The Trouble With Electricity Markets
and
California’s Electricity Restructuring Disaster

Severin Borenstein*

This Draft: September 10, 2001

Abstract: Beginning in June 2000, California’s electricity wholesale market produced extremely high prices and threats of supply shortages. The situation led to a utility bankruptcy, large retail price increases, and great political turmoil. But California’s is only the most recent and visible example of the trouble with deregulated wholesale electricity markets. The difficulties that have appeared in California and elsewhere are intrinsic to the design of current electricity markets: demand exhibits virtually no price responsiveness and supply faces strict production constraints and very costly storage. Such a structure will necessarily lead to periods of surplus and of shortage, the latter resulting from both real scarcity of electricity and from sellers exercising market power. Extreme volatility in prices and profits will be the outcome. This result, however, is not inevitable. By encouraging price-responsive demand and long-term wholesale contracts for electricity, policy makers can create electricity markets that will function much more smoothly.

* Director, University of California Energy Institute (http://www.ucei.org) and E.T. Grether Professor of Business Administration and Public Policy, Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1900. http://haas.berkeley.edu/~borenste. This is a revised version of POWER Working Paper PWP-081 (January 2001), “The Trouble with Electricity Markets (and some solutions).” I have benefitted a great deal from discussions with Carl Blumstein, James Bushnell, Erin Mansur, Paul Joskow, Steve Puller, Steve Stoft, Frank Wolak, Catherine Wolfram, and Hal Varian, but the opinions in this paper do not necessarily reflect their views. Erin Mansur provided excellent research assistance.
I. Introduction

Starting in June 2000, California’s average wholesale electricity prices increases to unprecedented levels. These high prices produced enormous profits for generating companies and financial crises for the utilities (and the state) that were required to buy power in the wholesale markets and sell at much lower regulated prices in the retail markets. Accusations of price gouging and collusion among the sellers were widespread. Some observers blamed the problems on the format of the wholesale auctions in California, while others focused on the way that transmission capacity is priced and locational prices are set. A number of economists, myself included, have done studies that have concluded that sellers exercised significant market power, at times raising prices to well above competitive levels.

While some of these issues played a role in the difficulties California and other electricity markets encountered, the policy discussion thus far has not focused directly on the fundamental problem with electricity markets: In nearly all electricity markets, demand is almost completely insensitive to price fluctuations and supply faces binding constraints at peak times. Combined with the fact that unregulated prices for homogeneous goods clear at a uniform, or near uniform, price for all sellers—regardless of their costs of production—these attributes necessarily imply that short-term prices for electricity are going to be extremely volatile. Problems with market power and imperfect locational pricing only exacerbate the fundamental trouble with electricity markets.

Two market design adjustments would greatly mitigate the fundamental trouble: long-term contracts between wholesale buyers and sellers and real-time retail pricing of electricity, which indicates to the final customer when electricity is more or less costly to consume. Historically, long-term contracts have been a standard feature of electricity markets, with cost-of-service regulation being the most detailed and extreme form of long-term contracting. Long-term contracts allow buyers to hedge against price booms and sellers to hedge against price busts. The long-term contracts signed in California in 2001 (and in other markets prior to and following the California crisis) engender more performance incentives than traditional regulation. The simplest form is one that sets a price and quantity to be delivered at every point in time, and leaves it to the producer to maximize its profits by meeting that supply commitment in its most cost-efficient manner.

---

1 This prescription is certainly not novel, see Joskow (2000) for example, but contracts have only recently been accepted by regulators in California and real-time retail pricing still is not a priority in any restructured markets.

2 Cost-of-service regulation is effectively a cost-plus contract between the regulated, vertically-integrated utility and the customers, where payment is adjusted for virtually all changes in the utility’s cost of production. Defense contracting has often been conducted in this way.
While long-term contracts alone could be used to avoid situations like the California crisis in 2000-01, a much more cost-efficient and environmentally responsible approach to the problem combines long-term contracting with real-time retail pricing. At first glance, it may seem that long-term contracting and real-time retail pricing are not compatible with one another, but that is not the case. Prices can reflect real-time variation in the price of electricity while monthly electricity bills can remain quite stable through the use of long-term contracts. Furthermore, implementing real-time retail pricing could substantially reduce the prices buyers would need to offer to procure long-term contracts. Together, these two policy responses would help to produce an electricity market that operates in a smooth, cost-effective, and environmentally responsible manner.

II. California’s Road to Electricity Deregulation

California began serious consideration of restructuring its electricity market in 1994, motivated in part by the high electricity prices the state’s customers faced at the time and in part by the example of electricity deregulation in the United Kingdom. California’s high electricity prices were primarily the result of investment and procurement mistakes that were made by the investor-owned utilities (IOUs), with the oversight of the California Public Utilities Commission, during the previous two decades. The utilities had built nuclear power plants that turned out to be far more expensive than originally forecast and they had signed (in some cases, under pressure from the CPUC) long-term contracts with small generators that committed them to very high wholesale purchase prices.

These mistakes were, for the most part, sunk costs, so restructuring couldn’t eliminate them. Some of the customers supporting the change hoped that restructuring could be used to shift those sunk costs from ratepayers to the shareholders of the IOUs. The three California IOUs,\(^3\) being potent political forces in the state, made it clear that they would block any restructuring bill if it did not allow for full recovery of their sunk investments, as would have occurred if no changes in regulation took place.\(^4\) So, when the restructuring bill was passed by the state legislature and signed by Governor Wilson in 1996, it contained a scheme that most observers believed would permit the IOUs full recovery of their bad investments, which were often referred to as “stranded costs”.

The scheme implemented a Competition Transistion Charge (CTC), which was not

---

3 Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E).

4 Borenstein & Bushnell (2000) discuss at greater length the reasonable and the unsupported promises that have been made in support of electricity deregulation.
simply a fixed surcharge on electricity consumption. Instead, the CTC fixed the retail price for electricity at about 6 cents per kilowatt-hour.\textsuperscript{5} It then required customers to pay for the wholesale price of electricity and, in addition, to pay to the IOUs the difference between 6 cents and the actual wholesale price of electricity, which was expected to be much lower than 6 cents.\textsuperscript{6} The effect was to freeze retail rates for consumers and allow the recovery of stranded costs to vary inversely with the wholesale price of electricity. The CTC was to end for a utility at the point that it had recovered all of its stranded costs or in March 2002, whichever came first. When the CTC ended for a given utility, the utility would then switch to simply passing through the (assumed lower) wholesale price of electricity.

SDG&E did, in fact, end its CTC in 1999, so when wholesale prices jumped in 2000, SDG&E passed them through to San Diego customers. These increases raised howls of protest and the state legislature quickly reimposed the frozen retail price on SDG&E, though with the understanding that SDG&E would be reimbursed eventually for the additional costs. The other two IOUs were still under the CTC in June 2000, so they found themselves buying power at prices averaging more than 10 cents per KWh and reselling to customers at the frozen rate of about 6 cents per KWh.\textsuperscript{7}

Besides the CTC, the most controversial aspect of the restructuring was the design of the wholesale electricity market. Essentially, there were two models of how the market could operate, an electricity pool or a market based on bilateral trades.\textsuperscript{8} In an electricity pool, all producers sell their power into a centrally operated electricity pool and all customers (or their retail providers) purchase from the pool. The pool market is run by an independent system operator (ISO) which also controls the physical structure of the electricity grid, and thus moves power to where it is demanded and adjusts prices to reflect supply/demand balance at each point on the grid. Parties are still free to make financial arrangements to hedge price risk associated with the market. For instance, if a producer at point A wished to sell power to a customer at point A, they would still be required to

\textsuperscript{5} Retail prices are usually expressed in cents per kilowatt-hour (KWh). Wholesale prices are usually expressed in dollars per megawatt-hour (MWh). One MWh is equal to 1000 KWh. One cent per KWh is equal to $0.10 per MWh.

