracy	Secular autocracy	Religious autocracy
Denmark	71.2	18.7	8.5	1.6
Andorra	69.7	11.2	12.6	6.5
Malta	66.5	17.9	12.8	2.8
Austria	64.3	18.4	12.2	5.0
Montenegro	62.0	11.9	18.5	7.6
Iceland	61.1	29.4	5.6	3.9
France	57.6	13.2	23.1	6.1
New Zealand	57.4	28.1	10.1	4.4
Greece	56.8	36.1	3.7	3.5
West Germany	56.7	28.0	8.4	6.9
Croatia	56.5	15.3	21.4	6.8
Czech Republic	55.4	23.8	14.5	6.3
Japan	55.2	20.1	16.4	8.3
Belgium	54.5	17.3	19.2	9.0
Albania	<b>54.4</b>	<b>19.8</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>9.4</b>
Portugal	54.4	9.8	20.5	15.3
Italy	54.1	27.7	11.5	6.6
Northern Ireland	53.9	28.8	8.8	8.4
Ireland	53.0	28.4	12.4	6.2
Estonia	52.6	16.8	19.5	11.1
Spain	52.5	22.8	11.8	12.8
East Germany	51.1	23.0	15.9	10.0
Tanzania	<b>50.9</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>4.6</b>
Canada	50.8	25.6	14.5	9.0
Sweden	50.5	31.1	9.9	8.5
Slovenia	48.9	20.2	18.4	12.5
Luxembourg	48.8	16.8	25.7	8.6
Bangladesh	<b>47.8</b>	<b>23.0</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>9.5</b>
Australia	47.5	27.6	14.0	10.9
Hungary	46.8	17.7	23.2	12.2
Great Britain	45.3	28.1	15.7	10.9
Netherlands	44.3	34.7	9.1	11.9
Cyprus	44.2	14.9	26.3	14.6
Serbia	42.5	17.6	22.7	17.2
Finland	41.5	28.5	15.5	14.5
Uruguay	39.9	24.9	17.6	17.7
Argentina	39.4	23.4	20.5	16.7
Bosnia	<b>39.4</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>30.1</b>	<b>14.6</b>
Ghana	38.5	38.8	14.1	8.7
Lithuania	38.2	11.1	37.8	13.0
Puerto Rico	38.0	30.4	15.4	16.2
Morocco	<b>37.8</b>	<b>39.3</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>9.3</b>
Slovakia	36.3	18.1	30.2	15.4
Latvia	35.4	16.0	34.1	14.5
Poland	35.1	9.6	41.7	13.6
Bulgaria	33.9	8.1	42.4	15.5
Belarus	33.1	10.2	39.4	17.3
Taiwan	32.6	6.3	49.4	11.7
Ethiopia	32.4	26.7	26.7	14.2
Trinidad and Tobago	32.3	33.7	16.1	17.9
Chile	32.0	21.6	24.5	21.9
Burkina Faso	<b>31.6</b>	<b>18.3</b>	<b>33.4</b>	<b>16.7</b>
United States	31.2	35.3	15.2	18.3

	Public preferences for regimes			
	Secular democracy	Religious democracy	Secular autocracy	Religious autocracy
South Korea	29.0	26.3	22.3	22.4
Uganda	28.3	34.8	25.1	11.9
Russia	28.1	10.2	40.4	21.3
South Africa	27.8	32.3	19.1	20.8
Viet Nam	26.5	16.5	35.4	21.6
Ukraine	26.2	11.5	35.8	26.4
Armenia	23.8	19.6	27.3	29.4
Romania	23.2	6.9	50.3	19.6
India	23.2	14.0	36.4	26.4
Zimbabwe	23.0	34.9	18.1	24.0
Macedonia	21.8	7.3	49.4	21.5
Moldova	21.7	16.0	31.7	30.6
Venezuela	21.6	26.7	23.3	28.4
Mali	<b>20.2</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>45.4</b>	<b>22.1</b>
Kyrgyzstan	<b>20.1</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>39.3</b>	<b>29.8</b>
Zambia	19.7	38.9	16.8	24.6
Philippines	18.5	6.4	47.6	27.4
Indonesia	<b>18.4</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>47.6</b>	<b>24.2</b>
Mexico	16.1	11.2	31.4	41.3
Brazil	14.0	13.7	34.4	37.9
Guatemala	13.6	13.5	36.1	36.8
Algeria	<b>9.9</b>	<b>39.9</b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>37.3</b>
Malaysia	<b>8.3</b>	<b>17.8</b>	<b>32.1</b>	<b>41.8</b>
ALL	38.6	21.3	23.8	16.4

