DPI 403 Class 5

The impact of democratic governance on peace and conflict
Structure of the class

I. Recap: does democratic governance matter *instrumentally* for development? Debate Carothers v. Fukuyama

II. Does democracy generate a peace dividend for the world? (Russett)

III. Or does the transition to democratic governance increase risks of conflict? Is there a sequential process of ‘state-building’ first, elections second? (Mansfield and Snyder)

IV. Paired advocacy discussion exercise
Required readings


I. Recap: Does democratic governance matter *instrumentally* for development?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Capacity</th>
<th>Restricted Voice and Accountability</th>
<th>Inclusive Voice and Accountability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expanded Governance Capacity</td>
<td>Bureaucratic autocracies E.g. China</td>
<td>Bureaucratic democracies E.g. Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Governance Capacity</td>
<td>Patrimonial autocracies E.g. Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Patrimonial democracies E.g. Mali</td>
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Debate: Carothers

- Democratic pessimists suggest the need for ‘democratic sequencing’
  - State building first, elections second
  - Traditional IR realists, traditional developmentalists, autocratic powers
  - Popularized by Zakaria, Mansfield and Snyder and Chua
Debate: Carothers

- Sequencing assumes that liberal autocrats will strengthen rule of law, and build strong and capable states, to expand economy.

  - Why? Plausible reasons?

  - Must the introduction of democratic elections wait for a well-functioning state to develop?

  - Or is the idea of democratic sequencing a fallacy?
Debate: Fukuyama

- Some cases of successful sequencing
  - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand (?)
  - Strong state bureaucratic tradition
  - But not outside of East Asia (?)

- State-building creates Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence over defined territory
  - Control of means of coercion: police, armies
  - State agencies for taxation and public goods
Debate: Fukuyama

- Therefore some tensions exist – especially in divided societies where national community is not agreed - between liberal democracy which limits the state’s capacity to coerce (through rules, checks and balances, and public opinion) and state-building, which expands governance capacity.

- State-building under democratic rules may freeze conflict and prolong instability.

- E.g. Bosnia, Sudan, Iraq?
# Predictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance Capacity</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Expanded Governance Capacity</td>
<td>Restricted Voice and Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed performance</td>
<td>Effective development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limited Governance Capacity</td>
<td>Ineffective development</td>
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**Controls:** Geography (fixed effects from climate and natural resources) and culture (predominant religious traditions)
Performance Indices

- Economic
  - Growth in per capita GDP, inflation and unemployment rates, poverty levels, GINI coefficient, manufacturing productivity

- Social Welfare
  - Health (Maternal, infant and child mortality, longevity, immunization), education (enrolment, girl’s schooling, literacy), living conditions (access to clean water, electricity, communications)

- Peace and security
  - Interstate and internal conflict, minority cultural rights
II. Does democratic governance produce a peace dividend?
Liberal peace

- Dyadic law-like relationship:
  - Democracies never, or rarely, fight other democracies
  - Intellectual origins: Immanuel Kant ‘*Perpetual Peace*’
- Numerous empirical studies have reported a negative relationship between dyadic democracy and inter-state disputes, crisis, and wars, especially post-WWII
- Any exceptional or border-line cases? Africa? Asia? LAM?
Evidence: Oneal and Russett (1999)

Data:

- Dependent var: onset of war (1st year)
  - Correlates of War (COW) data1950-1992 (Gleditsch and Ward)
  - The onset of a militarized dispute (MID): an international interaction involving threats, displays, or actual uses of military force

- Lagged independent variables (by one year)
  - Economic interdependence (IMF direction of trade)
  - Democratic state: Polity III democracy-autocracy index
  - Alliances, capabilities, contiguous dyads, major power dyads

Conclusions:

- Economic interdependence and joint democracy are generally associated with a reduction in interstate violence

Influence on US foreign policy

Policy implications?
- Democracies cause peace?

Bill Clinton
- “Ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracies elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other.” (1994)

George W. Bush
- “Democracies don’t go to war with each other…I’ve got great faith in democracies to promote peace.” (1994)
Why? Explaining the democratic peace

- **Institutional constraints:**
  - Limits on use of force arising from multiple veto points, large selectorates, and from public opinion (de Mesquita, Russett)

- **Culture:**
  - Social norms of bargaining and negotiation in democratic states; warfare becoming socially unacceptable

- **Capitalism**
  - Economic interdependence and benefits of territory v commerce

- **Cosmopolitanism:**
  - Existence of alternative international diplomatic mechanisms to resolve disagreements by negotiated settlements among states
  - Common interests and goals bind democratic nations
Critiques?

