

Chapter 5

Electoral systems

Electoral laws and regulations structure opportunities for party competition within each country. Building upon the framework developed in the previous chapter, here we can focus upon the final stage in the pursuit of elected office, including the impact of the major type of electoral system, the effective threshold, and the use of compulsory voting¹. Using the same approach, this chapter analyzes the impact of these formal rules on the electoral fortunes of radical right parties, measured by their national share of votes and seats in legislative elections in the nations under comparison. Much attention in the literature has focused on how electoral systems shape party competition; in particular the use of PR is often regarded as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition facilitating opportunities for extremist parties. Yet the evidence needs to be reexamined because, although widely assumed, the validity of this claim has been challenged.² Moreover the contrast is not simply between all majoritarian and all proportional electoral systems, since important variations exist among nations using PR: for example, Israel's combination of a single nation-wide constituency with a low legal vote threshold (1.5%) allows the election of far more minor and fringe parties than Poland, which has a 7% legal vote threshold and 52 small electoral districts for party lists. As a result, we also need to examine the effects of specific components of electoral systems, such as the impact of any national legal or effective threshold of exclusion, the mean district magnitude, and the level of proportionality.

The main conclusion, from the evidence considered in this chapter, is that electoral laws do have an important impact on the electoral fortunes of the minor parties on the radical right. But this impact is generated primarily through their mechanical effects in translating votes into seats (especially the role of legal thresholds in PR systems), more than their psychological effects in deterring voting support. In this regard, the conventional wisdom about how far PR facilitates extremist parties is only partially correct. Subsequent chapters develop the arguments further by considering the main reasons underlying these patterns, using individual-level survey evidence to explore strategic campaigning by parties and strategic voting by citizens.

Theoretical framework

Where minor parties manage to overcome inequalities of ballot access and funding access, the main mechanical hurdle remaining at the election stage concerns the barriers created by the electoral system and, in particular, the effective threshold that all parties have to surmount before being eligible to gain any seats. The conventional wisdom suggests that PR systems are an important contextual constraint on the electoral fortunes of the radical right. Ignazi summarizes this view: "*As with every new/minor party, extreme right parties need low institutional/electoral thresholds to enter the political arena. The thresholds are low when the electoral system is proportional, the requirements to participate (financial deposits, signatures, etc.) are minimal, and when the first electoral contest is run as a 'second-order' election.*"³ Critics commonly charge that PR systems with low thresholds facilitate party fragmentation and extremism, which, in turn, is associated with hung parliaments, unstable and ineffective governments, and, in extreme cases, even state failure. An extensive literature providing systematic comparisons of the relationship between electoral systems and party systems has developed since the seminal work of Douglas Rae.⁴ Much of this has focused upon the evidence surrounding Duverger's first 'law': (1) "*The plurality single-ballot rule tends to party dualism.*" The second claim is that (2) "*The double-ballot system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism.*"⁵ While originally stated as a universal law-like regularity, without exception, Duverger subsequently suggested that these claims were only weaker probabilistic generalizations⁶. The conditions under which this relationship holds, and its status as a law, have attracted considerable debate in the literature marked by continued reformulations of the original statement and many efforts to define precisely what is to 'count' as a party in order to verify these claims⁷.

Much of the literature, notably Lijphart's classic study, supports Duverger's generalization that plurality electoral systems tend towards party dualism, while PR is associated with multipartyism⁸. My

previous study compared the results of the most recent national election for the lower house of parliament in 170 contests held worldwide from 1995 to 2000⁹. The research found that the mean number of parliamentary parties (based on the simplest definition of parties holding at least one seat) was 5.22 in the countries using majoritarian systems, 8.85 in combined (or mixed) systems, and 9.52 in societies with proportional representation electoral systems. In other words, nations using any form of PR had almost twice as many parliamentary parties as countries using any form of majoritarian electoral system¹⁰. Confirming this broad pattern, although with less of a sharp contrast between the major types of electoral system, the comparison of the mean number of *relevant* parties in these elections (holding over 3% of parliamentary seats) was 3.33 in all majoritarian systems, 4.52 for combined systems, and 4.74 for all proportional systems. Party systems are usually more competitive and fragmented in PR elections, while majoritarian systems often restrict opportunities for minor parties.

The literature has also established evidence supporting the thesis that extremist parties flourish best under PR¹¹. For example, Katz compared the ideological position of parties in established democracies, using expert scales by Castle and Mair, and also by Laver, as discussed earlier, under different electoral systems. The study concluded that a wider range of parties stood for election in PR than in single-member plurality systems: “Clearly, PR is associated with more small parties and with more extreme and ideological parties, while single-member plurality and other barriers to the representation of small parties are associated with fewer parties and a tendency towards an abbreviated political spectrum.”¹²

Moreover, ‘before-and-after’ case-studies, monitoring the impact of electoral reform over successive elections within particular countries, lend credence to the conventional assumption that these rules matter for radical right party fortunes. In France, for example, the Front National won no seats in the 1981 parliamentary elections (held under the Second Ballot majoritarian electoral rules), suddenly gained 35 deputies (6.3%) under the proportional representation system tried in the 1986 parliamentary election, and then plummeted to only one deputy in 1988, despite an unchanged share of the vote, after PR was repealed¹³. Only a few FN candidates have ever been elected to the National Assembly under the second ballot system, but by contrast they have been far more successful under PR rules in European and regional contests. The impact of electoral reform can also be demonstrated by the electoral opportunities of New Zealand First under the Mixed Member Proportional system adopted in 1993, when a two party system became a multimember system overnight¹⁴. Although ‘before’ and ‘after’ natural experiments within each country are persuasive, they cannot furnish conclusive proof. Much else can change over successive elections – the issue agenda, the leaders or the government’s performance - which can also alter party fortunes. Moreover the exact conditions under which electoral systems constrain the success of radical right parties are only imperfectly understood.

