

Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey
Executive Summary¹

Overview

In a historic partnership, some three-dozen community foundations² have committed themselves to a long-term campaign to rebuild levels of connectedness in their communities. They will take the lead in catalyzing community action and in funding innovative approaches to increasing the stock of social capital.³ As the first step of this campaign, they have undertaken a massive scale survey to conduct "community physicals" using the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey. The survey maps the relative strengths and areas for improvement in their communities' civic behavior and sets a baseline against which future progress can be assessed in another survey several years hence.

The effort builds on the work of Prof. Robert D. Putnam, author of Bowling Alone: Collapse and Revival of the American Community (Simon & Schuster, 2000), that details how markedly our civic ties have weakened over the last generation and the price we pay for these frayed ties in the quality of our education, our physical health and happiness, the safety on our streets, the responsiveness of democratic institutions of government, and in economic development. While Putnam's previous work and others' research was designed to measure trends in civic engagement over time, the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey is useful not for assessing our past civic trajectory but to analyzing differences in civic engagement across place.

The community foundations' effort will also build on the strategies for civic revitalization outlined in Better Together – the report of the Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University. [The report is available online at: www.bettertogether.org.] The report – the culmination of three years of dialogue among a diverse group of thinkers and doers – details promising strategies for increasing our social capital through faith-based efforts, schools and youth, the workplace, politics, and the arts.

¹ The Executive Summary was prepared by the Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, a project of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The Executive Summary summarizes the macro trends and findings of the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. Individual community sponsors with help from local academic partners may have other local interpretations of the data.

² We refer to the sponsors as community foundations for shorthand; in actuality, less than a handful of them were other sponsors (generally private foundations).

³ Social capital refers to value of the social networks embodied in various communities (both geographically and communities of interest), and the trust and reciprocity that flows from those networks.

The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey is comprised of a national sample of 3,000 respondents and representative samples in 40 communities nationwide (across 29 states) covering an additional 26,200 respondents.

The Survey is the largest scientific investigation of civic engagement ever conducted in America. President Bush began his presidency by exhorting us to be ‘citizens, not spectators’ and to serve our nation ‘beginning with your neighbor’, and built on the Clinton Administration's similar interest in civic engagement. Given this backdrop, the Survey represents an extraordinary and enormous trove of data for policy makers, researchers, and community-builders. Investigations to-date have only begun to scratch the richness of the survey data. The trends discussed are generally rather robust, but every generalization may not necessarily be true of every part of the country, and probably is not true for some communities represented by this survey.

The Survey, in addition to revealing the character of civic engagement in each community, suggests two very large challenges and opportunities across all the communities sampled:

The opportunity and challenge of faith-based civic engagement.

Religious involvement is an important dimension of civic life in most American communities. This is especially true in the South and Midwest. (As rough rule of thumb, religiosity declines with distance from the Mississippi River.)

Moreover, at a time when the nation is actively discussing President Bush's new Office of Faith Based Programs, these data are particularly relevant. However, as we noted in Better Together, "For all that faith organizations contribute to community life, organized religion is – and always has been – controversial, especially when it spills out from behind the church doors and into the public sphere. Religion can heal divisions, to be sure, but it can also exacerbate them. Religious exhortations can reduce tensions, but also increase them." It is against this backdrop that the survey casts light.

Even without the new Bush administration's push, American faith-based participation and affiliation is widespread. Eighty eight percent of the national respondents reported some religious affiliation and 84% of national sample agreed somewhat or agreed strongly that religion was very important in their lives. Lower levels of respondents were actually members: 58% of national sample were members of a local church, synagogue or other religious or spiritual community. Some forty five percent of national respondents reported religious almost weekly or more frequently.

Throughout, blacks showed greater religiosity than whites⁴; hispanics showed greater religious affiliation and church attendance than whites but lower levels of membership and lower levels of participation in religious activities outside of services. Ninety one percent of blacks and 93% of hispanics reported religious *affiliation* versus 88% of whites. Fifty one percent of blacks *attended religious services* almost weekly or more often vs. 48% of hispanics and 43% of whites. Sixty four percent of blacks in the national

⁴ Throughout this Executive Summary, "white" is used as shorthand for non-hispanic white.

sample were *members* of religious communities vs. 59% of whites and 43% of hispanics. Forty seven percent of blacks participated in *religious activities other than religious services* as compared to 41% of whites and 31% of hispanics.