\textsuperscript{6} The customer was required to make this CTC payment to the IOU regardless of whether the customer switched to a retail provider other than the IOU.

\textsuperscript{7} Thus, they were accumulating “negative CTC collection” toward their stranded investment. These two utilities claim that their CTCs should have ended in the spring of 2000, so they should have been treated the same as SDG&E, but that claim was rejected by the CPUC and is now being adjudicated.

\textsuperscript{8} Joskow (2000) discusses the pros and cons of these organizational structures in much more detail.
sell to and buy from the pool, and do so at the pool spot price for that location. But they could sign a contract that offset any variations in that pool price and thus lock in a buy and sell price ahead of time.\footnote{For instance, if they wished to transact 120 MWh at $30 per MWh, they would sign a “contract for differences” (CfD) under which they would both do business with the pool, but if the pool price were $P$, the buyer would pay the seller $(30 - P)120$, with a price above $30$ implying payments from the seller to the buyer.}

The alternative plan was for a bilateral market with no centralized pool, at least not one dictated by the restructuring legislation. In this vision, buyers and sellers would trade bilaterally and then notify the ISO where they intended to produce and consume power. The ISO would step in only if the transactions that were planned for a given time period would overload some part of the transmission grid. In that case, the ISO would set grid usage charges that would induce changes in transaction plans so that the grid would not get overloaded.\footnote{Such transmission charges would determine the price difference between locations and would reflect the shadow value of capacity to carry power between those locations.} The ISO would also run a real-time “imbalance market” which market participants would have to use to make real-time (more precisely, after the fact) transactions since both production and consumption usually deviate at least slightly from the advance plan. Proponents argued that this was a more free-market approach to restructuring, and that if a centralized pool was so valuable, the market would create one. In addition, if such a pool were created, it would be under constant pressure to operate efficiently in order to keep traders using the pool rather than trading bilaterally.

What came out of the 1996-98 market design process was a hybrid of the two visions. The ISO was set up to operate with approximately the vision of those proposing the bilateral model. But the California Power Exchange (PX) was also created to run a pool. For the first four years, all three IOUs, who together had most of the retail customers and a large share of the production capacity, were required to transact all their business in the PX (or the ISO imbalance market). The PX ran a day-ahead trading market with both demand and supply bids. Beginning in 1999, the PX also started to run a forward market in which power could be traded for delivery many months in advance. This forward market never achieved sufficient volume to be considered a reliable market.\footnote{In fact, attempts by other trading forums, including the New York Mercantile Exchange, have also met with little success. It is hard to see how futures markets in electricity could achieve the depth and liquidity of markets that exist for other commodities such as oil, natural gas, or gold. Because electricity is not storable and transmission can become congested, prices can fluctuate dramatically over time and location. This means that trades for any given location and time will not be very useful in hedging the risk of power produced or consumed at another place or time. That is, the basis risk associated with such hedging attempts will be substantial.} Besides some small
purchases in the the PX’s forward market and the ISO imbalance market, the utilities purchased all of their power in the PX day-ahead market.

On April 1, 1998, California’s deregulated wholesale electricity market began operation. At that time, the three IOUs owned most of the electricity generation capacity in the state, which included nuclear, hydroelectric, coal, natural gas, and geothermal units. Over the ensuing 18 months, the utilities sold off nearly all of their natural gas powered generation, capacity that at the time produced 30%-40% of the state’s power. Five companies purchased most of this capacity, with each ending up with between 6% and 8% of the state’s generation capacity. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed these divestitures and concluded that none of these companies would own a sufficient quantity of production capacity to exercise market power.

For the first two years, prices fluctuated substantially within a month and even within a day. On a few days, the market registered severe shortage and the ISO’s real-time market price shot up to its price cap, which was $250/MWh until Oct 1, 1999, when it was raised to $750/MWh. Still, the average wholesale price was never greater than $50/MWh in any month. Then, in June 2000, the precarious balance that the market had maintained fell apart. Wholesale prices increased dramatically, the ISO found itself unable to purchase as much power as it needed through its real-time market, and the two largest IOUs were paying wholesale prices that vastly exceeded the retail prices they were allowed to charge. Many people were surprised by the market disruption, but in retrospect the suprise should have been that the market as it was designed took two years to self-destruct.

III. Why Are Electricity Prices So Volatile?

The physical properties of electricity transmission and distribution make it critical that supply exactly match demand at every moment, but the physical properties of electricity production make the matching of supply and demand especially difficult. Because storage of electricity is extremely costly and capacity constraints on production from a plant cannot be breached for significant periods without risk of costly damage, there are fairly hard constraints on the amount of electricity that can be delivered at any point in time. Yet, because of the properties of electricity transmission, an imbalance of supply and demand at any one location on an electricity grid can threaten the stability of the entire grid. The supply/demand matching between any customer and supplier is just part of the overall grid balancing and any mismatch could disrupt delivery of the product for all suppliers and consumers on the grid.

Given these unusual characteristics on the supply side of the market, it is all the
more remarkable how little flexibility has been built in to the demand side of the market. While the technology to meter consumption on an hourly, or even 10-minute, basis is widely available, and has even been installed at many industrial and commercial locations, very few electricity customers in the U.S. are charged time-varying prices that reflect the time-varying cost of procuring electricity at the wholesale level.

A third aspect of the electricity industry completes the circumstances that lead to volatile prices: electricity generation is capital intensive. Because a significant part of generation costs are fixed, the marginal cost of production will be below the average cost for a plant operating at below its capacity. So long as the market price is above a plant’s marginal operating cost, a competitive firm is better off generating than not. As a result, excess capacity in a competitive market will cause prices to fall to a level well below the average cost of producing electricity, and generators will lose money. This capital intensity, implying a high cost of idle capacity, is also the reason that it is very costly for firms to maintain the ability to increase electricity production on very short notice.

The effect of these characteristics of the electricity market can be shown graphically. Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which very-inelastic supply and very-inelastic demand intersect at a price that permits producers to cover their capital costs. This is a price that allows the plant to cover its marginal operating costs and earn enough beyond that to justify its capital investment, both depreciation and return on investment. But it is easy to see that if capacity cannot adjust quickly and demand is difficult to forecast precisely, figure 1 is an unlikely outcome. Even small changes will lead to a price boom or bust.

Figure 2 illustrates a slight mismatch in which quantity demanded exceeds supply at normal price levels. Unlike, for instance, in the airline industry, where capacity on a route can adjust quickly and demand is responsive to price changes, there is almost no price-responsive mechanism on the supply or demand side that allows the electricity market to adjust to such a mismatch. In this situation, price will skyrocket, eventually eliciting a bit more output as generators run their plants harder – risking heavier maintenance costs – due to the tremendous profit opportunity. Extremely high price can also elicit demand response, but in the current markets, this is quite limited. The most prevalent sources of “demand responsiveness” are attributable to actions by the independent system operator (ISO), which can reduce reserve margins and can exercise interruptible contracts,

---

12 This potential has been quite apparent in other capital-intensive industries, for instance, the memory chip market. In the early 1990s, high prices induced massive investment in memory chip fabrication plants. The resulting excess capacity caused prices of memory chips to collapse and producers to lose billions of dollars.
an extreme measure that causes significant disruption to the affected customers and is thus one that ISOs are reluctant to take.