Despite the body of evidence, the claim that PR necessarily depresses popular support for extremist parties, although common, has been questioned elsewhere in the literature. Kitschelt, for example, compared voting support for the radical right in Western Europe during the 1980s and found that this did not vary significantly and consistently under majoritarian, combined, or proportional electoral systems. On this basis, he dismisses the role of these institutional rules: “*While electoral laws have a non-negligible impact on party formation and the fragmentation of party systems taken by themselves, they explain very little about the actual dynamics of competition.*”¹⁵ Another recent study by Carter comparing the electoral formulae used in sixteen West European countries and estimated the mean share of the vote won by extreme rightwing parties from 1979 to 2002 under each major types of system. The conclusion agreed with Kitschelt, suggesting that, contrary to popular assumptions, PR systems do not promote party extremism: “*The share of the vote won by the West European parties of the extreme right in the period 1979-2002 appears unrelated to the type of electoral system in operation in the various countries.*”¹⁶

The idea that the type of electoral system should affect support for minor parties is based on the notion of strategic voting. In highly disproportional systems, in Duverger’s words: “*The electors soon realize that they votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party, whereas their natural*

*tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries.*¹⁷ The basic simple idea of ‘*strategic*’ voting (also known as ‘*tactical*’, ‘*insincere*’, or ‘*pragmatic*’ voting) is that these considerations come into play among voters whose favorite party has a poor chance of winning in their constituency, but who have a preference between the parties perceived to be in first and second place¹⁸. The necessary but not sufficient conditions for casting a tactical vote are threefold: voters need to have a clear *rank order* of preferences among parties; voters need to have certain *expectations* based on the available information about how well each party is likely to do in their constituency; and, lastly voters need to *rationaly calculate* that the benefit of casting a ballot for their second preference party outweighs the costs of not supporting their favorite party. The ‘wasted vote’ thesis assumes that higher thresholds commonly found in majoritarian elections deter rational citizens from casting a ballot for minor parties on the radical right, if they believe that their chosen party stands little chance of entering parliament, let alone government office. Such rational supporters of the radical right, the wasted vote thesis assumes, should either stay home, thereby reducing levels of turnout, or they should switch support to another party on strategic or tactical grounds. Citizens are expected to cast a ‘strategic’ vote for their second preference choice, in the belief that casting a ballot for smaller radical right parties under these rules will generate no direct policy benefits. This thesis assumes that people are instrumentally rational, that is, they care about whom they vote for only insofar as this affects the outcome in seats, thereby maximizing their utility in terms of policy outcomes. They are not concerned to express their symbolic support for a party, nor do they wish to swell the national vote share for their favorite party, nor attempt to exercise indirect influence over the policy platforms of other parties.

Evidence

The basic proposition to be explored is that the type of electoral system, and specific aspects of electoral law, will shape support for the radical right. In particular, compared with systems of proportional representation, majoritarian elections characterized by high electoral thresholds are expected to create greater mechanical and psychological hurdles for minor parties, and hence to prevent many radical right contenders from gaining office. To reexamine the basis for these claims with systematic evidence, electoral systems in the 39 countries under comparison are classified in this study into three major families, as listed in Table 5.1, each including a number of sub-categories: *majoritarian* formula (including First-Past-the-Post, Second Ballot, the Block vote, Single Non-Transferable Vote, and Alternative Voting systems)¹⁹; *combined* systems (incorporating both majoritarian and proportional formula); and *proportional formula* (including Party Lists as well as the Single Transferable Vote systems).

[Table 5.1 about here]

The effect of the electoral system on radical right votes

Based on this classification, Table 5.2 compares the share of the votes and seats won by radical right parties in the nations under comparison. Two periods are selected for analysis, to check whether the results are robust and consistent across both periods: the mean vote and seat share won by radical right parties in national elections held in each country since 1990, and, for comparison, the votes and seats share in the most recent national elections (held from 2000-2004).

[Table 5.2 about here]

The results in Table 5.2 suggest two main conclusions. First, contrary to the conventional wisdom, *the share of the vote achieved by radical right parties in the most recent national legislative elections was similar under majoritarian (7.2%) and proportional (7.1%) electoral systems*. How do we explain this pattern, which is consistent with Kitschelt and Carter, given that it runs counter to the ‘wasted vote’ thesis? There are at least two possible reasons suggested by the proximity model of voting used in this book why the ‘wasted vote’ assumption could be misspecified. First, any instrumental calculation by

voters depends, in part, upon the proximity or distance of parties across the ideological spectrum. Moderate parties are placed in an optimal position to be affected by strategic voting, since as the 'half-way house' it is relatively easy for their supporters to switch either to or from other second-preference parties on either the center-left or center-right. In the 1997 British general election, for example, the closure of the ideological gap between the main opposition parties -- with Tony Blair stealing Liberal Democrat clothes on constitutional issues and the Paddy Ashdown campaigning on Labour's territory of education and health -- may have significantly reduced the costs facing voters of transferring from one to the other. The main opposition parties offered more of an echo than a choice. If both parties were perceived to favor similar policies, then strategic considerations make it easier for voters to switch their vote more effectively in seats where this mattered. The 1997 election saw a considerable flow of the vote between Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters designed (successfully) to defeat the Conservative government²⁰. Yet the ideological position of radical rightwing parties is usually located well away from mainstream contenders across the political spectrum, which makes it more costly for their supporters to cast a strategic or tactical vote for another candidate, even if their favorite party faces little hope of winning any seats. Other parties on the center-right, whether Christian Democrats, Conservatives or liberals, are simply located too far away from their ideal policy position. For this reason, we might expect little strategic voting among supporters of the radical right, even if their preferred party cannot win office.

Moreover, if we relax the assumption of instrumental rationality, supporters of the radical right could be understood to be seeking political benefits beyond electing members to the legislature who can have a direct impact upon the public policy process. If people want to cast an 'expressive' or 'symbolic' ballot, such as registering disgust with the immigration policies adopted by both the mainstream governing and opposition parties, they might well remain willing to vote for a radical right party, even if their chosen candidate or party cannot hope to gain office²¹. By 'sending a message' through the ballot box, radical right supporters may still hope to influence public policy indirectly, for example causing the governing party to adopt more restrictive policies towards refugees and asylum seekers, even if not gaining any elected parliamentary representatives. The rational choice facing supporters of smaller radical right parties in majoritarian elections is therefore exit (either staying home), or else casting an expressive ballot for the radical right, with a potential indirect impact upon public policy, rather than switching to a party which is located far away from their ideal ideological location. The evidence supporting this proposition is explored more fully in chapter 7, analyzing individual-level survey data to see whether voter defection is less common among radical right than moderate center parties.