The survey found big differences by age with respect to religion. Younger respondents (18-34 years of age) were far less likely to be Protestants than respondents older than they were, and far more likely to be everything else (including expressing no religious affiliation).

<i>National Social Capital Survey Respondents</i>	Ages 18-34	Ages 35-49	Ages 50-64	Ages 65+
Protestant	34%	47%	56%	64%
Catholic	29%	26%	22%	25%
Other Christian	14%	12%	8%	5%
Other religion	5%	4%	5%	2%
No religious preference	18%	11%	9%	4%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

Younger respondents were also far less likely to be frequent attenders than older respondents: only 34% of respondents aged 18-34 attended religious services almost weekly or more often vs. 59% of respondents 65 and older.

What is the impact of this religious engagement? Involvement in communities of faith among all goes collectively is strongly associated with giving and volunteering. Indeed, involvement in religious community is among the strongest predictors of giving and volunteering for religious causes as well as for secular ones. Religious communities embody one of the most important sources of social capital and concern for community in America. Religious people are great at "doing for."

Moreover, religious involvement is positively associated with most other forms of civic involvement. Even holding other factors constant (comparing people of comparable educational levels, comparable income, and so on), religiously engaged people are more likely than religiously disengaged people to be involved in civic groups of all sorts, to vote more, to be more active in community affairs, to give blood, to trust other people (from shopkeepers to neighbors), to know the names of public officials, to socialize with friends and neighbors, and even simply to have a wider circle of friends. Interestingly as well, Americans are more likely to fully trust people at their place of worship (71%) than they are to trust people they work with (52%), people in their neighborhood (47%) or people of their own race (31%).

Another distinctive feature of religious involvement is that it is less biased by social standing than most other forms of civic involvement. Poorer, less educated Americans are much less likely to be involved in community life than other Americans, but they are fully as engaged in religious communities. Conversely, religiously engaged people have, on average, a more diverse set of friends than those who are less engaged in religion.

Holding constant their own social status, religiously engaged people are more likely than other Americans to number among their friends a person of a different faith, a community leader, a manual worker, a business owner, and even a welfare recipient.

For all these reasons, faith-based community involvement holds much promise. However, our survey suggests that religiously observant Americans today tend to be more conservative politically than their secular neighbors. Whether their views stem from their conservatism or their religiosity, our survey suggests, as earlier research has as well, that intense involvement in communities of faith is more likely to be associated with intolerance: i.e., favoring banning unpopular books from libraries, antipathy to equal rights for immigrants, lower levels of support for racial intermarriage and lower levels of friendships with gays. Religious involvement is linked to greater support for needy individuals, but it is not necessarily associated with greater support for social justice. The "social capital" embodied in religious communities is more likely to "bond" individuals with those like them than to "bridge" them to those unlike them. Communities of high religiosity are generous in their giving and volunteering, but they are relatively low on measures of social action (marches, petitions, rallies) and relatively low on tolerance (for immigrants, gays, unpopular ideas in general). So from a civic perspective, the special challenge associated with faith-based civic engagement is to encourage greater tolerance for minority viewpoints and greater sensitivity to imperatives of social reform. However, our survey shows that faith-based communities have some matchless strengths as sources of civic engagement.

The opportunity and challenge of *diversity*

As in some earlier eras in American history, America is rapidly becoming a more diverse society. Just as the arrival of waves of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe at the end of the 19th century roiled our large cities in the short run but enriched our nation in the long run, so now many of our communities now face the challenges and opportunities associated with rapid growth of racial and ethnic minorities.

Generally speaking, Americans seem open to this new diversity, at least by traditional measures of racial prejudice, as captured, for example, in the stereotypical expression of intolerance, "Yes, but would you let your daughter marry one?" Our survey found remarkably low levels of opposition to a close relative marrying someone of a different race or ethnicity. For example, only 22% of Whites expressed any opposition to a close relative marrying a Black and 18% of Hispanics opposed this. [Others figures showing even lower opposition to racial intermarriage are given in the accompanying table.] Some of this apparent tolerance for intermarriage may reflect more recent norms that have made it less legitimate to express racial intolerance in public, but even that minimal sort of change marks a real shift in American mores.