The situation in figure 2 is exacerbated if markets are not completely competitive. As many researchers have demonstrated,\(^{13}\) tight supply conditions in electricity markets put sellers in a very strong position to exercise market power, raising price above the level at which competitive supply and demand would otherwise meet. Because market power is easier to exercise in electricity markets when the competitive price would have been high anyway, it raises prices more during demand peaks that during off-peak periods. Thus, the presence of market power exacerbates the volatility of prices and further reduces the chance that prices will remain in a reasonable range.

Many observers of deregulation have said that the root of the problem in California is that the surplus of capacity that was supposed to exist in California disappeared due to strong economic growth in the state and throughout the western U.S. If the surplus had remained, however, the result would have been figure 3. Figure 3 illustrates a mismatch of supply and demand in the opposite direction, with supply exceeding demand at normal prices. With excess supply, price is likely to collapse to the low marginal running costs of the marginal unit. These prices would almost certainly fail to cover the average costs of operating the plants, a situation similar to the memory chip market in the early 1990s. Experience from many other industries – oil, dairy, or wheat, for instance – supports the political reality that such outcomes are usually followed by calls for price supports and subsidies to producers, essentially reregulation due to excessively low prices.

The careful reader will note that figures 1-3 each illustrate one supply/demand interaction, while in real electricity markets demand varies continuously throughout a day or month, and wholesale prices are set hourly or more frequently. The concept illustrated in these figures, however, also applies to the aggregate of these interactions. Consider, for instance, the supply curve shown in figure 4.\(^{14}\) Begin by assuming that demand in a month is distributed uniformly between \(D^a_L\) and \(D^a_H\). Now, consider a relatively small rightward shift of the demand distribution to between \(D^b_L\) and \(D^b_H\). This small shift replaces hours that were at very low prices, on the left of the distribution, with hours that are at ex-

---

\(^{13}\) See Wolfram (1999), Borenstein & Bushnell (1999), Borenstein (2000), Borenstein, Bushnell & Wolak (2000), and Joskow & Kahn (2000).

\(^{14}\) One could think of this as a competitive supply curve if the market is competitive. If firms have the ability to exercise market power, one could think of this roughly as a "quantity/price outcome" curve that incorporates price deviations from marginal cost at various levels of completely-inelastic demand.
tremely high prices at the right side of the distribution. Even this small shift can cause the quantity-weighted average price to increase drastically.

The critical point here is that electricity markets are especially vulnerable to these supply/demand mismatches due to the extreme inelasticity of supply and demand. In markets where output is storable or capacity constraints are more flexible, supply can adjust to such mismatches without extreme price movements. In markets where buyers can see time-varying prices and respond to them, demand can adjust to such mismatches and thus damp the price swings. As currently configured, electricity markets have almost no flexibility on either the demand or supply side. California entered a price boom in mid-2000, but if the western U.S. had suffered a significant economic downturn in the late 1990s – which was a real possibility in 1994 when the state began serious consideration of wholesale price deregulation – the opposite outcome could have occurred. The price volatility problem is exacerbated by the exercise of market power, raising prices above the outcome that would occur with the competitive supply and demand that is illustrated in figures 1-3, but doing so to a much greater extent at times when even competitive prices would have been very high.

A comparison of electricity markets to the airline industry is potentially useful, because that is also an industry with (a) time-varying demand that is difficult to forecast, (b) strict short-run capacity constraints, and (c) an inability to store output (i.e., once a plane takes off, any empty seats are pure waste). The key difference is that retail prices in the airline industry vary with demand – it is very hard to find a discount seat on a Friday afternoon at 5pm – and customers are aware of the prices, and respond to them, at the time they choose to purchase. Furthermore, mismatches between supply and demand on a route, or even in a region, can be remedied in a matter of days by flying in more capacity. Capacity expansion in the electricity industry takes years. Electrical transmission lines can substitute to some extent for production capacity at a location, making it easier to bring in power produced elsewhere, but those transmission lines also have capacity limits and new lines also take years to build.15

**Price Formation in a Commodity Market**

The discussion so far has assumed that all sellers in a short-term market for electricity receive the same price for delivery of power at the same time. In the policy debate, there

---

15 Transmission losses, which can dissipate as much as 10%-20% of the marginal quantity transmitted, increase the marginal cost of this power even before hitting the capacity constraint. But if a cost increase of that magnitude were the only barrier to bringing in ample supply, we still would not see 10- or 100-fold price spikes.
was a great deal of discussion about the fact that sellers who show a willingness to sell at low prices are paid a much higher market-clearing price. This is, however, the way that all commodity markets work. If an orange grower has a particularly fertile orchard that produces high yields and low costs per bushel, that grower still sells oranges at the market-clearing price. Likewise, gold mining companies and oil producers sell their output at the market price regardless of whether they are producing from low-cost or high-cost sources.

This uniform-price outcome is not a function of the auction format or some design flaw in the electricity market.\footnote{See Kahn et al (2001) for an analysis of uniform-price versus pay-as-bid auctions in the California electricity market.} Furthermore, it is true in all commodity markets, whether or not there are firms that are able to exercise market power. This reality, however, has important implications in electricity markets due to the extreme volatility of prices, as I’ve discussed above. When a supply/demand mismatch occurs, it changes the price for all power being sold in the market at that time.

The uniform-price outcome is in sharp contrast to the outcome under regulation, in which price is based on the average cost of production rather than the marginal cost (or marginal opportunity cost) of production. In other words, under regulation, production that takes place at lower costs is compensated at a lower level. The price consumers pay is the average of all of these production costs. Assuming that production is equally efficient under regulation as in a competitive market,\footnote{This is an assumption with which many people would take issue.} average cost pricing will yield lower prices when supply is tight, because the marginal cost of production is above the average cost. The difference will be even greater if the unregulated market is not completely competitive and unregulated prices are above marginal cost. That is the situation California faced beginning in summer 2000. But in a situation of surplus capacity, marginal cost will be below average cost. So, unless the markets suffer from significant market power, the price that then results from a market process will be below the price that regulation would produce. That is the situation that many people believed California would face in the early years of restructuring.

IV. The Upheaval in California’s Electricity Market

California’s summer 2000 electricity market illustrates the inherent volatility discussed in the previous section. A dryer-than-normal year, which reduced hydroelectric production,
combined with a hotter-than-normal summer and continued economic growth throughout the western US to shift the supply/demand balance, causing the market to tighten up rather suddenly. The result was just as discussed in the previous section. Although the IOUs had by 2000 begun buying power under long-term contracts, they were doing very little of it. They were still procuring about 90% of their “net short” position – the power that they were not producing with their own generation and did not have under contracts that pre-dated the restructuring – in the PX’s day ahead or ISO’s real-time market.

In addition, cost increases raised production costs and, importantly, did so much more for the marginal production units. Figure 5 shows the market marginal cost curve from thermal unit production in California. The lowest line is the cost curve during July 1998 when gas prices were low and the costs of NOx pollution permits were negligible. The next highest line shows costs during June 2000, when natural gas prices were almost double their 1998 levels. Not only has the curve shifted up, it has rotated, with costs of the most expensive units increasing more than the less expensive units. This rotation results from the fact that the most expensive units convert natural gas to electricity at about half the efficiency rate of the least expensive generators. By August 2000, shown in the highest line, the problem was further exacerbated as the price of NOx pollution permits increased from about $1 per pound to over $30 per pound (and gas price increased further). The least efficient generators were also the biggest NOx emitters, so the rotation was even more pronounced.