The effects of the electoral system on radical right seats

Despite these patterns, and confirming the conventional wisdom, the mechanical effects of the electoral formula on the ration of votes-to-seats are also strikingly evident. The second major finding in Table 5.2 is that, despite having roughly the same share of the vote, *radical right parties were more than twice as successful in gaining seats under PR as under majoritarian elections*. In the most recent elections, radical right parties won 3.8% of seats under majoritarian rules and 9.9% under PR. Another way of summarizing this data is to calculate the votes: seats ratio²². Under majoritarian systems, with 7.2% of votes, radical right parties won 3.8% of seats, or a ratio of 0.52. Under combined or 'mixed' systems the ratio is 0.64. Under PR it becomes 1.39, meaning that radical right parties win a far higher share of seats than they get votes. Similar patterns were evident in the comparison of all national legislative elections held since 1990. The effect of majoritarian systems was therefore *not* to depress the popular vote for radical right parties, contrary to expectations of strategic voting, but rather to limit their access to legislative office and all the trappings of power and legitimacy that flow from this position. In this regard, majoritarian electoral systems work exactly as proponents claim in excluding extreme parties from parliament. Combined systems prove the intermediate position, as predicted, because they include elements from both the majoritarian and PR systems. In confirmation of the conventional wisdom, radical right parties reaped their greatest parliamentary rewards under PR elections. The outcome for their share of seats is politically important because, in turn, it determines the power, legitimacy, status, and resources that flow from elected office. The type of electoral system is therefore critical in constraining the legislative influence of extreme parties, even where they tap into reservoirs of popular support.

[Table 5.3 about here]

These patterns can be illustrated in more detail by classifying types of radical right parties by their electoral strength (measured by their average share of the national vote during the 1990s). Table 5.3 shows the relative success of these parties under different electoral systems. Three relevant radical right parties (gaining on average over 3% of the vote) compete in nations with majoritarian electoral systems (Pauline Hanson's One Nation in Australia, the Canadian Reform party, and the French Front National), along with a few fringe parties. Four relevant radical right electoral parties exist in countries using combined (or 'mixed') electoral systems. By contrast, there are sixteen relevant radical right parties under PR systems (including all those parties that have ever entered governing coalitions), along with fifteen fringe radical right parties.

The impact of the electoral rules is also illustrated by Figure 5.1, showing the proportion of votes-to-seats achieved by radical right parties under the three basic types of electoral system. The majoritarian systems provide the least proportional results for these parties, notably in France where Le Pen's Front National gains minimal deputies in the French National Assembly, due to the Second Ballot majoritarian system, despite having the support of more than one in ten voters. In Canada, by contrast, as mentioned earlier, the Reform Party does relatively well in parliament, because of the regional nature of Canadian electoral politics. The combined systems, used for national legislative elections in countries such as Hungary, Russia, Italy and New Zealand, prove moderately proportional. And the PR electoral systems, used in places such as Switzerland, Romania, and Norway, prove most proportional for radical right contenders.

[Figure 5.1 about here]

Electoral thresholds

The evidence considered so far confirms that, compared with PR, majoritarian electoral systems usually limit how far radical right candidates and parties succeed in entering legislative office, unless their vote is spatially concentrated within a specific region where they can overcome these hurdles, for example the Canadian Reform Party tapped into regional anti-Quebecois sentiments in Western Canada. Yet there remain substantial variations in the success of radical right parties, even within PR systems; for example their considerable success in Switzerland and Israel, compared with their marginalization in Sweden and Spain. If all PR schemes were perfectly proportional then we would not have to investigate further conditions, but in fact these vary a great deal depending on specific arrangements such as the mean district magnitude and the use of legal thresholds. To explore variations between and within the main types of electoral systems, we need to compare specific components, including the legal and effective electoral thresholds that minor parties face. Under the Second Ballot electoral system used in France, for example, Front National parliamentary candidates need to get an absolute majority (50%+) of the vote in their department to enter the National Assembly and the same barrier faces One Nation under the Australian AV system. British National Party candidates standing in single-member plurality districts, with at least three rivals, often need to get a third of the vote or more to win a Westminster seat, a barrier which they have consistently failed to overcome. These are all far more daunting obstacles than that faced by *Miflegat Datit Leumit (Mafdal)* when seeking office in the highly proportional Knesset elections, where parties have to win just 1.5% of the national vote to overcome the minimum legal threshold for representation²³.

Two basic types of threshold determine the minimum vote that a party needs to obtain in order to be represented. Some proportional or combined electoral systems specify a '*legal*' (otherwise known as a '*formal*' or '*artificial*') threshold, representing the minimal percentage share of the vote in the electoral district or the whole nation which all party lists must meet in order to be eligible for a seat. Parties falling below the specified legal threshold are automatically excluded from office. Examples include the German *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (NDP), which won 4.3% of the second (party list) votes in the 1969 federal elections, falling below the 5% threshold for entry into the Bundestag, before declining in popular support in subsequent contests²⁴. The aim of formal thresholds is to reduce party fragmentation

by excluding fringe and extreme parties from the legislature. Electoral laws differ according to their level of application (whether there needs to be a minimum share of the vote achieved at the district or the national level, or both); the percentage specified for any legal threshold (ranging from 0.67 in the Netherlands to 10 percent of the vote in Turkey); whether the threshold is applied to the first or any subsequent stage of any seat allocations; and whether the threshold varies for parties and for party alliances²⁵. Moreover the effects of the legal threshold depend on the context; in Germany, for example, as already observed, the 5% threshold proved critical for the NDP, whereas the 3% legal threshold in Greece has little effect since many minor parties fail to get elected due to the use of 56 districts for party lists. A national legal threshold (as in Germany) applied across the whole country, limits minor parties such as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) who are strongest in the East but who fell below the 5% level nationally in the 2002 Bundestag election, whereas a district-level legal threshold (such as that used in Spain) will not affect small parties such as the Basque Nationalists, who are returned in their regional strongholds.