- *Universal pattern?* Or only evident in Western states in the post-World War II era? (Cohen, Henderson 2008)

- *Pacificism due to other factors*, not democracy, including capitalist development (Gartzke 2007)

- *Not applicable to regimes transitioning from autocracy* (Mansfield and Snyder)
III. Or does the transition to democracy heighten the risks of war?
Mansfield and Snyder: Theory

- No mature democracies have ever fought a war against each other; mature democracies have strong accountability institutions
- BUT the short-run transition to democracy often gives rise to war
- Why? Transitional states lack strong political institutions which make democracies work
  - Effective state, rule of law, organized parties, professional news media, non-corrupt bureaucracy, competent legislatures
- Elites use nationalism to mobilize support
Mansfield and Snyder: Claims

- “Ill-prepared attempts to democratize weak states – eg Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Rwanda and Burundi – may lead to costly warfare in the short run, and may delay or prevent real progress towards democracy over the long term.”

- Sequential process – state-building first – then expand mass participation
Types of power and control

- Despotic –
  - physical compulsion

- Patronage –
  - buy compliance

- Infrastructural –
  - increase group’s efficiency

- Legitimate –
  - appeal to appropriate procedures or principles
Propositions

Incomplete democracies with weak institutions are

1. More likely to become involved in war
2. More likely to initiate inter-state war
3. Highest risk when elites feel threatened by democratic transitions
Mansfield and Snyder: Evidence

- **Regime typology:** Authorities accountable to
  - **Democracy:** Mass population engaged through fair, regular and competitive election
  - **Anocracy (Mixed)**
  - **Autocracy:** Elites only, suppressed competition

- **Transitions**
  - **Incomplete democratization:** Autocracy to anocracy
  - **Democratization:** From autocracy or anocracy to democracy
Models

- Autocracy • With or without strong state institutions

- Anocracy

- Democracy

Risk of war rises

Risk of war diminishes
Mansfield and Snyder: Evidence

- Regimes classified by Polity III
- 20-pt democracy-autocracy scale
- 1800-1994, 177 nations
- Regime transition defined by change in regime categories averaged over a 1, 5 & 10 year period
- War classified from Correlates of War (COW) project 1816-(to 1992)
  - International war – interstate 1000+ fatalities (N.79)
  - Extra-systemic war – nation state v non-state actor, 1000+ fatalities (N.108)
- Logistic regression robust SE (latest work)
Results and findings

- On average, democratizing states were about two-thirds more likely to fight wars than were states which did not experience a regime change. P12
- Democratization promotes war
- Effects strengthened by type of institutions
- Effects due to elites using nationalist populist appeals in poorly institutionalized regimes
- Policy implications: curb ‘naïve enthusiasm for spreading peace by promoting democratization’
Critiques of Mansfield and Snyder

- Robust findings?
  - Problems of regime categories not continuous measures
  - Arbitrary intervals to define regime change, lacking theoretical rigor?
  - Is a change in scores a ‘regime’ change?
  - Results depend upon use of categories or continuous scores
  - Descriptive cases do not focus upon ‘incomplete democratizers’
  - “The relationship between incomplete democratization and war is highly dependent upon the sources, concepts and measures used.” (Bogaards)

- Imprecise measure of strong political institutions?
- Risks may vary by types of democratization?
- Assumes that nationalist sentiments are invariant across societies

- Pros and cons? Give examples…
IV. Discussion: What are the policy implications?
Advocacy debate:

- You are asked to break up into discussion pairs.
- You have 15 minutes allocated for the paired discussions.
- You are asked to *draw upon the readings* for this class and *your own arguments* and *experience*.
- For policy advocacy, you should either argue for or against the proposition that democratic governance reduces poverty, improves welfare and promotes peace.
- Give a series of reasons, ranked in importance using the template overleaf, supported by evidence or case illustrations wherever possible.
- After 15 minutes, we will compare the reasons for or against the proposition in plenary, to see if a consensus emerges.
## Template

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRO: Reasons why democratic governance promotes prosperity, peace and welfare</th>
<th>Evidence, examples, support for this claim</th>
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<tr>
<th>CON: Reasons why democratic governance fails to promote prosperity, peace and welfare</th>
<th>Evidence, examples, support for this claim</th>
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Next class
Measures of democratic governance

Class Materials: www.pippanorris.com