Thus, even absent any exercise of market power, the cost and demand changes that took place during summer 2000 would have greatly increased market prices. The rotation of the supply curve meant that the increased price of gas and NOx not only raised electricity prices to cover increased costs, they also increased the inframarginal rents that suppliers were able to earn. In July 1998, the most expensive generators had costs $20/MWh greater than the least expensive natural gas plants. By August of 2000, the difference was more than $100/MWh. Thus, when the high-cost plants needed to run, it created enormous inframarginal rents for low-cost producers.

Market Power in California’s Wholesale Market

The most controversial aspect of the California market meltdown is the issue of firms exercising market power. A number of empirical studies of the issue have now been done and all have concluded that sellers have exercised market power in California’s wholesale
electricity market.\textsuperscript{18} Harvey and Hogan (2000, 2001) have disputed these conclusions by suggesting that the studies did not appropriately control for costs and scarcity, though their work does not offer an alternative empirical analysis.

These debates over market power have differed from those in many other industries because they have focused on unilateral exercise of market power by firms that have a comparatively small share of total production in the market. The unregulated generation owners that have been accused of exercising market power own between 6\% and 8\% of the production capacity in the ISO control area. The FERC has the power to regulate prices these companies have charged, but in 1998 decided that this wasn’t necessary due to the small market shares that each producer possessed.

Unfortunately, the FERC focused exclusively on market share analysis, without examining whether such measures would really indicate the ability of firms to exercise market power. In a market with no demand elasticity, however, a firm with even a few percent of the market could exercise extreme market power when demand is high. On a hot summer afternoon when the ISO needs 97\% of all generators running in order to meet demand, it is clear that a firm that owns 6\% of capacity can exercise a great deal of market power.

That sort of example did eventually make it into the understanding of regulators, but it had the unfortunate effect of focusing some regulators solely on periods in which one firm’s production could be “pivotal” in meeting demand.\textsuperscript{19} In fact, a seller will find it profitable to exercise market power any time the elasticity of residual demand that firm faces is sufficiently small. That elasticity is determined by the elasticity of market demand and the elasticity of supply from other producers.\textsuperscript{20} In July 1998, figure 5 shows that supply was highly elastic over a broad range of output, but that changes in 2000. Beyond about 14,000 MW of thermal generation, the marginal cost curve becomes increasingly steep, implying a less elastic residual demand curve faced by any single producer. Restricting output becomes more profitable when the cost of the next highest cost generation unit exceeds the market price by a greater amount, \textit{i.e.}, when the industry supply function is steeper.


\textsuperscript{19} One FERC commissioner, was quoted as saying that sellers could only exercise market power when the system was in a Stage 3 emergency, which occurs when available capacity exceeds demand by less than 2\%.

\textsuperscript{20} See Borenstein (2000) for further discussion of the constraints on the exercise of market power in electricity markets.
Thus, while the exact degree of market power is an empirical question, a reasonable first cut analysis leads one to ask why a seller with 3,000-4,000 MW of capacity wouldn’t exercise market power. Borenstein & Bushnell (1999) simulated the market (actually the entire western grid) using a Cournot quantity-setting model. Even with an assumed demand elasticity of -0.1, we found the potential for very significant markups, some over 100%, without any collusion among sellers.21

V. The Role of Long-Term Contracting

In unregulated markets that exhibit a great deal of spot-price volatility, it is common for buyers and sellers to smooth their transaction prices by signing long-term contracts. This can and should be a significant part of any electricity market undergoing deregulation. Nearly all markets outside of California have taken this approach. In many cases, the sale of utility generation facilities to other firms has been accompanied by “vesting contracts” that promise a certain amount of power sales back to the utility at a predetermined price. Also, the regulated utilities, now operating primarily as utility distribution companies (UDCs) and electricity retailers, have in many cases retained some of their generation facilities. The price customers end up paying for the power from those facilities is then based on their costs of operation, not the market price. While California had virtually no vesting contracts, the California utilities have retained generation facilities and long-term contracts that pre-date deregulation that produce more than 60% of the power they deliver to customers. If they had sold all of their generation facilities, and still not signed long-term contracts, the situation in California during 2000-2001 would have been much worse than it was.

Some participants in the debate have suggested that utilities in California and elsewhere could save money by purchasing their power through long-term forward contracts.22

---

21 Some observers have argued that any capital intensive industry will always be imperfectly competitive, so measuring margins above short-run marginal cost is meaningless. This is simply incorrect on both counts. First, even if markets are imperfectly competitive, measuring price-cost margins is the appropriate way to see how imperfect that competition is and monitor changes in the degree of imperfection. Second, many capital intensive industries are populated by price taking firms. Gold mining, for instance, is a highly capital intensive industry in which all sellers are price takers; they produce so long as the market price is above their SRMC. In fact, the same is true for most of the goods listed on the commodities page of the Wall Street Journal (oil, natural gas, corn, oats, silver, copper, etc.), the same place that California electricity prices are listed.

22 The discussion here refers to long-term contracts that are negotiated in a market context, whether bilaterally or in a more organized forward market. Cost-based long-term contracts that are imposed through a regulatory process offer much of the same hedging benefit, but the relationship between long-term contract and spot prices is not as clear cut.
While long-term contracts reduce variability in the cost of buying power, long-term contract prices are very unlikely to be systematically below spot prices on average. In the case of summer 2000 in California, power contracted in advance was cheaper than spot power, but the reason sellers were willing to contract at those lower prices when the contracts were signed – in late 1999 or early 2000 – was that their best guess of summer 2000 prices was below the spot prices that actually resulted. The offer prices for power during 2001-2003 in California shot up in early 2001 because sellers updated their beliefs and then anticipated that spot prices over that time period would be quite high. In the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland pool, by contrast, buyers who contracted for summer 2000 power in advance ended up paying higher prices than those who bought on the spot market, because mild weather led to prices that were below expectations. Likewise, because of mild weather and conservation in California, among other factors, prices in California turned out to be lower than expected and purchases made in advance were at prices above the spot price the obtained. On average, a purchaser buying power in forward markets (or through long-term bilateral contracts) will not receive lower power costs than a purchaser buying in the spot market.

From a buyer’s perspective, the concern with long-term forward contracting, of course, is that the buying firm might lock in a higher price than it would have had to pay if it had purchased in nearer-term markets. This is an especially large fear for regulated utilities acting as energy service providers (ESPs) in a restructured market. They are concerned that in such a situation the state regulatory agency might decide that the contract purchase price was “imprudent” and not allow the utility to pass through the costs to customers. Credible commitment by regulators is difficult, but it is clear that the correct standard for judging the prudence of these contracts is based on the information available at the time the contract is signed, not looking backwards after the actual spot prices have become available. A hedging instrument is not going to save money on average, and will frequently lose money, compared to the relevant spot prices.

Long-term Contracts and Market Power

23 Statements by various parties that trumpet the savings buyers obtain by purchasing power through forward markets do not mention the losses of exactly equal size that producers experience by selling in advance. Generators would not be likely to continue to sell in the forward market if they knew they could systematically earn more in the spot market.