In other PR systems, if no legal threshold is specified by electoral law, then there is an '*informal*' (sometimes known as the '*natural*' or '*mathematical*') threshold. This is strongly influenced by the mean district magnitude, meaning the average number of legislators returned per district, ranging from one Member of Parliament per constituency elected to the British House of Commons, and two Congressional deputies per district in Chile, up to 150 members in the Netherlands. But the informal threshold can also be affected, to a lesser extent, by the working of the electoral formula translating seats into votes (for example differences in proportionality among the d'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, LR-Droop, and Hare formula), and by the number of political parties competing in a seat. It has two boundaries: the threshold of *representation* is the minimum percentage of the vote that can earn a party a seat under the most favorable circumstances. The threshold of *exclusion* is the maximum percentage of the vote that, under the most favorable conditions, may be insufficient for a party to win a seat. These can be understood as representing the upper boundaries (where it is possible to win a seat) and lower boundaries (where it is guaranteed to win a seat). Following Lijphart, the informal threshold is calculated as the mean of the threshold of representation and exclusion, so that it is assumed to be half-way between the upper and lower threshold.²⁶ Estimating the informal threshold at national-level, however, is not a precise matter as this represents a range, which can also vary from district to district²⁷. Any national estimates have to remain approximate because the precise conditions under which electoral thresholds curtail opportunities for minor parties depend heavily upon the distribution of party support and the number of members returned within each district. For example, even under first-past-the-post majoritarian elections, smaller parties can overcome vote thresholds and gain districts if their support is spatially-concentrated, such the Reform Party which picked up substantial votes and seats in their heartland of Western Canada. At the same time, even in proportional systems, minor parties with popularity dispersed across many regions can be heavily penalized; Poland, for example, has open list PR but sets a 7% legal national voting threshold which smaller parties must surmount to gain a single parliamentary seat. Nevertheless, the basic proposition expected here is that the higher thresholds commonly found in majoritarian systems will restrict opportunities for minor parties, including smaller parties on the radical right, compared with the lower thresholds usually evident in PR systems.

The two types of threshold can be combined for analysis. The *effective* national-level electoral threshold is defined as either the *legal* threshold (in countries where this is specified at national-level) or, where this is not specified by electoral law, by the '*informal*' threshold at national-level. To examine the effects of specific features of electoral systems on the vote and seat shares for radical right parties, as well as on the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) in a country, we can compare a number of indicators, including the legal and the effective electoral threshold at national-levels, as well as the mean district magnitude (the average number of representatives elected per district), and the index of proportionality. The specific measures used are listed under Table 5.4.

[Table 5.4 about here]

The results in Table 5.4 demonstrate that PR systems with low legal thresholds, exemplified by Israel or the Netherlands, facilitate the share of seats won by radical right parties. This process is critical: through winning even a handful of parliamentary seats, radical right parties thereby gain legitimacy and a public platform which they can use to consolidate their power and gradually expand their influence. But the results also suggest that legal thresholds do not affect the share of the *vote* for the radical right. Other features of electoral systems which are under comparison, including the effective threshold, the index of proportionality, and the mean district magnitude, also fail to affect the vote or the seat share won by the radical right, and the ENPP measure of party competition. One reason why the national level of effective thresholds may prove less important than expected is the role of electoral geography; in particular where support for the radical right is concentrated in particular regions and areas, what matters for their exclusion is the effective threshold at *district*, not national, level. If parties can mobilize votes in their heartland areas, they can overcome the effective threshold in these areas, whether in majoritarian or proportional electoral systems. The results provide further confirmation of Lijphart's findings that the electoral system is not a strong instrument in shaping the party system, especially the effective number of elective parties²⁸. It appears that, although each of these specific aspects could affect the radical right, it is use of PR systems in general, and the use of restrictive legal thresholds in particular, which has a significant impact upon their share of seats.

Compulsory voting

In addition to these features, other specific variations in the electoral rules could also shape the fortunes of minor parties. Electoral laws and administrative procedures cover numerous matters including the administration of voting facilities, the frequency of contests, the drawing of constituency boundaries, and citizenship qualifications for the franchise. Discussing how all these matters could affect the electoral fortunes of radical right parties would take us too far from the main subject of this book, but nevertheless we should consider the impact of compulsory voting, as a plausible explanation which has been discussed in the literature. These laws have been suggested as one factor influencing the success of the Vlaams Block in Antwerp, for example, since under these rules citizens are required to cast a ballot, even where they are dissatisfied by the performance of the major parties, and so they may be tempted to cast a protest vote for the radical right as an expression of anti-party sentiment²⁹. Similar patterns may be evident in some of the other nations using compulsory voting, such as Italy and Australia.

[Table 5.5 about here]

Worldwide, twenty-three countries currently use compulsory voting in national parliamentary elections, including Australia, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Italy. This practice is also used in a few provinces in Austria and in Switzerland, and (until 1970) in the Netherlands. Table 5.5 compares the share of the vote and seats won by radical right parties in the countries which did and did not use such regulations. The results show that the radical right did fare slightly better in the eight nations which use compulsory voting, with perhaps an extra 2 to 3 percentage points in the vote. This evidence is suggestive but, given the limited number of cases, not surprisingly the modest difference was not statistically significant at the conventional level. This suggests that we need more conclusive proof from survey evidence at individual-level before we can safely conclude that the radical right do indeed benefit from compulsory voting laws.

One reason why the results are ambiguous is that the strength of any effect may depend upon how strictly compulsory voting regulations and any associated sanctions are implemented and enforced³⁰. In practice, legal rules for voting may be *de jure* or *de facto*. The most common legal basis is statutory law although the obligation to vote may also be rooted in constitutional provisions. Implementation ranges from minimal *de facto* enforcement to the imposition of various sanctions. Fines are most common, as in Luxembourg, although other punishments include the denial of official documents like passports, identity cards, drivers' license or government benefits, used in Italy and Greece, but even occasionally the threat of imprisonment as a criminal offence. The effectiveness of any legal penalties is dependent upon the

efficiency of the prior registration process and, where the initiative falls upon the elector, whether there are fines or other penalties associated with failure to register³¹.