**Note:** For the construction of all measures, see Appendix A

**Source:** Pooled World Values Survey, 1995-2007

**Table 4: Multilevel model predicting support for secular democracy**

	<b>Model 1</b> Democratic values	<b>Model 2</b> Secularism	<b>Model 3</b> Secular Democracy
<b>PREDICTOR VARIABLES</b>			
<b>Muslim religious identity</b>	<b>-.739***</b> (.125)	<b>-.063***</b> (.014)	<b>-.108***</b> (15.3)
<b>Islamic society</b>	-1.81 (1.10)	.114 (.089)	-50.9 (107)
<b>Strength of religiosity</b>	<b>-.617***</b> (.093)	<b>-.264***</b> (.011)	<b>-.262***</b> (.12.3)
<b>INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONTROLS</b>			
<b>Age (years)</b>	<b>.801***</b> (.079)	<b>.032***</b> (.009)	<b>86.5***</b> (10.5)
<b>Gender (male=1)</b>	-.006 (.069)	<b>.026***</b> (.008)	11.3 (0.04)
<b>Household income 10-pt scale</b>	-.100 (.817)	.001 (.010)	-17.8 (10.6)
<b>Education 9-pt scale</b>	<b>2.01***</b> (.081)	<b>.118***</b> (.010)	<b>233***</b> (10.7)
<b>Labor force participation</b>	.097 (.074)	-.001 (.009)	4.97 (9.73)
<b>Marital status</b>	<b>.255***</b> (.072)	-.009 (.008)	13.4 (9.48)
<b>NATIONAL-LEVEL CONTROLS</b>			
<b>Middle East</b>	1.85 (1.27)	-.124 (.109)	10.98 (131)
<b>Logged GDP per capita</b>	<b>4.12***</b> (.814)	.112 (.070)	<b>3.97***</b> (.86)
<b>Constant (intercept)</b>	70.0	7.54	53.1
<b>Schwartz BIC</b>	454,657	206,495	765,586
<b>N. respondents</b>	54,424	50,334	42,884
<b>N. nations</b>	45	39	37


**Note:** All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the results of the REML multilevel regression models including the beta coefficient, (the standard error below in parenthesis), and the significance. The 100 point scales are constructed from the items described in Appendix A. P. \*\*\*>.000, \*\*=.01, \*>.05

**Source:** Pooled World Values Survey 1995-2007.

**Figure 1: Schematic model of regime typology**


	Low << Liberal democracy >> High	
High >> Religious freedom	Secular autocracy	Secular democracy
Low << Religious freedom	Religious autocracy	Religious democracy

Figure 2: Operationalizing the regime typology



**Notes:** *Liberal democracy* is measured by the Freedom House Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties, 2008, standardized to 100-points. *Religious freedom* is measured by the Religious Freedom Index on a 100-pt scale developed for *Sacred and Secular* (Norris and Inglehart 2004). See Appendix A for details. *Religious cultures* are classified by the predominant religious population in each society derived from the CIA World Yearbook. For details, see Appendix A

**Figure 3: The distribution of regime types**




**Notes**

*Liberal democracy* is measured by the Freedom House Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties, 2008, standardized to 100-points. Democracies and autocracies are dichotomized around the mean.

*Religious freedom* is measured by the Religious Freedom Index on a 100-pt scale developed for *Sacred and Secular* (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Secular and religious regimes are categorized around the mean. See Appendix A for details.

*Religious cultures* are classified by the predominant religious population in each society derived from the CIA World Yearbook.

**Figure 4: Public attitudes towards ideal regime principles**



**Notes:** See Appendix A for details of each scale.

**Source:** World Values Surveys

**Appendix A: Concepts and Measures**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definitions, coding and sources</b>
<b>Per Capita GDP</b>	Measured in constant international \$ in Purchasing Power Parity. Various years. Source: The World Bank. World Development Indicators.
<b>Type of religion</b>	V184: “Do you belong to a religious denomination? [IF YES] Which one?” Coded: No, not a member; Roman Catholic; Protestant; Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.); Jewish; Muslim; Hindu; Buddhist; Other. Source: World Values Surveys.
<b>Type of predominant religion in each society</b>	The classification of the major religion (adhered to by the plurality groups in the population) in all 193 states around the world is based on the CIA. <i>The World Factbook, 2009</i> . (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency). Source: <a href="http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook">http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook</a>
<b>Level and type of democracy</b>	Freedom House Gastil index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, <i>Freedom in the World</i> <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org">www.freedomhouse.org</a>
<b>Islamic societies</b>	Based on the societies with Muslim-plurality populations, based on the above source, as listed in Table 1. It should be noted that throughout the paper the term ‘Islamic’ is used to refer to Muslim-plurality <i>societies</i> , and it is not used to describe the official religion or policies of the state, or the relation between religious and political authorities. ‘Muslim’ refers to individuals who identify with the Muslim faith.
<b>Support for secularity (separation of church and state)</b>	<i>How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (i) Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections; (ii) Religious leaders should not influence government decisions.</i> (Agree coded high on a 10-point scale). Source: <i>World Values Surveys 1999-2007</i> .
<b>Support for democratic principles</b>	<i>“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (i) Having a democratic political system. (ii) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections; (iii) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country; (iv) Having the army rule.”</i> Source: <i>World Values Surveys 1995-2007</i>
<b>Occupational Class</b>	Coded for the respondent’s occupation. “In which profession/occupation do you, or did you, work?” The scale is coded into 4 categories: Professional/manager (1); Other non-manual (2); Skilled non-manual (3); Unskilled Manual Worker (4). Source: World Values Surveys
<b>Paid work status</b>	V220. “Are you employed now or not?” Coded fulltime, part-time or self-employed (1), other (0). Source: World Values Surveys
<b>Education</b>	V217. “What is the highest educational level that you have ever attained?” Coded on a 9-point scale from no formal education (1) to university level with degree (9). Source: World Values Surveys
<b>Age</b>	Age coded in continuous years derived from date of birth. Source: World Values Surveys.  Age groups: Younger (18-29), middle (30-49), and older (50+).
<b>Religiosity</b>	V192 ‘How important is God in your life’ 10-point scale
<b>Household</b>	V253 “On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the “lowest income