24 Borenstein, Bushnell, Knittel, and Wolfram (BBKW, 2000) looks at the relationship between the price in the California Power Exchanges day-ahead price and the California ISO’s balancing market price. As discussed by BBKW, there could be a systematically lower price in the forward market if sellers are systematically more risk averse than buyers, but this is unlikely to occur.
There is, however, a potential price-lowering effect in both forward and spot markets if buyers in aggregate purchase more power in long-term contracts. Locking in some sales in advance reduces the incentive of multiple firms to behave less competitively among themselves.\(^\text{25}\) The idea, basically, is that if firms are maintaining high prices by mutually foregoing aggressive price cutting, then the existence of many forums for trading, especially over time, makes it more difficult to maintain such mutual forbearance.\(^\text{26}\) Thus, the possibility of selling in advance makes it more difficult for firms to restrain competition. Once a firm has sold some output in advance, it has less incentive to restrict its output in the spot market in an attempt to push up prices in that market, since it does not receive the higher spot price on the output it has already sold through a forward contract.\(^\text{27}\) Thus, in anticipation of more aggressive competition in the spot market – because some firms have presold significant output in a forward market – firms are likely to price more aggressively in the forward market.\(^\text{28}\)

In equilibrium, the actual magnitude of this potential impact of forward contracting on both spot and forward market prices is not known. It can do no more than eliminate the portion of price premia that are due to market power, and it might have a substantially smaller effect. Forward contracting cannot reduce the price increases that would accompany supply shortages in even a completely competitive market.

Furthermore, the details of the long-term contracts are critical to their effect on market power. Some contracts are tied to the production from a specific plant, so the generator is not required to deliver power if the plant is taken out of production for technical reasons. These are called non-firm contracts. Firm contracts require the seller to produce the power or purchase it on the spot market. These are called “contracts for differences” (CfDs) since they can be settled by the seller paying the buyer the spot price minus the contracted price (and the buyer paying the seller if the difference is negative). Since the legitimacy of a plant shutdown is difficult to verify, the seller that owns multiple plants can still have an

\(^{25}\) This insight is generally attributed to Allaz and Vila (1993).

\(^{26}\) The mutual forbearance can take the form of implicit or explicit collusion or it can be firms simply competing less aggressively than they could by, for instance, limiting the quantity of power they make available to the market as in Cournot competition.

\(^{27}\) Borenstein (2000) discusses this effect in more detail.

\(^{28}\) In a June 8, 2001 Wall Street Journal article on the May-June 2001 decline in spot electricity prices, an executive of Calpine – a small unregulated generators in California – was quoted on the effect of California’s long-term contracts as saying “their locking up of that volume is a big part of the reason we have these lower prices today.” Long-term contracts will impact spot prices in the short run only to the extent that they undermine the exercise of market power.
incentive under a non-firm contract to shut down one plant in order to drive up the spot price for other plants. Under a CfD, the seller would not have that incentive.

More generally, the incentive of a generating company to exercise market will depend on its net purchasing position in the market at a given point in time. If a firm were a large net seller, it would likely have an incentive to restrict output to raise price. If it had sold much of its output under firm contracts (or sold CfDs), then it would have much less incentive to restrict its output since it would have a smaller inframarginal quantity on which to collect the resulting higher price. If a firm is a net buyer, then its incentive could actually reverse: a net buyer is likely to have an incentive to run even a non-economic plant (marginal cost above the market price) in order to drive down the market price at which it would have to make its net purchase, i.e., exercise monopsony power.

*Long-term Contracting is Only Part of the Solution*

Long-term contracting is an important part of the solution to the fundamental problem of electricity markets, but it is only one part of the most efficient solution. Long-term contracting does not “solve” the mismatches between supply and demand. It just prevents large fluctuations in electric bills when those mismatches occur. It can, however, help pay for excess or stand-by capacity, by assuring that the generating companies receive payment of their capital costs even if demand turns out to be low, spot prices collapse, and some of the capacity does not get used.

In fact, this is what the old regulatory system did. Utilities were assured of revenues to cover their costs and in return built sufficient capacity to make sure that all contingencies could be covered. Supply always exceeded demand by a significant amount, and the cost of all that idle or reserve capacity was rolled into the price that customers paid for the power that they did use.

This system could still work in a quasi-deregulated form in restructured electricity markets. Utilities (or other ESPs) could, with the oversight and consent of the regulator (or without it, for unregulated ESPs), sign long-term contracts for power and capacity (or simply take-or-pay contracts) that assured generators they could recover their costs even if the capacity were not actually used. This would mimic the regulatory system and would produce many of the same inefficiencies.

This would be an unfortunate outcome, since it would still fail to bring the demand side into the market. Demand-side price responsiveness is valuable in this market because it does not make sense to produce more power if that production imposes costs that are
greater than the customer’s value of consuming the additional power. Real-time retail prices that reflect the cost imposed by additional consumption are the ideal mechanism for making that tradeoff.

Thus far, California and all other states have attempted to make electricity markets work almost entirely on the supply side of the market. At times, this has worked relatively well in some markets, but the California crisis that began in June 2000 has demonstrated the variety of constraints that exist on the supply side. In California, these include production capacity constraints, new plant siting constraints, pollution emission constraints, and constraints on the quantity of natural gas that is shipped into the state in any given time period. Deregulating only the supply side of the market seems to be the equivalent of making an electricity market operate with one arm tied behind its back.

The complete solution to the fundamental trouble with electricity markets includes a combination of long-term contracting for supply (and reserve capacity) and real-time retail pricing for customers. Together, these mechanisms can provide the right economic incentives to reduce demand at peak times when the system is strained while still assuring customers of relatively stable monthly bills.

VI: Real-time Retail Price Signals and Stable Monthly Bills

A distinct feature of electricity markets around the world is that although the marginal cost of delivering the product can vary tremendously over time and hard capacity constraints are present, retail prices are seldom adjusted to reflect these cost (or opportunity cost) variations. The effect of customers facing a single constant price for electricity is that they have no more incentive to conserve during peak consumption times, such as on a hot summer afternoon, than during low consumption times, such as during the night. They also have no incentive to shift consumption away from times when the production capacity of the grid is strained and production costs are highest. As a result, more capacity needs to be built to accommodate all of the demand at the highest peak times than would otherwise be the case. Real-time pricing would reduce the need to site and build new peaking plants, which otherwise may run only a few days each year. If consumption is much less price-elastic at low prices than at high prices, then real-time pricing is also

29 Peak/off-peak pricing is fairly common for commercial and industrial customers, though it is virtually always implemented as “time of use” (TOU) pricing, a two- or three-price system with, for instance, one price for daytime usage and a lower price for nighttime usage. Real-time retail pricing, in contrast, allows prices to change with each given time interval, such as 10 minutes or one hour, and prices need not be the same at a given time from one day to the next. Borenstein (2001) discusses the large advantages for real-time pricing over TOU pricing.
likely to lower the overall consumption of electricity. Thus, in addition to the potential cost savings for customers, the environmental impact of real-time pricing makes it quite attractive.

While many people have advocated greater price-responsiveness in demand through real-time retail electricity pricing, at the same time, there have been calls for greater protection of customers from price spikes. These two positions are inherently incompatible since price-responsive demand will take place only when customers are exposed to variable prices. But the underlying goals of these two policy proposals are not incompatible. It is possible to expose customers to nearly the full range of price fluctuations, so that price-responsive demand will be meaningful, and still assure them of relative stability in their monthly bills. It seems clear that customers are concerned about stability in their monthly bills, not about stability in their hour-to-hour prices.