Conclusions

The study examined evidence for the impact of electoral systems and electoral thresholds, particularly the standard claim that PR facilitates support for smaller extremist parties. The results suggest three main findings:

- i. A revised version of the conventional wisdom is partially correct: *electoral systems do affect the seats gained by minor radical right parties*, with their rise facilitated by PR systems with low legal thresholds.
- ii. Nevertheless the evidence suggests an important and overlooked qualification to the conventional wisdom: the effect of electoral systems works through determining their share of seats *not* votes. The effects here are mechanical rather than psychological, for reasons discussed below.
- iii. And lastly, within PR systems, legal thresholds also exert a critical mechanical impact on the radical right share of seats.

The clear role of electoral systems and thresholds on the distribution of seats can be illustrated by a few examples. Under majoritarian elections, for example, Le Pen's *Front National* has been stranded on the sidelines of French politics for decades. By contrast, after gaining a similar share of the vote (11-12%) in the most recent national general elections, under PR the *Vlaams Blok* constitute one tenth of the members of the Belgian Parliament, while *Alleanza Nazionale* hold ministerial office in Berlusconi's cabinet. Politically this process is vital, since parliamentary representation provides the radical right with legitimacy, resources, and power. Through PR, parties gain access to a platform on the national stage, allowing them to propagate their views, influence debates, and mobilize popular support via the national news media, not just gain sporadic bursts of publicity during occasional election campaigns.

There is one important qualification to these conclusions, as it should be noted that the evidence about the impact of electoral systems remains limited, and the direction of causality in this relationship, in particular, cannot be determined from cross-sectional evidence alone. What this means is that we cannot say whether majoritarian electoral systems penalize and thereby discourage extremist parties from competing, or, alternatively, whether newer democracies containing multiple parties dispersed widely across the political spectrum are more likely to adopt PR rules in their electoral laws and constitutions. What we can conclude, however, is that in established democracies which have had relatively stable electoral systems over successive decades, or even for centuries, in the long term it seems plausible that the rules of the game (adopted for whatever reason) will constrain *subsequent* patterns of party competition. In Britain, for example, the system of plurality single-member districts has persisted in elections for the House of Commons since the Great Reform Act of 1832, with the exception of a few dual-member seats which were finally abolished in 1948. This system has greatly limited the opportunities for minor center parties to challenge the Labour and Conservative predominance at Westminster, despite growing patterns of partisan dealignment and surges of popular support for the Liberal Democrats in recent decades. In the 2001 general election, the 'manufactured majority' bias for the governing Labour party was the largest since the war³². Where electoral rules have persisted unchanged for many decades, we can conclude that they determine how parties respond strategically to the structure of opportunities they present.

The conventional wisdom remains partially *incorrect*; although the institutional context of the electoral system might be expected to influence popular support for minor parties, with majoritarian systems having a psychological effect in depressing their vote share for the radical right, this turns out not to be the case. The 'wasted vote' thesis does not hold for these parties; given the proximity theory of voting, their supporters are located too far away from other contenders across the ideological spectrum for them to switch to their second-preference choice for 'tactical' or 'strategic' considerations. Fuller

support for this argument is presented in Chapter 7, examining survey evidence of protest and strategic voting.

In subsequent chapters in this book we also need to consider other psychological effects from electoral rules, in particular whether the type of basic type of electoral system exerts an important indirect impact upon the campaign strategies and ideological positions adopted by minor parties on the radical right. As explored in detail later, majoritarian rules with higher thresholds are expected to generate incentives for rational vote-seeking parties to adopt 'bridging' strategies, appealing to citizens across different ideological persuasions and social backgrounds. By contrast, under proportional systems with lower thresholds, rational parties have greater incentive to adopt 'bonding' strategies, appealing more exclusively to their home base³³. Far from being irrelevant, therefore, the strategic agency theory presented in this book regards the electoral system as central to understanding variations in the electoral success of the radical right, as well as how these parties respond to the institutional constraints on their behavior. The next step is to examine the social background and ideological profile of radical right supporters, to which we now turn.