Race/ethnicity of respondent

<i>National SCCBS data</i>	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics
Oppose somewhat or strongly a close relative marrying a black person	22%		18%
...marrying a Latino/Hispanic person	12%	9%	
...marrying an Asian person	11%	10%	12%
...marrying a white person		10%	10%

America's large, rapidly growing, ethnically diverse metropolitan communities, especially concentrated in the Sunbelt, constitute in some respects the most distinctive type of American community at the turn of the twenty-first century. Indeed, important social features of places like LA, Houston, Phoenix, and the Bay Area are also increasingly mirrored in places like Yakima, Minneapolis, and Boston. A primary asset of these communities is the richness of their multicultural "stew," adding chimichangas, *kimche*, and collard greens, both literally and metaphorically, to the traditional American cuisine.

Some aspects of this distinctive flavor appear in our community surveys. Compared to ethnically more homogeneous sites, the most diverse communities in our project report a higher density of ethnic, neighborhood, and self-help groups. Not surprisingly, perhaps, residents of ethnically diverse communities are more likely to report friendships with people of color and gays, as well as having a stronger sense of their own ethnic identity. Moreover, in some respects these diverse communities are also more tolerant: for example, the greater the ethnic diversity of a community, the *less* likely its residents are to say that "A book that most people disapprove of should be kept out of my local public library." Civil liberties, one might almost say, are safer in the hands of immigrants.

On the other hand, our survey results also make clear the serious challenges of building social capital in a large, ethnically diverse community. The more diverse a community in our study, the *less* likely its residents are:

- *to trust other people*. It is perhaps not surprising, given the inevitable ethnic tensions associated with rapid change, that interracial trust is substantially lower in ethnically diverse communities, but the pattern we find is much broader. Residents of ethnically diverse communities are less likely to trust people in their neighborhoods, the clerks where they shop, the people they work with, and even (quite remarkably) people of their *own* ethnic group. (In ethnically diverse communities, in other words, whites are less likely to trust other whites, Hispanics to trust other Hispanics, and so on.)
- *to connect with other people*, even informally. Residents of more diverse communities are more likely to be personally isolated; they claim fewer friends and confidants, spend less time socializing with friends and relatives, and have less sense of community with their friends. (Compared to people in the most ethnically homogeneous sites in our study, respondents in the most ethnically diverse communities were nearly twice as likely to say that that there was *no one*

or at most one other person "in your life with whom you can share confidences or discuss a difficult decision.")

- *to participate in politics.* People in more ethnically diverse communities are more likely to feel that "the people running my community don't really care much what happens to me." They are less likely to vote, to participate in demonstrations or protests, or to sign petitions. People at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder are especially disengaged from politics in ethnically diverse communities.
- *to connect across class lines.* Residents of ethnically diverse communities are less likely to number among their acquaintances someone who has been on welfare, a manual worker, a business owner, a vacation homeowner, or someone of a different religious faith. Although they are more likely to report having an acquaintance of a different race, they are *not* more likely to have invited those interracial acquaintances into their homes. Moreover, as we discuss below, class differences in levels of social capital are much greater in ethnically diverse communities.

Much of our survey was designed to measure the *amount* of social capital in various communities, but the data also allow us to assess the *social distribution* of social capital in those same communities. At any given *level* of social participation (say, 30 percent of the population attending public meetings), the *social distribution* of that participation could be quite different. The 30 percent who attend meetings could be drawn more or less proportionately from different income, and racial, and educational categories, in which case we would describe the distribution as "egalitarian." Or the 30 percent who attend meetings could be drawn entirely from the more privileged social strata—rich, well-educated, and white, so that rates of participation would be quite different at different levels of the local social hierarchy. In some communities, the bank president, the bank teller, and the bank janitor all turn out for community activities, but in other communities only the president does.

Generally speaking, our survey found disturbingly unequal access to social capital in most American communities. Rates of political participation, social participation, social trust, and the like are quite different in different social strata. For example, blacks/hispanics were less than half as likely to trust other people in their neighborhoods a lot as whites (56% of whites trusted people in their neighborhoods v. 21% for blacks and 19% for hispanics). Forty-six percent of whites had 6 or more close friends versus only 28% of blacks and 30% of hispanics. Sixteen percent of blacks and 26% of hispanics never spoke with their neighbors versus this being the case with only 6% of whites. Whites were more likely to vote and be registered to vote than blacks or hispanics (controlling for citizenship), and more likely than blacks and hispanics to work on community projects or sign a petition.⁵ In some sense, that is, our survey uncovered the

⁵ There were a few countertrends of blacks having more "non-family" members treated as family than whites or hispanics, or blacks going to marches and rallies more often than whites, or participating more in religious services, but these trends of lower civic participation and social capital were remarkably persistent.

social capital equivalent of the "digital divide." Americans who lack access to financial and human capital also lack access to social capital. Quite apart from increasing the *level* of civic engagement in American communities, we need to attend to its *social distribution*.