The key to meeting both of these goals is to recognize that the overall or average level of prices can be stabilized without damping the variation in prices. In order for an energy service provider to offer both real-time retail price variation and monthly bill stability, without risking substantial losses, it needs to hedge a significant portion of its energy cost through long-term contracts. With a large share of power purchased under long-term contracts, the ESP can adjust all of the hourly real-time retail prices up or down as necessary each month in order for the payments under real-time pricing to equal the costs of procurement.

To be concrete, assume that the ESP begins by engaging in no hedging. It charges customers a fixed per-kilowatt-hour transmission and distribution (T&D) charge plus the spot price of energy in each hour.\(^{30}\) This satisfies the real-time pricing goal, but does not assure stable monthly bills. In fact, the monthly bills would be as variable as the month-to-month variation in the weighted-average spot energy prices.

To attain the goal of monthly bill stability, the ESP would sign a long-term contract to buy some amount of power at a fixed price.\(^{31}\) To fix ideas and keep the presentation

---

\(^{30}\) The spot price here could refer to a day-ahead price or the real-time imbalance energy price. Many customers prefer to use a day-ahead price for greater planning certainty, but others have recognized the potential enormous option value of basing decisions on the more-volatile real-time imbalance price. Obviously, this entire discussion assumes that the customer has installed a real-time electricity meter. The cost of such meters is not a significant expense for most commercial and industrial customers. With scale economies in a neighborhood, real-time meters at even the residential level could probably be installed for less than $100 per household.

\(^{31}\) In fact, the contract just has to have less variance than the spot price. It could, for instance, have a fuel adjustment clause.
simple, I’ll assume that the ESP signs a long-term contract at the same price for each hour. Such a contract is likely to be at about the average spot price of the electricity that the parties anticipate over the life of the contract, but in any given month the contract price could be greater or less than the average spot price.

This contract can be considered a financial investment that is completely independent of the ESP’s retailing function. The critical point is that the ESP’s return on this financial investment varies directly with the average spot price of energy, and that return can be applied to change the average level of customer bills. When viewed this way, it becomes clear that the long-term contract can affect the average price level without damping the price variation. The gains (when the average spot price is higher than the contract price) or losses (when the average spot price is lower than the contract price) from the long-term contract would be distributed to customers by a constant (over the month) surcharge or discount on each kilowatt-hour sold during that month.\(^{32}\)

After the fact, the ESP would then charge the customer the spot price plus or minus the return per kilowatt-hour from the long-term contract. Since the return to owning the contract is greater when the average spot price is higher, it would be used to offset the high average spot price, thus lowering the volatility of monthly electricity bills. If the ESP hedged nearly all of the demand it served, then this offset would be sufficient to nearly eliminate variability in monthly bills. If the ESP hedged, say, 80% of the demand, then about 80% of the variability in monthly bills would be eliminated. The actual price that the customer was charged in each hour, however, would still have the same variance as the spot price.

During the month, customers would not know the actual price they will be charged for each hour, but they would be able to learn the spot price at any point in time, so they would know in which hours electricity will end up being extremely expensive and in which hours it will be much cheaper. The offset, since it is averaged over all hours, would be just a few cents per kilowatt-hour, or much less, so the hedging of the average price would not interfere with the “passthrough” of real-time price signals.

Figure 6 illustrates the effect that this approach would have had in June of 2000. In this illustration, the utility is assumed to have signed a contract for 80% of its demand at 6¢ per kilowatt-hour. In addition to energy charges, the utility is assumed to assess a 4¢ per kilowatt-hour charge for transmission and distribution. The T&D charge is added to

\(^{32}\) Obviously, much more sophisticated hedging is possible and the gains or losses could be distributed in a way that is completely independent of consumption during the month.

18
all prices for ease of comparison. The three horizontal lines show the quantity-weighted average price a customer would pay (assuming it had the same time profile of demand as the system as a whole) if the utility was fully hedged (lowest line), if it was completely unhedged (highest line), and if it was 80% hedged (middle line).

Of the two volatile lines, the higher shows the real-time price a customer would pay with no hedging and the lower shows the price the customer would pay under the approach proposed here that combines real-time pricing with 80%, in this case, purchased through long-term contracts. The quantity-weighted average of the higher line is 18.08 cents, the same as the highest horizontal line. The quantity-weighted average of the lower line is 11.62 cents, the same as the middle horizontal line.³³

This illustration demonstrates that a customer under the plan proposed here would face the same volatility in prices as it would under 100% real-time pricing. The only difference is that the price curve would be shifted down, in this example, by the “profits” from the long-term contract, which is this example are 6.46¢ per kilowatt-hour. During the hours of extremely high spot prices, customers would face nearly as extreme prices, and would have a strong incentive to reduce consumption. Yet, the average monthly prices (and monthly bills) the customer would face would be much less volatile than without hedging.³⁴

The most important impact of this approach would be that it would lower quantities demanded at peak times, and by doing so, it would lower the market prices at those times. Harkening back to figures 1-3, the demand curves would become much flatter, since customers would be able to see and respond to high prices. This would prevent the extreme price spikes that we now see. It would also reduce the financial incentive to exercise market power since one firms reduction of output would have a smaller effect on price than it does with demand that is completely price-inelastic. Thus, real-time retail pricing would lower

³³ Though it does not occur in this illustration, it is possible that this formula could result in negative prices in certain hours. This outcome could easily be avoided, however, with a small modification. A minimum price, say 1¢ per kilowatt-hour, could be set and any resulting excess revenue could then be redistributed evenly among all other hours.

³⁴ This illustration slightly overstates the monthly bill stability that could be achieved through 80% hedging because it assumes that the hedged quantity is 80% of the actual demand in each hour. The contract (or contracts) would quite likely hedge a larger quantity during periods when demand is anticipated to be high, but the variation would probably not match exactly the actual variation in consumption that occurs. Since price will be highest in periods when the quantity exceeds anticipated levels, the protection from the hedging contract would be slightly less than if it matched the actual consumption pattern exactly.
the overall average wholesale cost of power.\textsuperscript{35}

This has very important implications for the negotiation of long-term contracts. If sellers, at the time of negotiation, believe that effective real-time retail pricing is likely to be implemented, then they will reduce their forecasts of the average spot prices they would be able to earn if they did not sell through a long-term contract. As a result, the sellers will be willing to accept a lower long-term contract price than they otherwise would. Thus, it would be quite valuable for the regulator (or ESP) to make a credible commitment to implementing real-time retail pricing before negotiating long-term contracts. Unfortunately, California did not make such a commitment before it negotiated many long-term contracts in the spring of 2001.

Though real-time retail pricing has not been widely used in the U.S., the technology for it is well-established and available. Most large commercial and industrial customers in California have real-time meters already, and communication of the day-ahead or balancing market price to those customers easily can take place through the internet. In the near future, it may not be practical or necessary to include residential customers in a real-time retail pricing program, but as the cost of real-time meters declines, there is no reason that it shouldn’t occur. It is critical to understand that the \textit{variation} in prices can be separated from the \textit{average level} of prices. For any given level of flat retail price that is contemplated, the same average price level can be attained each month with real-time retail pricing. Doing it with real-time pricing will reduce the cost of procuring the power and reduce the need to build more power plants, ultimately allowing lower retail prices.

\textit{The Difference Between Real-Time Retail Pricing and Paying for “Negawatts”}

Many alternative programs have been proposed that mimic, to some extent, the effect of real-time pricing. These programs generally are based on the idea of paying customers to reduce consumption at certain times. Interruptible contracts – in which a customer agrees to completely stop electricity consumption when the operator asks (up to a maximum number of hours per year – are the bluntest instrument of this type. Other proposals suggest that the ISO should have a standard offer or run an auction of some sort for demand reduction at the time the system is under strain.