Table 5.1: The 39 electoral systems under comparison

TYPE OF DISTRICTS	Year of Election	Electoral System	Party List	Formula	Total N. of MPs	N. Of SMD	N. Of List	Total number of Districts for Lists	Average VAP per member	Mean District Magnitude	Legal Threshold	Effective Threshold	Prop.	ENPP	Max. Years between Elections
						MPs	MPs				% Nat Vote				
MAJORITARIAN															
Australia	1996	AV	None	Majority	148	148	0	0	91,500	1.0	None	50.0	84	2.61	3
Belarus		2nd Ballot	None	Majority	260	260	0	0	29,432	1.0	None	50.0			
Canada	1997	FPTP	None	Plurality	295	295	0	0	78,300	1.0	None	35.0	83	2.98	5
France		2nd Ballot	None	Majority	577	577	0	0	77,161	1.0	None	50.0	75	3.70	5
UK	1997	FPTP	None	Plurality	659	659	0	0	68,400	1.0	None	35.0	80	2.11	5
USA	1996	FPTP	None	Plurality	435	435	0	0	436,700	1.0	None	35.0	94	1.99	2
COMBINED															
Independent															
Japan	1996	FPTP+PR	Closed	D'Hondt	500	300	200	11	193,400	18.0	None	4.0	86	2.93	4
Korea, Republic	2000	FPTP+PR	Closed	LR-Hare	299	253	46	1	114,900	46.0	5	5.0	84	2.36	4
Lithuania		2nd+PR	Open	Hare	141	71	70	1	21,653	70.0	5	5.0	76	4.20	4
Russia	1999	FPTP+PR	Closed	LR-Hare	450	225	225	1	242,700	225.0	5	5.0	89	5.40	4
Taiwan	1996	SNTV+PR	Closed	LR-Hare	334	234/27	100	2	42,900	50.0	5	5.0	95	2.46	4
Ukraine	1998	FPTP+PR	Closed	LR-Hare	450	225	225	1	86,500	225.0	4	4.0	86	5.98	5
Dependent															
Germany	1998	FPTP+PR	Closed	LR-Hare	656	328	328	1	100,000	328.0	5	5.0	94	3.30	4
Hungary	1998	FPTP+PR	Closed	D' Hondt	386	176	110	20	20,000	6.0	None	11.3	86	3.45	4
Italy		FPTP+PR	Open	Hare	630	475	155	1	75,131	155.0	4	4.0	90	6.69	5
New Zealand	1996	FPTP+PR	Closed	St Laguë	120	65	55	1	21,400	55.0	5	5.0	96	3.78	3
Mexico	1997	FPTP+PR	Closed	LR-Hare	500	300	200	5	110,800	40.0	2	2.0	91	2.66	3
Thailand	2001	FPTP+PR	Closed		500	400	100	1	85,000	100.0	5	5.0		3.05	4
PROPORTIONAL															
Austria		PR Lists	Open	Hare	183	0	183	9	35,319	20.3	4	4.0	99	3.41	4
Belgium	1999	PR Lists	Open	D' Hondt	150	0	150	20	53,300	7.5	None	9.2	96	9.05	4
Chile		PR Lists	Open	Binomial	120	0	120	60	80,289	2.0	None	29.2	86	5.18	4
Czech Republic	1996	PR Lists	Closed	LR-Droop	200	0	200	8	39,300	25.0	5	5.0	89	4.15	4
Denmark	1998	PR Lists	Open	St Laguë	179	0	179	17	23,000	7.9	2	2.0	98	4.92	4
Finland		PR Lists	Open	D' Hondt	200	0	200	14	20,779	14.3	None	5.0	92	5.15	4
Greece		PR Lists	Open	Hare	300		288	56	26,311	5.1	3	3.0	88	2.12	4
Iceland		PR Lists	Closed	Hare	63	0	63	9	3,121	6.3	None	10.8	97		4
Ireland		STV	Open	Droop	166	0	166	41	16,156	4.0	None	16.3	89	2.99	5
Israel	1996	PR Lists	Closed	D' Hondt	120	0	120	1	30,700	120.0	1.5	1.5	96	5.63	5
Luxembourg		PR Lists	Open	Droop	60	0	60	4	5,600	15.0	None	4.8	92		
Netherlands	1998	PR Lists	Closed	D' Hondt	150	0	150	1	80,000	150.0	0.67	0.7	95	4.81	4
Norway	1997	PR Lists	Closed	St Laguë	165	0	165	19	20,000	8.7	4	4.0	95	2.35	4
Peru	2000	PR Lists	Open	D'Hondt	120	0	120	1	127,000	120.0	None	0.6	98	3.81	
Poland	1997	PR Lists	Open	D' Hondt	460	0	460	52	60,700	8.8	7	7.0	82	2.95	4
Portugal		PR Lists	Closed	D'Hondt	230	0	230	22	33,935	10.5	None	6.7	90	2.61	4
Romania	1996	PR Lists	Closed	D' Hondt	343	0	343	42	48,800	8.2	3	3.0	82	3.37	4
Slovenia	1996	PR Lists	Open	LR-Hare	90	0	90	8	17,000	11.0	3	3.0	84	5.52	4
Spain	1996	PR Lists	Closed	D' Hondt	350	0	350	52	88,600	7.0	3	3.0	93	2.73	4
Sweden	1998	PR Lists	Open	St Laguë	349	0	349	29	19,800	10.7	4	4.0	97	4.29	4
Switzerland	1999	PR Lists	Panachage	D' Hondt	200	0	200	26	28,700	7.7	None	9.0	93	5.08	4
AVERAGE	1997				296	140	154	14	69,037	48.6	4	11.5	90	3.92	4

Source: Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For definitions, see the notes for Table 4.5.

Table 5.2: Electoral systems and support for radical right parties

Major type of electoral system	Elections 1990-2004			Most recent election			Number of countries
	% Votes	% Seats	Ratio	% Votes	% Seats	Ratio	
Majoritarian system	8.6	3.5	0.40	7.2	3.8	0.52	6
Combined system	4.4	2.1	0.48	3.6	2.3	0.64	12
Proportional system	7.9	8.7	1.10	7.1	9.9	1.39	21
Total	6.9	5.9	0.85	6.1	6.6	1.08	39
R (Sig.)	.059	.255	.375*	.065	.226	.319*	

Notes: The results summarize the mean percentage of votes and seats won by radical right parties in elections for the lower house in the national legislature. For the classification of electoral systems by nation see Table 5.1 and also Pippa Norris. 2003. *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2.

Data sources: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. *The International Almanac of Electoral History*. Washington DC: CQ Press; Tom Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. *A Decade of Election Results: Updating the international Almanac*. Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; *Elections around the World* www.electionworld.org; Richard Rose, Neil Munro and Tom Mackie. 1998. *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990*. Studies in Public Policy 300. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.