This problem of inequality in access to social capital is, it turns out, greatly exacerbated in ethnically diverse communities. More than size or wealth or education, it is ethnic diversity that distinguishes communities in which class differences in community involvement are greatest. In ethnically diverse places like Los Angeles, Houston, or Yakima (Washington), college graduates are four or five times more likely to be politically involved than their fellow residents who did not get past high school. In ethnically less diverse places like Montana or New Hampshire, the class gaps in political participation are less than half that large. In terms of civic activity, there is not much difference between a high-tech executive in Houston and a high-tech executive in Nashua (New Hampshire), but there is a very substantial difference between an auto mechanic in Houston and an auto mechanic in Nashua.

In short, the opportunities for social capital building in America's increasingly diverse communities are substantial, but the challenges are great, as well. Our evidence suggests that community activists in settings of unusual diversity need to redouble their efforts to build trust (and not just across racial lines), to reduce social isolation, to expand political participation and to bridge class barriers. If we are creative and thoughtful, we can build greater social connectedness in diverse places, and we will surely benefit, as we have in earlier periods of our history, from the rich diversity of multiculturalism.

Community connectedness linked to happiness and vibrant communities

Social capital and social trust matter a lot for both the quality of life in our communities and our personal happiness.

Social connectedness is a much stronger predictor of the perceived quality of life in a community than the community's income *or* educational level. In the five communities surveyed having the highest social trust, 52% of residents rated their community as an *excellent* place to live, the highest possible grade. In the five communities with the lowest levels of social trust, only 31% felt that good about their quality of life.

Similarly, personal happiness is also much more closely tied to the level of community social connectedness and trust than to income or educational levels. This is true, even controlling for individual characteristics, such as income, education, and so on. That is, even comparing two persons of identical income, education, race, age, and so on, the one living in a high social capital community typically reports greater personal happiness than his/her "twin" living in a low social capital community. The same thing is *not* true of the overall level of *community* income or education. In other words, your personal happiness is *not* directly affected by the affluence of your community, but it *is* quite directly affected by the social connectedness of your community.

Dimensions of social capital

Social capital, like intelligence, generally coheres as a core concept. Some people are smarter than others, and people adept at math are likely to be good at poetry; which is why one can speak of IQs (Intelligence Quotients). However, at a finer grain, there are different types of intelligence—the best mathematicians are not the best poets, and neither are they necessarily emotionally intelligent.

The same is true of social capital. Among literally hundreds of different measures of social capital in the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey, some people (or communities) broadly are more (or less) socially connected. People with lots of friends are more likely to vote more, to attend church more often, and to bowl in leagues. This means that you can speak of a person (or a community) as being generally high (or low) in social capital. On the other hand, closer examination reveals different sub-dimensions (comparable to the difference between mathematical, verbal, emotional, and spatial intelligence).

What follows is a brief description of the 11 different facets of social capital that have emerged from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey. There are two dimensions of "*social trust*" (whether you trust others), two measures of *political participation*, two measures of *civic leadership and associational involvement*, a measure of *giving and volunteering*, a measure of *faith-based engagement*, a measure of *informal social ties*, a measure of the *diversity of our friendships*, and a measure of the *equality of civic engagement* at a community level.

Trust

Social trust: at the core of social capital is the question of whether you can trust other people. Often this trust is forged with specific people through common participation in groups, associations, and activities. Nevertheless, when this trust transcends from trust of *specific* individuals to generalized trust, it is extraordinarily valuable. Much like cash is more efficient than barter (because it eliminates the need to negotiate each transaction), generalized social trust is extremely important in lubricating social interaction and getting things accomplished. Our first index of social trust combines trust of people in one's neighborhood, coworkers, shop clerks, co-religionists, local police, and finally "most people."

Inter-racial trust: as we've discussed earlier, a critical challenge facing communities attempting to build social capital is the fact that it is simply harder to do in places that are more diverse. The measure of inter-racial trust looks at the extent to which different racial groups (whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) trust one another and is thus one proxy for the health of inter-racial relations in a community.

Diversity of friendships: equally important to their levels of social trust are how diverse people's social networks are. Since it was impractical in a 25 minute phone survey to ask each person surveyed to list all the people he/she knew and to describe each one, we asked (as a proxy) whether the respondent had a personal friend who is a: business owner, was on welfare, owned a vacation home, is gay, is a manual worker, is White, is

Black, is Hispanic, is Asian, is a community leader, and was of a different faith. Then we added up how many of these 11 categories each respondent mentioned. This index thus broadly measures the degree to which people's social networks (and collectively a community's networks) are diverse. These "bridging ties" are especially valuable in producing community solidarity and in forging a larger consensus on how communities need to change or work together.