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<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/> The report is produced due to the *International Religious Freedom Act of 1998* (U.S. Public Law 105-92) and monitored by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom. <http://www.uscirf.gov>. The US State department report largely reflects the evaluations of the state of religious freedoms reported by human rights organizations such as Freedom House and Amnesty International and by comparative studies. See, for example, Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen. Eds. 1997. *Freedom of religion and belief: A world report*. New York: Routledge; Paul Marshall. Ed. 2000. *Religious freedom in the world: A global report on freedom and persecution*. Nashville, Tenn: Broadman and Holman.

<sup>26</sup> Mark Chaves and David E. Cann. 1992. 'Regulation, pluralism and religious market structure.' *Rationality and Society*. 4: 272-290.

<sup>27</sup> Bruce Ledewitz. 2007. *American religious democracy: coming to terms with the end of secular politics*. Westport, Conn: Praeger Publishers.

<sup>28</sup> US State Department International Religious Freedom Report 2010. Mali. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148703.htm>

<sup>29</sup> US State Department International Religious Freedom Report 2010. Tunisia. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148847.htm>

<sup>30</sup> Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2011. *Sacred and Secular: Politics and Religion Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition; M. Steven Fish. 2011. *Are Muslims Distinctive?* New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>31</sup> Mark Tessler and E. Gao. 2005. 'Gauging Arab support for democracy.' *Journal of Democracy* 16 (3): 83-97; Mark Tessler. 2002. 'Do Islamic orientations influence attitudes toward democracy in the Arab world? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria.' *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43 (3-5): 229-249; Mark Tessler. 2002. 'Islam and democracy in the Middle East: The impact of religious orientations on attitudes toward democracy in four Arab countries.' *Comparative Politics* 34 (3): 337-+.

<sup>32</sup> Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2011. *Sacred and Secular: Politics and Religion Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition.

<sup>33</sup> Pippa Norris. 2011. *Democratic Deficit*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ch 8.

<sup>34</sup> Full methodological details about the World Values Surveys, including the questionnaires, sampling procedures, fieldwork procedures, principle investigators, and organization can be found at: <http://worldvaluessurvey.org/>

<sup>35</sup> Mansour Moaddel. 2007. *Values and perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern publics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>36</sup> These regimes are classified according to the 2009 Freedom House assessments of political rights and civil liberties Freedom House. 2009. *Freedom in the World*. [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).

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<sup>37</sup> William Mishler and Richard Rose. 1995. 'Trajectories of fear and hope: support for democracy in Post-Communist Europe.' *Comparative Political Studies* 28:553-81; Richard Rose and William Mishler. 1996. 'Testing the Churchill hypothesis: popular support for democracy and its alternatives.' *Journal of Public Policy* 16:29-58; Richard Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. 1998. *Democracy and Its Alternatives in Post-Communist Europe: Testing the Churchill Hypothesis*. Cambridge: Polity Press; Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. *Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes. 2001. 'Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental.' *British Journal of Political Science* 31(3); Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes, and E. Gyimah-Boadi. 2004. *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., 2006. *Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the Pacific Rim* Oxford: Oxford University Press; Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. 2008. *How People View Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press; Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. Eds. 2008. *How East Asians View Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press; Pippa Norris. 2010. *Democratic Deficit*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>38</sup> Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. *Hierarchical Linear Models* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Robert Bickel. 2007. *Multilevel Analysis for Applied Research: It's Just Regression!* New York: the Guilford Press.

<sup>39</sup> Pippa Norris. 2009. *Driving Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.