Table 5.3: Types of electoral system and radical right electoral parties

Majoritarian		Combined		PR	
Nation	Party	Nation	Party	Nation	Party
RELEVANT PARTIES					
Australia	One Nation	Hungary	Hungarian Justice & Life Party	Austria	Freedom Party
Canada	Reform	Italy	National Alliance	Belgium	Flemish Block
France	National Front	Italy	Northern League	Chile	Independent Democratic Union
		Russia	Liberal Democrat Party	Chile	National Renewal
				Czech Rep	Republican Party
				Denmark	People's Party
				Denmark	Progress Party
				Israel	National Religious Party
				Israel	National Union
				Netherlands	List Pym Fortuyn
				New Zealand	New Zealand First
				Norway	Progress Party
				Romania	Greater Romania Party
				Romania	Romanian National Unity Party
				Slovenia	Slovene National Party
				Switzerland	Swiss People's Party
	(3)		(4)		(16)
FRINGE PARTIES					
Belarus	Liberal Democrat	Germany	Republican Party	Belgium	National Front
UK	British National Party	Germany	German People's Union	Finland	Patriotic National Alliance
UK	National Front	Germany	National Democratic Party	France	Movement for France
		Italy	Social Movement 3 Flames	France	National Republican Movement
		Ukraine	Ukrainian National Assembly	Greece	Populist Orthodox Rally
		Lithuania	Lithuanian Freedom Union	Greece	Greek Front
				Netherlands	Center Democrats
				Norway	Fatherland Party
				Spain	Falange
				Sweden	Swedish Democrats
				Sweden	New Democracy
				Switzerland	Union of Federal Democrats
				Switzerland	Swiss Democrats
				Switzerland	Ticino League
				Switzerland	Freedom Party
	(3)		(6)		(15)
NONE					
US	None	Japan	None	Iceland	None
		Korea, Rep	None	Ireland	None
		Mexico	None	Luxembourg	None
		Taiwan	None	Peru	None
		Thailand	None	Poland	None
				Portugal	None
	(1)		(5)		(6)

Notes: 'Radical right' parties are classified on the basis of the Lubbers expert survey (where included) or by other reference sources, as discussed in chapter 2. *Electoral parties* are defined as those radical right parties contesting seats in the lower house of the national legislature. 'Relevant' electoral parties are defined as those with an average of 3.0% or more of the vote in national legislative elections held during the 1990s. 'Fringe' electoral parties are defined as those with an average of 0.1 to 2.9% in national legislative elections held during the 1990s. 'None' are where no parties meet these criteria.

Sources: classified from Tables 2.1 and 3.1.

Table 5.4: Electoral rules and support for radical right parties

	<i>Elections 1990-2004</i>				<i>Most recent election</i>				ENPP	<i>Number of countries</i>
	% Votes	% Seats	Ratio		% Votes	% Seats	Ratio			
Legal electoral thresholds in PR systems	-.358	-.481 **	-.432 **		-.302	-.366 *	-.493 **		-.314	21
Effective thresholds in all systems	.171	.026	-.163		.192	.038	-.148		-.204	39
Index of proportionality	.004	.098	.137		-.061	.048	.134		.218	38
Mean district magnitude	-.002	-.096	-.067		-.101	-.121	-.017		.281	39

Notes: The figures represent the simple correlation coefficients between support for the radical right parties and electoral rules.

Legal threshold in PR systems: This is the minimum share of the vote (in the district or nation) required by law to qualify for a seat.

ENPP: Effective number of parliamentary parties, calculated following the method of Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

Effective thresholds in all systems: Following Lijphart (1994), the legal threshold, where available, or else $\frac{50\%}{M+1} + \frac{50\%}{2M}$, where M is the district magnitude.

Index of proportionality: Calculated as the difference between a party’s share of the vote and its share of the total seats in Parliament, summed, divided by two, and subtracted from 100. Theoretically it can range from 0 to 100. This is a standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index. For details see Rose, Munro and Mackie (1998).

Mean district magnitude: the average number of seats (representatives returned to parliament) per electoral district.

* Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) ** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Data sources: See table 5.1


Table 5.5: Compulsory voting and support for radical right parties

	Elections 1990-2004			Most recent election			Number of countries
	% Votes	% Seats	Ratio	% Votes	% Seats	Ratio	
Compulsory voting is not used	6.3	5.1	.41	5.9	5.9	.41	31
Compulsory voting is used	9.0	7.5	.37	8.8	8.6	.37	8
Difference	+2.7	+2.4	.04	+2.9	+2.7	.04	39

Notes: The results summarize the mean percentage of votes and seats won by radical right parties in elections for the lower house in the national legislature. For the classification of compulsory voting by nation see Pippa Norris. 2003. *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7. The mean difference in the proportion of votes and seats won by radical right parties between countries which did and did not use compulsory voting were *not* significant at the conventional .95 confidence level when tested by ANOVA.

Data sources: See table 5.1

Figure 5.1: The ratio of votes-to-seats won by radical right parties, 2000-2004



Notes: The proportion of votes and seats won by radical right parties in the most recent national legislative election for the lower house (held from 2000-2004). The regression line summarizes the relationship between votes and seats.

Source: See Table 5.1.

¹ Given limitations of space, this chapter will set aside the impact of partisan bias arising from any malapportionment or gerrymandering of constituency boundaries, which could also disadvantage minor parties. This is an important but complex topic. See Richard S. Katz. 1997. 'Districting: Apportionment and Gerrymanders' In *Democracy and Elections* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

² Jackman and Volpert conclude: "*Electoral disproportionality (through the mechanism of thresholds) increasingly dampens support for the extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. At the same time, multi-partyism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality.*" P.516. See Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. 1996. 'Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in Western Europe.' *British Journal of Political Science* 264:501-22. Others, however, critique this assumption. For example, after re-analyzing Jackman and Volpert's dataset, Golder concludes: "There is no evidence that (*national*) electoral thresholds actually influence extreme right parties at all." (my parenthesis) P.8. See Matt Golder. 2003. 'Electoral institutions, unemployment and extreme right parties: A correction.' *British Journal of Political Science* 33(3): 525-534. See also Elisabeth Carter. 2002. 'Proportional representation and the fortunes of right-wing extremist parties.' *West European Politics* 25 (3): 125-146; Matt Golder. 2003 'Explaining Variation in the Electoral Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe.' *Comparative Political Studies*. 36:4, pp. 432-466; Elisabeth Carter. 2004. 'Does PR promote political extremism? Evidence from the West European parties of the extreme right.' *Representation* 40(2): 82-100.

³ Piero Ignazi. 2003. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 205. See also Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. 1996. 'Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in Western Europe.' *British Journal of Political Science* 264:501-22.

⁴ Douglas W. Rae 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press [1971 revised ed.]

⁵ Maurice Duverger. 1954. *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Wiley.

⁶ Maurice Duverger. 1986. 'Duverger's Law: Forty years later.' In *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*. Ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press.