Political participation

Conventional politics participation: One of the key measures for how engaged we are in communities is the extent to which we are involved politically. This measure looks at how many in our communities are registered to vote, actually vote, express interest in politics, are knowledgeable about political affairs and read the newspaper regularly.

Protest politics participation: The data in the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey indicate that many communities that exhibit low levels of participation in conventional/electoral ways, nonetheless exhibit high levels of participation in protest forms, such as taking part in marches, demonstrations, boycotts, rallies, participating in groups that took action for local reform, participating in labor and ethnically-related groups. This dimension is a composite of those types of participation.

Civic leadership and associational involvement: Many people typically get involved locally by joining groups that they care about (be they veterans groups, sports groups, literary groups, or new age poetry clubs). We measured such engagement in two ways:

Civic Leadership: this is a composite measure both of how frequently respondents were engaged in groups, clubs and local discussions of town or school affairs, and also whether the respondent took a leadership role within these groups. Communities that rank high on this aspect of social capital benefit from a hum of civic activity.

Associational involvement: we measured associational involvement across 18 broad categories of groups (including an "other" category). Respondents were asked about participation in the following types of groups: organizations affiliated with religion; sports clubs, leagues, or outdoor activities; youth organizations; parent associations or other school support groups; veterans groups; neighborhood associations; seniors groups; charity or social welfare organizations; labor unions; professional, trade, farm or business associations; service or fraternal organizations; ethnic, nationality, or civil rights organizations; political groups; literary, art, or musical groups; hobby, investment, or garden clubs; self-help programs; groups that meet only over the Internet; and any other type of groups or associations.

Informal socializing: While many communities (or individuals) are either higher or lower generally in social capital, some communities or individuals are more likely to develop social connections through formal memberships and associations ("machers") and others are more likely to develop these connections through informal friendships ("schmoozers"). While the "civic leadership" and "associational involvement" measures above capture the formal social ties, the "informal socializing" dimension measures the degree to which residents had friends over to their home, hung out with friends in a

public place, socialized with co-workers outside of work, played cards or board games with others, and visited with relatives.

Giving and volunteering: One of the ways that Americans express their concern for others is through giving to charity or volunteering. Various aspects of generosity go together: people who are generous with their purse are also generous with their time. The same is true of communities. This dimension measures how often community residents volunteer at various venues and how generous they are in giving.

Faith-based engagement: religion in America is a big part of social capital. Roughly one-half of all American connectedness is religious or religiously affiliated, whether measured by memberships, volunteering time, or philanthropy. Thus, this dimension matters a lot to overall levels of community connection. This measure of faith-based engagement looks at: religious attendance and membership, participation in church activities besides services, participation in organization affiliated with religion, giving to religious causes and volunteering at place of worship.

Equality of civic engagement across the community: in some communities the ranks of the civic are much more heavily skewed towards those who are wealthier, more educated, and whiter. In other communities, the poor, less educated, and people of color participate at rates much closer to their wealthier, whiter and more educated brethren. Since it is important to the community health, this measure scores highly those communities with more egalitarian civic participation. [This measure is an average correlation across 8 different types of civic participation and across three measures of class (race, income, and education) to see how skewed civic participation in a community is.]

Variation between communities/community analysis

While the survey contained a national reference sample, the heart of the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey consisted of 40 American communities taking stock of their levels of local social capital. A website for the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey at: <http://www.cfsv.org/communitysurvey> highlights what each of the communities believe is interesting about their data, and compares the communities on the 11 key social capital dimensions discussed above: social trust, inter-racial trust, conventional politics participation, protest politics participation, civic leadership, associational involvement, informal socializing, diversity of friendships, giving and volunteering, faith-based engagement, and equality of civic engagement across the community.