\textsuperscript{35} It is also worth noting that setting retail prices below the sum of the wholesale price and the transmission and distribution charge can move prices closer to the actual marginal cost, even if there is no market power present. Transmission and distribution is charged on a marginal basis, but these costs are largely fixed. Therefore, reducing price by up to the T&D fee that would otherwise be in the retail price has the effect of moving price closer to marginal cost.
While these programs can, at their best, offer many of the benefits of real-time pricing, in practice they offer much less benefit and about the same cost as real-time pricing. On the cost side, with the exception of the very bluntest customer interruption, implementing any sort of demand-reduction market requires the same real-time metering equipment and about as much price, quantity demanded, or reserve-margin information transmission as real-time pricing.

The more difficult problem with paying for demand reduction is the baseline from which the payment is made. Unless the program is mandatory and the baseline is set based on information that is completely out of the control of the customer (such as demand information from a number of years earlier), the program will be subject to extensive manipulation and self-selection problems. The manipulation occurs if the baseline is set based on any consumption information that can be affected after the program is announced or anticipated. For instance, one current suggestion in California would pay a customer on superpeak hot summer days to reduce demand from its average level over the previous $x$ days. This would greatly diminish any incentive to reduce demand in other days, since such actions would lower the baseline the customer started from on the superpeak days.

The self-selection problem exists even if the baseline is set from truly exogenous information. The entities that would opt to sign up for these programs will disproportionately be the ones who know already that they will be reducing their demands, such as companies that are reducing their operations or that have already changed their production process to use less power.\footnote{A very similar self-selection problem occurs if real-time pricing is implemented on a voluntary basis. Those entities that know they consume disproportionately at the peak times will not opt for the program and will thus continue to have no incentive to conserve when the system is strained. Particularly for industrial and commercial consumers, real-time pricing is best implemented as the default pricing system. If a company then wanted to sign a contract with a power marketer to obtain flat prices, they could do so. Marketers, however, would sell such contracts at a very high price, because they would recognize that the buyers are customers who disproportionately consume at high-cost times.} Likewise, those entities whose baseline has been set inordinately high, due to some unusual activity during the period used for determining the baseline, would also be more likely to join the program.

Paying for demand reduction at peak demand times seems, at first, more attractive than real-time pricing, because it “rewards” those who conserve at peak times rather than “punishes” those who consume when the system is strained. There are, however, no free lunches, and this distinction is a false one. Those payments to entities that conserve at peak times must come from somewhere. If the revenue source is an explicit or implicit surcharge on all power consumed – probably the most likely scenario – then prices are being
increased for all other users, and the punishment is just as great for those who consume in the middle of the night as for those who consume during a hot afternoon. If the revenue source is general state funds or some other tax source, then it is coming from all users and the punishment is allocated in a way that has nothing to do with energy usage at all.

Finally, the payments in many of these programs fail to recognize the savings that a customer already gains by reducing consumption, the price they would have paid for the power. Thus, if additional power would cost $300/MWh to procure and the customer is paying $80/MWh, the maximum payment the ISO should be willing to make to the customer for demand reduction is $220/MWh, not $300/MWh. From the provider’s side, this is because reducing demand saves procurement costs of $300, but lowers revenue by $80 for a net savings of $220. From the customer’s side, it is effectively being “paid” $220 plus the savings of $80 for a total of $300 for every MWh it reduces.37

**Fairness and Distributional Concerns with Real-Time Retail Pricing**

Real-time pricing would almost certainly lower the total payments for power by discouraging peak-time consumption that otherwise causes prices to skyrocket. Not everyone would benefit equally from a switch to real-time pricing, however, and some customers could be made worse off. Those who now consume disproportionately at times when the system demand is highest could be made worse off. Under the current flat pricing of electricity, these entities are being subsidized by those that consume a smaller share of the system load at peak times than at off-peak times. In the case of California, this cross-subsidy roughly runs geographically from areas that do less air conditioning to areas that do more. There is concern that central valley communities could be harmed relative to coastal communities.

It is worth pointing out first that with even a moderate amount of price responsiveness, it is possible that nearly all customers could be made better off, as the real-time retail pricing reduces demand at peak times and prevents most or all of the extreme price shocks. Even though the cross-subsidy of peak-time consumption would be ending, the wholesale price at peak times would be reduced as demand at those times declines, so the increase in the retail price at peak times relative to flat retail pricing would not be nearly as great as one would infer from looking at recent price patterns. To the extent that policy makers wish to continue to cross-subsidize towards areas that consume more power at peak times, this could be done through an explicit and transparent subsidy of power use in those

---

37 If the system operator wishes to use demand response to exercise monopsony power in the energy market, payments in excess of the net savings the customer provides would make sense.
areas, preferably one that does not continue to subsidize consumption at peak times most heavily. In the end, however, the only way to absolutely assure that no one will be made worse off by ending this cross-subsidy is to continue with flat pricing, which gives no incentive to reduce peak-time consumption.

VII. The Role of Price Caps

In California and other electricity markets, price spikes have led to price caps, and to a debate about the appropriateness of imposing price caps. Some participants are “for” price caps and others are “against” them. These philosophical debates about price caps are an unfortunate distraction from the real issues.

Price caps are and will continue to be a critical element of wholesale electricity markets. The markets as now configured do not give customers an opportunity to respond to high prices by reducing their consumption. Furthermore, the extreme inelasticity of both supply and demand mean that there is the opportunity for exercise of extreme market power, potentially driving prices to a thousand or a million times higher than their normal level. Such outcomes would destroy the market. Therefore, the debate should be about the level of price caps and mechanisms for their adjustment.

Those arguing against price caps have said that they will reduce investment in production facilities and reduce production from facilities that already exist. Both statements are potentially true. If price caps are set too low, they will have detrimental effects. Virtually no one disputes this. The question is at what level these effects will occur. The answer in economic terms is straightforward.

In the short run, a price cap will deter production from an existing facility if the cap is below the short-run marginal cost of production. If a plant manager is trying to decide whether it is profitable to produce power, he will compare the incremental revenue he will get from running the plant to the incremental cost of running the plant. Until summer 2000 in California, suggestions that a $250 price cap would deter production were extremely difficult to credit. The incremental running costs of all plants in the state were well below this level. During the summer, the additional cost of air pollution permits in the south coast may have pushed the incremental cost for some plants in that area above

---

38 For public health reasons, one might want to exempt, or explicitly subsidize, low-income consumers who are reliant on electricity use at peaks times.

39 Amortization of the plant fixed costs will not figure into the calculation, but the need for more frequent maintenance as the plant operates for more hours will.
the cap, and thus deterred them from producing. The problem became very salient in November and December of 2000, when a spike in the price of natural gas – rising from $4-$6 per million BTU to over $30 – put the incremental cost of nearly all gas plants above the price cap. These situations point out that price caps can in fact deter production. It also shows that price caps should be set in a way that takes into account variations in the cost of production. A single rigid price cap that is not indexed to costs of production will either have to be set so high that it has little effect or it will occasionally cause shortages and disruption in the market.

Price caps, however, can also deter the exercise of market power. A standard example of price caps demonstrates that a price cap set above the competitive price, but below the price that results without the cap, will lower prices and increase aggregate output from the firms in the market. The intuition is that without price caps, firms with market power have an incentive to restrict output in order to increase price to their profit-maximizing level. If the price cap is imposed, then once the price reaches the cap, firms do not have an incentive to restrict output further in order to drive the price higher. Thus, the appropriate level for price caps trades off the risk of setting them too low and deterring production with the risk of setting them too high and permitting the exercise of excessive market power.