⁷ Douglas W. Rae 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press [1971 revised ed.]; William H. Riker. 1976. 'The number of political parties: A reexamination of Duverger's law.' *Comparative Politics* 9: 93-106; William H' Riker. 1982. 'The two-party system and Duverger's Law: an essay on the history of political science.' *American Political Science Review* 76: 753-766; William H' Riker. 1986. 'Duverger's Law Revisited.' In *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press, Inc; Arend Lijphart, 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Rein Taagepera. 1999. 'The number of parties as a function of heterogeneity and electoral system.' *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (5): 531-548; Patrick Dunleavy and Françoise Boucek. 2003. 'Constructing the number of parties.' *Party Politics* 9 (3): 291-315.

⁸ Arendt Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Richard S. Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁹ Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.

¹⁰ Similar patterns were found when the analysis was confined to the 37 nations classified worldwide by the Freedom House Gastil index as 'older' or 'newer' democracies. In these countries, the mean number of parliamentary parties was 7.4 in majoritarian systems and 10.2 in PR systems. The mean effective number of relevant parties was 3.0 in majoritarian systems and 5.5 in PR systems.

¹¹ See the discussion in Arend Lijphart. 2001. 'The pros and cons – but mainly pros – of consensus democracy.' *Acta Politica*. 35:363-398; R.B. Andeweg. 2001. 'Lijphart v. Lijphart: The cons .of consensus democracy in homogeneous societies.' *Acta Politica*. 36: 117-28.

¹² Richard S. Katz. 1997. *Democracy and Elections*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. P. 154. See also Tables 10.4 and 10.5. See also David M. Farrell. 2001. *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*. London: Palgrave. Pp.199-200.

¹³ Paul Hainsworth. 2004. 'The extreme right in France: The rise and rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National.' *Representation* 40(2): 101-114.

¹⁴ Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp. 1998. *Voters' Victory? New Zealand's First Election under Proportional Representation*. Auckland: Auckland University Press; Jack Vowles. 1995. 'The politics of electoral reform in New Zealand.' *International Political Science Review* 16(1): 95-116; D. Denmark and Shaun Bowler. 2002. 'Minor parties and protest votes in Australia and New Zealand: Locating populist politics.' *Electoral Studies*. 21(1): 47-67.

¹⁵ See Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Table 2.4 p.60.

¹⁶ Elisabeth Carter. 2002. 'Proportional representation and the fortunes of right-wing extremist parties.' *West European Politics* 25 (3): 125-146; Elisabeth Carter. 2004. 'Does PR promote political extremism? Evidence from the West European parties of the extreme right.' *Representation* 40(2): 82-100; Elisabeth Carter. 2005. *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?* Manchester: Manchester University Press. It should be noted that both Kitschelt and Carter limited their comparison to examining the evidence for the effect of the major type of electoral systems on the radical right share of voting support, rather than seats.

¹⁷ Maurice Duverger. 1954. *Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Wiley. P.226.

¹⁸ For a detailed discussion, see Gary W. Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹ It can be argued that a further distinction needs to be drawn between majority and plurality elections, given the higher effective electoral threshold used in the former. Nevertheless the classification used in this study is more parsimonious, the ballot structure used for plurality and majoritarian elections is similar (casting a vote for a single candidate), and it reflects the standard typology used in the literature.

²⁰ Geoffrey Evans, John Curtice, and Pippa Norris. 1998. 'New Labour, New Tactical Voting?' In *British Elections and Parties Review*. Edited by Charles Pattie et al. London: Frank Cass. Pp.65-79.

²¹ A. Schuessler. 2000. *A Logic of Expressive Choice*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

²² Calculated simply by dividing the percentage of votes won by radical right parties into their percentage of seats.

²³ Support for this relationship has been found by Matt Golder. 2003. 'Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe.' *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (4): 432-466; Kenneth Wald and S. Shye. 1995. 'Religious influence in electoral behavior: The role of institutional and social forces in Israel.' *Journal of Politics*. 57(2): 495-507.

²⁴ Richard Stöss. 1988. 'The problem of rightwing extremism in West Germany.' In *Right Extremism in Western Europe*. Edited by Klaus von Beyme. London: Frank Cass.

²⁵ Dieter Nohlen. 200X. 'Threshold of exclusion.' In *The Encyclopedia of Electoral Systems*. Ed. Richard Rose. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

²⁶ Lijphart estimates the effective threshold as the mean of the threshold of representation and exclusion. It is calculated as: $\frac{50\%}{M+1} + \frac{50\%}{2M}$, where M is the district magnitude. See Arendt Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.25-56.

²⁷ See Arendt Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Rein Taagepera. 1998. 'Effective magnitude and effective threshold.' *Electoral Studies*. 17(4): 393-404; Rein Taagepera. 2002. 'Nationwide threshold of representation.' *Electoral Studies*. 21 (3): 383-401.

²⁸ Arendt Lijphart. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.141.

²⁹ Marc Hooghe and K. Pelleriaux. 1998. 'Compulsory voting in Belgium: An application of the Lijphart thesis.' *Electoral Studies* 17 (4): 419-424; Leuvan De Winter and J. Ackaert. 1998. 'Compulsory voting in Belgium: a reply to Hooghe and Pelleriaux.' *Electoral Studies* 17(4): 425-428.

³⁰ Wolfgang Hirczy. 1994. 'The Impact of Mandatory Voting Laws on Turnout: A Quasi Experimental Approach.' *Electoral Studies* 13(1): 64-76; Arend Lijphart. 1997. 'Unequal participation: democracies unresolved dilemma.' *American Political Science Review*. 91:1-14; Mark Franklin. 1999. 'Electoral engineering and cross-national turnout differences: What role for compulsory voting?' *British Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 205-216; Wolfgang Hirczy. 2000. 'Compulsory Voting.' In *The International Encyclopedia of Elections*. Ed. Richard Rose. Washington DC: CQ Press.

³¹ Ian McAllister. 1986. 'Compulsory voting, turnout and party advantage in Australia.' *Politics* 21(1): 89-93.

³² Pippa Norris. 2001. 'Apathetic landslide: The 2001 British general election.' In *Britain Votes, 2001*. Ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³³ Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4.