Note: we have chosen to compare the communities using what we call "Community Quotients." We have done so since the communities sampled are so varied and since the choice of whom to poll was left entirely up to the partnering institutions. We needed to standardize the comparisons so that one community choosing only to sample the inner city would not be compared falsely to another community surveying the entire metro area and so that a rural community could be compared to an urban one.⁶

⁶ Unadjusted, along some dimensions there are huge discrepancies in the results, for example: social trust ("do you think most others can be trusted or you can't be too careful") ranges from 36% believing that most

Along every dimension of social capital (such as social trust, faith-based participation, etc.) a **community quotient** (CQ) score shows a community's performance on this dimension relative to what was predicted given its urbanicity, ethnicity, levels of education and age distribution. A score *above* 100 indicates that a community shows more of this community connectedness than its demographics would predict; conversely, a score below 100 indicates that a community shows *less* of this type of social capital than its demographics would suggest. Roughly 68% of all communities would fall in the 85-115 range, and almost 95% of all communities would fall in the 70-130 range.

Survey design, methodology, and other housekeeping details

The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey was designed by the Saguro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, a project at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The principal investigator on this project was Prof. Robert D. Putnam, and the survey drew upon the lessons learned from a Social Capital Measurement Workshop held at Harvard University in October 1999. In addition, there was a Scientific Advisory Committee convened to advise on survey construction, consisting of some of the leading scholars on measuring social capital and cross-racial social trends.⁷ All efforts were made, where possible to use questions extensively tested in previous surveys.

The survey, averaging 26 minutes, was conducted by telephone using random-digit-dialing during July to November, 2000, although interviewing in the national survey and in most of the community surveys was concluded by October. TNS Intersearch, an international survey firm, was commissioned to conduct the interviewing, and prepare the data for analysis. Roughly 29,200 people were surveyed. The national sample (N = 3,003) of the continental U.S. contains an over-sampling of black and Hispanic respondents; 501 non-Hispanic blacks were surveyed and 502 Hispanics participated.

In addition, each sponsoring organization (largely community foundations) decided on the size and sampling geography for each community sample. Most of the samples range in size from 500-1,500 interviews. (A complete list of communities surveyed, their sample size and geographic definition are shown in Table 1 below.)⁸

others can be trusted in one community to 75% in another; or the percent saying they signed a petition in the last 12 months ranged from 17% in one community to 60% in another.

⁷ The members of the Scientific Advisory Committee were Lawrence Bobo (Harvard University Department of Sociology), Xavier de Souza Briggs (Harvard University Kennedy School of Government), Michael delli Carpini (Columbia University Department of Political Science), Michael Dawson (University of Chicago Chairman of the Department of Political Science), Tom Guterbock (U. Virginia), Robert D. Putnam (Harvard University Department of Government and Kennedy School of Government), Wendy Rahn (University of Minnesota Department of Political Science), Robert Sampson (University of Chicago Department of Sociology), and J. Phillip Thompson (Columbia University Department of Political Science).

⁸ In most cases, the survey area was one county or a cluster of contiguous counties; some of the community samples are municipalities and others are entire states. Most of the community surveys called for proportionate sampling, that is, no over- or under-sampling of sub-areas or population groups.

The confidence interval for the various communities is given in Table 2 below and ranges from +/- 2.1% for the national sample to +/- 5.8% for some communities like Seattle.

Response rates averaged 28.9% for the community samples and 28.7% for the national sample, using the AAPOR RR2 formula. The adjusted cooperation rates, examining the percent of those contacted who agreed to participate and completed the interview, were 41.6% for the community samples and 42.3% for the national sample.⁹

Up to 10 additional callbacks after the initial call were made to try to get respondents to participate and calls were made at various times of the day and various days of the week, spread out over the call period. All but very hard refusals were attempted to be converted into participants.

The survey data, codebook, and survey instrument itself will be made available to researchers through the Roper Center & Institute for Social Inquiry in Storrs, Connecticut, as soon as possible after the release of the survey results.

⁹ To gauge the extent to which the results of a survey are representative, pollsters commonly use two measures: response rate and cooperation rate. Both are expressed as percentages. Response rate refers to the number of completed interviews relative to the estimated number of eligible individuals (or households) whose phone numbers were dialed at least once. [The calculation ignores *ineligible* phone numbers such as numbers that are no longer working, fax machines, business numbers, etc.] For individuals who were not contacted (due to devices like answering machines and caller ID or due to non-answered phone numbers), the response rate estimates the number of eligible respondents.

The cooperation rate refers to the percentage of completed interviews out of the number of eligible individuals *who were contacted*. The cooperation rate is equal to 100% less the percent of eligible individuals contacted who refused to complete an interview (refusal rate). Because the cooperation rate does not include those who could not be contacted, it is almost always higher than the response rate. Both are important measures of the quality of the data and results, but some researchers worry more about low cooperation rates because they fear that persons who *consciously refuse* to participate are more likely to hold different survey-relevant views than those who do. In theory, of course, some of those who "cannot be contacted" may also be consciously avoiding being surveyed (through caller ID, etc.). In addition, in theory those who are hard to contact may also hold different views from those easier to contact.