Even if price caps do not deter production, it has been argued that they can deter sale of that output in one area if the seller can receive higher prices in nearby areas that do not have a price cap. In all of the U.S. wholesale electricity markets, this has been a concern. However, if the price cap is set above the competitive price in an area that is a significant part of the regional grid, it is unlikely that it will cause a shortage of power in the area that imposes the price cap. The basic reason is that at the competitive regional price, the quantity demanded can be provided by sellers without any generator selling at a price below its marginal cost. Thus, so long as the price is set higher than the regional competitive price, firms will have an incentive to provide all the power demanded across the grid without any firm selling at below its production cost. Thus, a regional price

---


41 Consider a region with two markets, A and B, and a large-capacity transmission line between them. Assume that the competitive market price in this region would be $180, but a group of firms with market power are able to push the price up to $300. Assume also that marketers can take advantage of any profitable arbitrage opportunity between the two markets. Now impose a price cap of $250 in market A. Power then shifts to market B until the price in B is pushed down to $250. No more power would be sold in B – if it were, it would push the price in B below $250 – until all demand at $250 is satisfied in A. The question then is whether all demand at $250 will be satisfied. However, there is no reason for firms, even ones with market power, not to fulfill all demand at $250 because they can do so at a marginal cost below $250 (which follows immediately from the fact that the
cap in the western U.S. is unlikely to do any more to cap prices than a credible price cap in California. The credibility of the price cap, however, is likely to be increased if it is imposed regionally, as I discuss below.

The long-run impact of price caps is easier to analyze conceptually, but more difficult to study empirically. A price cap will deter investment in new capacity if it is set, or investors believe it will be set, at a level that does not allow a return on investment that exceeds the investor’s cost of capital. The data available on costs of building a power plant are necessarily rougher than the data on variable costs of production, because the costs of building a power plant are subject to many idiosyncratic factors related to location, siting restrictions, and other attributes. Furthermore, the beliefs of investors play a critical role, because the return is calculated over the life of the plant. Thus, just as under cost-of-service regulation, uncertainty about future regulatory intervention is likely to deter investment. It is for this reason primarily that price caps should be used with great caution. In a fully restructured electricity market with price-responsive demand and long-term contracts, price caps should exist only as a backstop measure, in case a failure occurs in the market mechanisms and the normal functioning of economic supply and demand is disabled.\textsuperscript{42}

In discussing price caps thus far, I have assumed that a price cap once announced is credible and is never breached. That has not been the case in California, where the ISO has frequently violated the cap, both during the summer when the competitive price was probably below the cap nearly all of the time and in November and December when the competitive price almost certainly exceeded the cap much of the time. In the latter situation, violation of the cap was the only reasonable action since it clearly made more sense for many generators to shut down than to sell power at $250/MWh.

During the summer, however, the breaches of the cap made it very difficult to convince sellers that their efforts to raise the price above the cap through exercise of market power would not be successful. The discussion above relies critically on the ability of the buyer to stick to the cap. Otherwise, the announcement of the cap creates a game of “chicken”

---

competitive price is less than $250) and additional production to fulfill demand in A does not drive down the price they receive for their sales in B, which is already at $250. The only case in which this will not hold is if market A is so small relative to market B that all firms are better off ceasing sales in market A and maintaining the price above $250 in market B. (If the transmission line is not of sufficient capacity to handle all attempts to ship power out of the area with the price cap, then the cap is even less likely to result in shortages in the price cap area.)

\textsuperscript{42} If, for instance, the dissemination of real-time price information broke down on a hot summer after (due, say, to an internet failure), the price cap would prevent prices from rising to levels that would not occur in a functioning market.
between sellers and buyers. In the case of California, the ISO’s unwillingness to curtail
demand, and inability to elicit demand-side response with real-time retail prices, put it in
a very weak position in these showdowns. In California, the ISO breached the cap during
summer 2000 by making “out-of-market” purchases at higher prices. Until recently, these
purchases were restricted to sellers outside of the state. This set up an obvious strategy
by generators to sell power out of the state and then resell it back in to the state at above
the cap. A regional price cap – if it were credible and were set above the competitive price
– could be quite valuable in deterring this behavior.

VIII. Conclusion

Beginning in summer 2000, California’s wholesale electricity market experienced ex-
treme prices and other market disruptions. In part, the problems are attributable to factors
that would have had adverse impacts even under the old regulatory regime: a spike in the
price of natural gas, which has been much worse in the west than in the rest of the U.S.;
environmental restrictions on generation in some areas; and tremendous economic growth
throughout the western grid, which has put real strain on the existing generation resources.

The restructuring of California’s market, however, has greatly exacerbated the prob-
lems. The fact that commodity markets clear at a uniform price has meant that the
mismatch between supply and demand, and the accompanying seller market power, has
driven up the price for all power that the utilities must buy from other companies.\footnote{I specify other companies here because, notwithstanding the December 2000 order from the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, a utility selling power into an electricity market and buying it back
at the same price is not driving up its costs of providing power. When a utility sells power into the
market and buys back the same amount of power from the same market at the same price, its net
cost of that power is still just its production cost. The FERC’s order that California utilities retain
their power for their own use did not significantly change their costs of providing power to customers.}
The inability of the utilities to buy much of that power through long-term contracts has under-
mined their ability to hedge against high short-term prices. The absence of restructuring on
the demand side of the market, where virtually all consumption is still billed at a constant
price regardless of the wholesale cost of power at the time it is supplied, has exacerbated
the supply/demand mismatch and has increased the ability of sellers to exercise market
power.

Still, the movement towards restructuring of electricity markets was born from a his-
tory of well-supported dissatisfaction with outcomes under cost-of-service regulation. And
it was recognized by many that the major benefits of restructuring would not occur until
well after the time that the costs became apparent. Real-time retail pricing and long-term
contracting will help to control the soaring wholesale prices recently seen in California, and will buy time to address other important structural problems that need to be solved to create a stable, well-functioning market. These problems include creating a workable structure for retail competition, determining the most efficient way to set locational prices and transmission charges, implementing a coherent framework for investing in new transmission capacity, and optimizing the ISO’s procurement of ancillary services.

Those states and countries that have not yet started down this road would be wise to wait to learn more from the experiments that are now occurring in California, New York, Pennsylvania, New England, England and Wales, Norway, and Australia, as well as other locations. The difficulties with the outcomes so far, however, should not be interpreted as a failure of restructuring, but as part of the lurching process toward an electric power industry that is still likely to serve customers better than the approaches of the past.
References


Kahn, Alfred E., Peter C. Cramton, Robert H. Porter and Richard D. Tabor, “Pricing


FIGURE 3

Supply

Demand

FIGURE 4

Supply

$D^a_L$  $D^b_L$  $D^a_R$  $D^b_R$

$p_a$  $p_b$
FIGURE 5

California Thermal MC

MW

Aug-00
Jul-98
Jun-00

MW$/

0.00 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00 140.00 160.00

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Real-time Pricing with Monthly Bill Stability
(Assumes contract at 6 cents/kWh. Prices include 4 cents/kWh T&D)

Cents per kWh (with T&D)

- PX (hourly price)
- PX Month Avg (18.08 cents)
- 100% Contract (10 cents)
- 20% PX Month Avg + 80% Contract (11.62 cents)
- PX Adjusted for Contract (PX-6.46 cents)

Day of June 2000

FIGURE 6