The AAPOR (the American Association of Public Opinion Researchers) RR2 formula for response rates is: $RR2 = I / (I + R + NC + O + e(UH))$, where: I = the number of completed interviews; R = the number of refusals and terminations; NC = the number of households where the designated respondent was not reached (and there was no explicit refusal); O = other (health or language barriers); UH = unknown eligibility / unknown if household – mostly repeated busy signal or Caller ID block. The proportion of unknowns estimated to be eligible (*e*) was .25. In most samples, there was no geographic or race/ethnicity screening, so all adults qualified (incidence = 100%).

In the community surveys where screening occurred (as in the national survey), incidence was less than 100% – requiring an adjustment to make the screened and unscreened sample response rates comparable. The adjustment consisted of multiplying the sum of the non-response categories in the denominator of the formula [R, NC, O, *e*(UH)] by the estimated incidence and recalculating RR2. The incidence proportion was calculated as the sum of (the completed interviews plus partial interviews plus terminates) divided by the sum of (the completed interviews plus partial interviews plus terminates plus the number of households screened and determined to be ineligible).

The Adjusted Cooperation Rate uses the same logic as the RR2 Response Rate – only it deletes the NC, O, and *e*(UH) terms from the denominator.

Table 1
Communities Surveyed, Geography of Area, and Sample Size

Sponsor	Area	Sample Size	
		Goal	Actual
Arizona Community Foundation	Maricopa County	500	501
Community Foundation for Greater Atlanta	Counties: DeKalb, Fulton, Cobb, Rockdale, Henry	500	510
Forum 35/Baton Rouge Area Foundation	East Baton Rouge Parish	500	500
Community Foundation of Greater Birmingham (AL)	Counties: Jefferson, Shelby	500	500
Boston Foundation	City of Boston (includes oversample of 200 in 4 zip codes)	600	604
Community Foundation Serving Boulder County	Boulder Co.	500	500
Foundation for the Carolinas	Counties: N.C.: Catawba, Iredell, Rowan, Cleveland, Lincoln, Gaston, Mecklenburg, Cabarrus, Stanly, Union, Anson; S.C.: York, Chester, Lancaster	1500	1500
Central NY Community Foundation	Onondaga Co (includes City of Syracuse)	500	541
Chicago Community Trust	Counties: Lake, McHenry, Cook, DuPage, Kane and Will.	750	750
Greater Cincinnati Foundation	Counties: OH: Butler, Clermont, Hamilton, Warren; KY: Boone, Campbell, Kenton; IN: Dearborn	1000	1001
Cleveland Foundation	Cuyahoga Co. (includes oversample of 100 Latinos)	1100	1100
Delaware Division of State Service Centers/Delaware Community Foundation	Kent County (342), Sussex County (342), city of Wilmington (342), non-Wilmington New Castle County (342)	1368	1379
Denver Foundation / Rose Community Foundation / Piton Foundation	City and County of Denver	500	501
East Tennessee Foundation	Counties: Anderson, Blount, Campbell, Claiborne, Cocke, Grainger, Greene, Hamblen, Hawkins, Hancock, Jefferson, Knox, Loudon, Monroe, McMinn, Morgan, Roane, Scott, Sevier, Union, Unicoi, and Washington.	500	500
Fremont Area Community Foundation (MI)	Newaygo County (with screening)	750	753
Grand Rapids Community Foundation	City of Grand Rapids	500	502
Community Foundation of Greater Greensboro	Guilford County, (includes oversample of 250 in Greensboro)	750	750
Greater Houston Community Foundation	Harris county	500	500
Indiana Grantmakers Alliance	State of Indiana	1000	1001
Greater Kanawha Valley Foundation	Counties: Kanawha, Putnam, Boone	500	500
Kalamazoo Community Foundation	Kalamazoo County	500	500
California Community Foundation	Los Angeles County	500	515
Maine Community Foundation	Cities/Towns: Lewiston, Auburn, Greene, Sabattus, Lisbon, Mechanic Falls, Poland, Turner, Wales, Minot	500	523
Montana Community Foundation	State of Montana	500	502

Sponsor	Area	Sample Size	
		Goal	Actual
New Hampshire Charitable Foundation	State of NH. (includes oversample of 160 in Cheshire County and 40 in I-93 corridor ^{h*})	700	711
Peninsula Community Foundation /Community Foundation Silicon Valley	Counties: San Mateo, Santa Clara Part of Alameda County: Fremont, Newark, Union City	1500	1505
Rochester Area Community Foundation	Counties: Monroe, Wayne, Ontario, Livingston, Genesee, Orleans (includes oversample to achieve minimum of 100 Latinos and 100 African Americans)	900	988
The Saint Paul Foundation	Counties: Dakota, Ramsey, Washington	500	503
The San Diego Foundation	San Diego County	500	504
Walter & Elise Haas Fund	City & County of San Francisco	500	500
Community Foundation for Southeastern Michigan	Counties: Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, St.Clair, Washtenaw, Monroe, Livingston	500	501
The Winston-Salem Foundation	Forsyth County	750	750
York Foundation (PA)	York County	500	500
Northwest Area Foundation			
Minneapolis	City of Minneapolis	500	501
North Minneapolis	ZIP 55411 & ZIP 55405 north of I-394 (with screening)	450	452
Rural South Dakota	rural South Dakota	375	368
Central OR	central Oregon	500	500
Seattle	City of Seattle	500	502
Yakima	Yakima County	500	500
Bismarck	City of Bismarck	500	506

^h Defined as: in Hillsborough County: Nashua, Hudson, Pelham, Litchfield, Merrimack, Bedford, Goffstown, Manchester, Hollis, Amherst; in Rockingham County: Salem, Windham, Derry, Londonderry

Table 2
Effective Sample Sizes and 95% Confidence Intervals for Percentage Estimates
(for estimates near 50%; estimates farther from 50%
will have narrower confidence ranges)

	Final Sample	Statistical Efficiency	Effective Sample Size	95% Con- fidence (±)
Atlanta Metro (GA)	510	0.802	409	4.8%
Baton Rouge (LA)	500	0.820	410	4.8%
Birmingham Metro (AL)	500	0.780	390	5.0%
Bismarck (ND)	506	0.835	422	4.8%
Boston (MA) [city]	604	0.473	285	5.8%
Boulder County (CO)	500	0.802	401	4.9%
Central Oregon	500	0.801	400	4.9%
Charlotte (NC) [14-county region]	1500	0.800	1200	2.8%
Chicago Metro (IL)	750	0.766	574	4.1%
Cincinnati Metro (OH)	1001	0.796	796	3.5%
Cleveland / Cuyahoga Co. (OH)	1100	0.687	755	3.6%
Delaware	1383	0.570	788	3.5%
Denver (CO) (city/cty.)	501	0.762	381	5.0%
Detroit (MI) [Metro - 7 co. area]	501	0.766	383	5.0%
East Tennessee	500	0.805	402	4.9%
Fremont / Newaygo Co. (MI)	753	0.750	564	4.1%
Grand Rapids (MI) [city]	502	0.737	369	5.1%
Greensboro / Guilford Co. (NC)	752	0.789	593	4.0%
Houston / Harris Co. (TX)	500	0.841	420	4.8%
Indiana	1001	0.673	673	3.8%
Kalamazoo Co. (MI)	500	0.801	400	4.9%
Kanawha Valley (WV)	500	0.731	365	5.1%
Lewiston-Auburn (ME)	523	0.804	420	4.8%
Los Angeles Co. (CA)	515	0.733	377	5.0%
Minneapolis (MN)	501	0.688	344	5.3%
Montana	502	0.795	399	4.9%
New Hampshire	711	0.638	453	4.6%
North Minneapolis (MN)	452	0.732	330	5.4%
Peninsula / Silicon Valley (CA)	1505	0.717	1079	3.0%
Phoenix / Maricopa Cty. (AZ)	501	0.698	349	5.2%
Rochester Metro (NY)	988	0.744	735	3.6%
San Diego Co. (CA)	504	0.578	291	5.7%
San Francisco (CA) [city]	500	0.641	320	5.5%
S. Dakota (rural)	368	0.769	282	5.8%
Seattle (WA)	502	0.566	284	5.8%
St. Paul Metro (MN)	503	0.740	372	5.1%
Syracuse / Onondaga Co. (NY)	541	0.797	431	4.7%
Winston-Salem / Forsyth Co. (NC)	750	0.778	583	4.1%
Yakima (WA)	500	0.807	403	4.9%
York (PA)	500	0.808	404	4.9%
National sample	3003	0.687	2063	2.1%

